Hart v. City of Johnson City
Decision Date | 03 December 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 47,47 |
Citation | 801 S.W.2d 512 |
Parties | Edna Ruth HART, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. CITY OF JOHNSON CITY, Tennessee, Defendant/Appellee. 801 S.W.2d 512 |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Charlton R. DeVault, Jr., John S. McLellan, III, Michael May, Kingsport, for plaintiffs/appellants.
James H. Epps, III, City Atty., James D. Culp, Staff Atty., Johnson City, David H. Hornik, Evans, Jones & Reynolds, Nashville J. Wesley Edens, Bristol, for defendant/appellee.
This case requires this Court to determine the constitutionality of the 1984 amendment to Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 6-51-103--the statute authorizing suits to contest municipal annexations. The amendment permits property owners adjacent to property annexed by municipal ordinance to bring a quo warranto action contesting the reasonableness of the annexation. However, by population classification it excludes adjacent property owners in 81 of 95 Tennessee counties from the amendment's provisions.
The plaintiffs insist that the population classifications set out in the 1984 amendment are unconstitutional because they violate Article XI, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution 1, which provides that the Legislature shall by general law provide the exclusive method by which municipal boundaries may be altered.
The trial judge upheld the constitutionality of the 1984 amendment and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs, as adjoining property owners, lacked standing to file a quo warranto action because the annexation took place in Sullivan County, one of the counties excluded by the classification provisions of the 1984 amendment.
We conclude that the entire 1984 amendment violates Article XI, Section 9, the Municipal Boundaries Clause of the Tennessee Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional for the reasons that follow.
The defendant, City of Johnson City, passed an ordinance annexing a portion of the Piney Flats community lying along Highway 11E in Sullivan County, Tennessee, in response to a petition initiated by property owners and residents of the Piney Flats community requesting the annexation. Johnson City is a municipal corporation maintaining its city offices in Washington County.
On May 20, 1988, plaintiffs, Sullivan County and certain individuals who own property bordering but not within the annexation area, filed a quo warranto suit in Washington County Chancery Court to challenge the reasonableness of the annexation ordinance. Prior to 1984, only aggrieved owners of property within the territory to be annexed could contest by quo warranto action an annexation ordinance. In 1984 the Legislature enacted Chapter 642, Public Acts of Tennessee, 1984, which amended Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 6-51-103 to allow adjoining property owners to contest annexation by ordinance as well, but excluded certain counties by population classifications. Sullivan County property owners are excluded from the standing conferred upon adjacent property owners by the express population classifications of the 1984 amendment. 2
The pertinent parts of the challenged statute are set out below. The 1984 amendment language added by Chapter 642 of the Public Acts is underlined for clarity.
6-51-103. Quo warranto to contest annexation ordinance--Appellate review.--(a)(1)(A) Any aggrieved owner of property which borders or lies within territory which is the subject of an annexation ordinance prior to the operative date thereof, may file a suit in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding in accordance with this part, Sec. 6-51-301 and title 29, chapter 35 to contest the validity thereof on the ground that it reasonably may not be deemed necessary for the welfare of the residents and property owners of the affected territory and the municipality as a whole and so constitutes an exercise of power not conferred by law....
(B) The provisions of this subdivision (a)(1) shall not apply to the counties covered by subdivision (a)(2).
(2)(A) Any aggrieved owner of property lying within territory which is the subject of an annexation ordinance prior to the operative date thereof, may file a suit in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding in accordance with this part and Sec. 6-51-301 and chapter 35 of title 29, to contest the validity thereof on the ground that it reasonably may not be deemed necessary for the welfare of the residents and property owners of the affected territory and the municipality as a whole and so constitutes an exercise of power not conferred by law.
(B) The provisions of this subdivision (a)(2) shall apply only in counties having a metropolitan form of government and in counties having populations of:
not less than nor more than
4,000 43,000
14,940 15,000
43,700 44,700
49,400 49,500
58,000 59,000
67,300 67,400
74,500 74,600
100,000 250,000
475,000 480,000
according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, and in any county with a population of not less than two hundred eight-five thousand (285,000) and not more than two-hundred ninety thousand (290,000) based upon the 1980 federal census.
(b) The municipality shall have the burden of proving that an annexation ordinance is reasonable for the overall well-being of the communities involved.
(Emphasis added.) The 1984 amendment also contained a severability clause 3 which was not reprinted in the statute as codified.
The defendant, City of Johnson City, filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' suit on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to file an action contesting the annexation because they resided in Sullivan County, a county excluded from the 1984 amendment's provisions by population classification. The trial judge sustained the motion to dismiss, finding the 1984 amendment constitutional. From this judgment plaintiffs have appealed to this Court.
The plaintiffs argue that the population classifications of the 1984 amendment unconstitutionally restrict the general right of adjoining property owners in certain counties from contesting an annexation. They insist Article XI, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that the exclusive method of altering municipal boundaries is by general law, and that population classifications depriving Sullivan County property owners of a right granted to other county property owners cannot be constitutional and are irrational.
Johnson City argues that under the terms of the 1984 amendment, Sullivan County has no standing to file a quo warranto action contesting the annexation; that as a matter of law, an adjoining property owner cannot be aggrieved and therefore no population classification would be unconstitutional; and that the amendment is constitutional because the classification was reasonable.
This Court has upheld the use of population classifications in legislation which has rendered general statutes applicable in several, but not all, counties in which the Court found a rational basis for the classification. See, e.g., Bates v. Alexander, 749 S.W.2d 742 (Tenn.1988) ( ); Baker v. State, 191 Tenn. 559, 235 S.W.2d 435 (1950) ( ); Reasonover v. City of Memphis, 162 Tenn. 633, 39 S.W.2d 1029 (1931) ( ); Darnall v. Shapard, 156 Tenn. 544, 3 S.W.2d 661 (1928) ( ).
We have also upheld legislation which has rendered general statutes applicable in only one county, where we found a rational basis for the classification. See, e.g., Shelby County Civil Service Merit Bd. v. Lively, 692 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn.1985) ( ); Harwell v. Leech, 672 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn.1984) ( ); Peterson v. Grissom, 194 Tenn. 26, 250 S.W.2d 3 (1952) ( ); Elliott v. Fuqua, 185 Tenn. 200, 204 S.W.2d 1016 (1947) ( ); Knox County v. State ex rel. Nighbert, 177 Tenn. 171, 147 S.W.2d 100 (1940) ( ); cf. Canale v. Steveson, 224 Tenn. 578, 458 S.W.2d 797 (1970) ( ).
In each of the foregoing cases, the relevant statutes were challenged as violative of Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, which provides that the legislature has no power to suspend any general law for the benefit of a particular individual inconsistent with the general laws of the land. Article XI, Section 8 has been interpreted as prohibiting passage of laws to benefit specific counties or cities as well as individuals, White v. Davidson County, 210 Tenn. 456, 360 S.W.2d 15 (1962), unless the special classification rests on a reasonable basis. City of Chattanooga v. Harris, 223 Tenn. 51, 58, 442 S.W.2d 602, 605 (1969). See also Stalcup v. City of Gatlinburg, 577 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn.1978); State ex rel. Brown v. Bates, 553 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn.1977); Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657, 430 S.W.2d 345 (1968).
However, we have never upheld class legislation in annexation statutes. Such statutes are subject to an entirely different constitutional prohibition, the Municipal Boundaries Clause found in art. XI, Sec. 9. See footnote 1, supra. The Municipal Boundaries Clause is couched in "unambiguous mandatory language," and was adopted to remedy "the great evils that had...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Gunter v. U. C.H.R.a. & Poore
...party attacking the statute. Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657, 430 S.W.2d 345 (1968). Stalcup, 577 S.W.2d at 442. In Hart v. City of Johnson City, 801 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1990), the Tennessee Supreme Court listed cases in which the use of population classifications in legislation which rendered ......
-
State v. Boyd
...basis. The burden of showing that the classification is not reasonable is upon the party attacking the statute. Hart v. City of Johnson City, 801 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tenn.1990); Harwell v. Leech, 672 S.W.2d 761, 763-64 (Tenn.1984). However, the defendant fails to specify what makes the populat......
-
Highwoods Properties, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. W2007-00454-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 11/27/2007)
...population classifications that excluded residents of certain counties from application of the amendment. See Hart v. City of Johnson City, 801 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1990). As such, only owners of property lying within the territory have standing to bring a quo warranto action pursuant to ......
-
Martinez v. Lawhon
...that the legislature would have passed the act with [the unconstitutional portion of the statute] omitted." Hart v. City of Johnson City, 801 S.W.2d 512, 518 (Tenn. 1990) (internal citations omitted). Section 50-6-241(e)(2)(B)(ii) cannot be elided because it is not "fairly clear of doubt" t......