Hart v. Cole

Decision Date22 June 1892
Citation156 Mass. 475,31 N.E. 644
PartiesHART v. COLE.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

H.F Naphen, for plaintiff.

E.M Johnson, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

This case presents for consideration important questions which have never been decided in this commonwealth. The defendant was a tenant for life of a building consisting of several tenements, which she let to different tenants, who used the outside steps in common as a means of access to their tenements. These steps were in the possession of the defendant, and it was her duty to keep them in a reasonably safe condition for the use of her tenants, and of other persons who were using them by her invitation, express or implied. There was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff, while coming from a wake in one of the tenements was injured in passing down the steps by a defect negligently suffered by the defendant to be there. The deceased person was a brother of the wife of one of the tenants, and there was no evidence that he was an acquaintance of the plaintiff or that she was expressly invited to the wake, or that she was in any way related to any of the occupants of the house. The jury were instructed that the defendant was liable to any one injured by a defect negligently suffered to be in the steps if the injured person was lawfully going to or from the house in the exercise of due care, having lawful business there, and if the steps were apparently designed and intended as a means of access to the house and of egress from it. In Plummer v. Dill, 31 N.E. 128, we considered at some length the question whether an owner of real estate fitted up for use in business is liable for its unsafe condition to one who goes there on business of his own not connected with the business actually or apparently carried on there; and it was held that such a person is a mere licensee, to whom the owner owes no further duty than to refrain from putting traps or pitfalls in his way, and from negligently doing injurious acts to his prejudice. We have now to consider how far an owner of a dwelling house is liable for its condition to one who comes there without express invitation, and not for the transaction of any kind of business carried on by any of the occupants; and also what should be deemed an implied invitation in a case of that kind. The defendant is liable to a visitor of the tenant for the condition of the steps if the tenant himself would have been liable had the steps been included in the tenement let, and not otherwise. It seems clear that one coming to a dwelling house to do business in which he alone is interested cannot expect a warmer welcome, or claim greater care for his safety, than if he went for the same purpose to the place of business of the occupant. In either case he is a mere licensee. In preparing a convenient entrance to his house one does not invite there peddlers, book agents, and others who come solely for their own convenience or profit. So far as they are concerned, his preparation of his premises for travel is an indifferent act. It has no such relation to them as it has to those who come to do business which he carries on there. The inducement, invitation, and implied representation of safety which he holds out to the latter are not for them, and the law imposes no affirmative obligation, and creates no active duty, to those who come as volunteers. He merely gives them free license and permission to use his premises, and impliedly agrees that he will not set traps for...

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42 cases
  • Mounsey v. Ellard
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 6, 1973
    ...a licensee. The problem existed at least as early as 1892, as indicated by the following language in our decision in Hart v. Cole, 156 Mass. 475, 477--478, 31 N.E. 644, 645: '(W)hether an implied invitation to come as a guest for friendly intercourse can create a liability greater than that......
  • Massaletti v. Fitzroy
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • October 29, 1917
    ...of care required is that of licensor and licensee (Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426, 31 N. E. 128,32 Am. St. Rep. 463;Hart v. Cole, 156 Mass. 475, 31 N. E. 644,16 L. R. A. 557), which, as has often been said, requires only that the licensor shall not set traps for the licensee and shall refra......
  • Cook v. Cole
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • January 12, 1931
    ...going upon the land for their own purposes (see Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426, 31 N. E. 128,32 Am. St. Rep. 463;Hart v. Cole, 156 Mass. 475, 31 N. E. 644,16 L. R. A. 557;Glaser v. Congregation Kehillath Israel, 263 Mass. 435, 161 N. E. 619) are distinguishable because of the difference in ......
  • Glaser v. Congregation Kehillath Israel
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 28, 1928
    ...invitation, cannot recover for ordinary negligence of the defendant, as, for example, one who attends a wake or a funeral. Hart v. Cole, 156 Mass. 475, 31 N. E. 644;Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426, 31 N. E. 128,32 Am. St. Rep. 463;Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 507, 508, 118 N. E. 168......
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