Hart v. Columbus
| Decision Date | 03 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 46762,No. 2,46762,2 |
| Citation | 125 Ga.App. 625,188 S.E.2d 422 |
| Parties | Sarah S. HART et al. v. COLUMBUS, Georgia et al |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Grogan, Jones & Layfield, Milton Jones, Martelle Layfield, Jr., Columbus, for appellants.
Lennie Davis, Charles A. Gower, Columbus, for appellees. Syllabus Opinion by the Court
This appeal involves a declaratory judgment action challenging the manner in which the governing authorities of Columbus, Georgia, sought to comply with the charter requirements that created the consolidation of the city and county of Muscogee County and the City of Columbus.
In a laudable effort to improve the quality of their local governments which they believed would result from a consolidation, the citizens of Muscogee County prevailed upon the General Assembly to propose a constitutional amendment for consolidation. (Ga.L.1968, p. 1508, et seq.) This amendment was approved at the November 1968 General Election and authorized the legislature to provide for creation of a charter commission to study all matters relating to the consolidation of the governments of the City of Columbus and the County of Muscogee, 'for the establishment of a successor government and drafting of a proposed charter for submission to the voters of Muscogee County and the City of Columbus and for other purposes.' Acting under this authority, the General Assembly passed an Act creating the Muscogee County Charter Commission. (Ga.L.1969, pp. 3571, et seq.) The commission's proposed charter was then submitted to the electorate. Upon their approval a new body politic known as 'Columbus, Georgia' came into existence on January 1, 1971, with all of the governmental and corporate powers, duties and functions held prior to its creation by the City of Columbus and by Muscogee County.
Not only was there a consolidation of the city and county governments but a new and unique concept of ad valorem taxation was provided for in the charter, namely dividing the geographical territory into two or more taxing districts called 'Services Districts' with ad valorem taxes varying according to governmental services rendered within each of these districts.
The excellent brief filed by appellants eloquently states:
Refusing to accept the cynical aphorism, 'You can't fight City Hall', the appellant citizens instituted a declaratory judgment, contesting the manner in which the governmental authorities had undertaken to comply with the charter requirements.
The attacks have their genesis in those sections of the charter which directed the first council of the consolidated government to divide the territory into two or more taxing districts called 'Services Districts.' At least one of such districts to be known as 'General Services District' was to consist of the total area in Muscogee County and with a differentiation as to the other services districts based on 'additional or higher levels of services than are provided throughout the territory of the consolidated government.' A differential is made between those services generally available to all residents throughout the total area and those additional services 'which benefit primarily the residents of such urban services districts.' Direction is given as to the manner in which these urban services districts are to be 'created, expanded, merged, consolidated or reduced.' The charter further directs that the ad valorem taxes shall be assessed 'in such a way as to reasonably reflect the kind, character, type, degree and level of services afforded to such urban services taxing district or districts.'
Following a study, the extent of which we refer to hereinafter, two ordinances were adopted. One adopted March 9, 1971, known as No. 71-53 established the geographical territories for each taxing or services district. The second ordinance carrying No. 71-184 was adopted on June 22, 1971, and after reaffirming the previous ordinance and the boundaries for each of the 'services districts' established the various tax millages that were to be levied in each of the districts and specified the amount for each governmental service.
City council created four services districts. The first was the General Services District with a millage levy of 9.3 for three items: general operating expenses, bonded indebtedness, and medical center. The other three urban services districts which are known respectively as USD 1, USD 2 and USD 3 had their millage varied according to the services to be rendered which services were divided into four categories in addition to the three described for the General Services District. These four categories are fire protection, public works and public safety (less fire), paving and sewer. USD 1 consisted of the city area prior to the annexation that had occurred December 31, 1969, and had a total millage of 26.9 including retirement of prior bond issues. USD 2 encompassed that area which had been annexed as of December 31, 1969, with a total millage of 24.8. USD 3 was everything outside of the area and had a total millage of 20.5. Each district varies as to population and available services.
Appellants point out that USD 3 is essentially rural and agrarian in nature and cannot receive the same services in certain respects as those who are in the concentrated downtown area. Even those who reside in USD 1 claim a differential with respect to public protection and to public services because certain areas in this district have a six day a week garbage collection and have a policeman walking a 24-hour beat as contrasted to other USD 1 properties receiving only twice a week garbage collection and without similar 24-hour police protection.
In addition to attacking the two ordinances as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article I, Section I, Paragraphs II and III of the State Constitution the essence of appellants' complaint is that the two ordinances are invalid 'on the ground that the same arbitrarily, capriciously, and unreasonably established said taxing and servicing districts based on geographical boundaries of previous city limits of the City of Columbus and are not in accordance with the requirements and mandate . . . 'to reasonably reflect the kind, character, type, degree and level of services afforded' . . .'
The contentions for both sides were capably and fully presented during a trial that occupied two days. In addition to the oral testimony contained in the transcript we have had the benefit of exhibits which included the charter, maps, charts, and the two ordinances along with a copy of the minutes of a public meeting held January 25, 1971.
A review of the trial transcript shows the steps taken by the governmental officials to comply with the mandate given by the people. Prior to January 1, 1971, a study commission was created headed by City Councilman Jack Land consisting of him and two other members of the city council. They consulted with the acting city manager, city administrator, city engineer, city attorney, a representative from the Department of Property Appraisers, a member of the charter commission, and with two representatives of the planning commission. They held four formal meetings. They wrote to Jacksonville, Florida, and Nashville, Tennessee, for copies of their charters with questions as to the manner in which these two innovative communities had handled their taxing problem after mergers of their city and county governments. Although appellants complain that the problems were too great to be solved in 8 to 10 hours of meetings the evidence shows that each of the members individually studied the problems and 'gave thought to the ideas that were presented in each of the meetings and attempted to prepare themselves for the next meetings by developing suggestive formulas and so forth and setting tax rates.' (Transcript, p. 65.) It is further shown that the news media covered these meetings even though invitations were not extended to the public.
Additionally, a called public meeting was held on January 25, 1971, at the municipal auditorium. The transcript of the minutes of this meeting shows a unanimous attendance of the mayor and councilmen along with the city manager, city attorney and clerk of council. Although the minutes state 'less than 100 interested citizens were present' it is clear from the record that the electorate was given an opportunity to express objections and in fact 16 citizens made inquiries from the floor. A written report was submitted to this meeting by the Taxing District Study Committee which began thusly: 'Recognizing the fact that there can be no perfect system of assessing each citizen in absolute direct proportion to the level of services received by him, it has been the objective of our committee to formulate a proposal for establishing taxing districts and assessing taxes, which would be basically fair to all citizens and provide for the greatest benefit to the community as a whole.'
Appellants argue this public meeting was not legally sufficient because at that date the tax rate had not been established. Although this is true the report explains in detail the manner in which and the determinants for...
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