Hart v. Doe

• Decision Date: 15 August 1973
• Docket Number: No. 19677,19677
• Citation: 261 S.C. 116,198 S.E.2d 526
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Maggie Lee HART, Appellant, v. John DOE, Respondent.

Page 526

198 S.E.2d 526

261 S.C. 116

Maggie Lee HART, Appellant, v. John DOE, Respondent.

No. 19677.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Aug. 15, 1973.

Lofton M. Fanning, Orangeburg, for appellant.

C. Walker Limehouse, Orangeburg, for respondent.

BUSSEY, Justice:

This action was brought in Orangeburg County Court against 'John Doe', the unidentified driver of a motor vehicle, under the provisions of Secs. 46--750.34 and 46--750.35, supplement to the 1962 Code of Laws. Upon the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for both actual and punitive damages. Following the verdict, the defense made a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, or in the alternative, for a new trial. The motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was granted and plaintiff appeals.

On the morning of May 8, 1971, at approximately 11 o'clock, the plaintiff was driving an automobile, the property of her husband, in a northerly direction on South Carolina Highway No. 453, between Holly Hill, South Carolina, and Eutawville, South Carolina, in Orangeburg County. Passengers in the automobile were plaintiff's married daughter, Linda Kay Martin, aged 19; her son, George Hart, aged 17; and Walter Martin, aged 15, a brother-in-law of Linda. It was raining at the time. As plaintiff approached the intersection of secondary road S--38--174, a pickup truck with a camper thereon was approaching the intersection on S--38--174. The intersection of these two highways is a long Y-shaped one, at which the secondary road merges into the main highway from the south.

It is plaintiff's contention that John Doe, the driver of the camper truck, failed to yield the right of way, struck the vehicle driven by her, causing the same to wreck, with resulting serious personal injuries to the plaintiff. In the vicinity of the intersection plaintiff swerved her car to the left, crossed a ditch or embankment into a field, and did considerable damage to the front end of her car, none of which, admittedly, was caused by any contact with the pickup truck. It is plaintiff's contention, however, that the pickup truck made contact with the right door of her car.

Upon hearing the post trial motion, the trial judge concluded that the ends of justice required at least the granting of a new trial and stated that he would not hesitate to grant the same if the defendant were not entitled to judgment non obstante veredicto. Judgment n.o.v. was granted on the grounds, (1) that there was no evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that there was any contact between the vehicle driven by the plaintiff and defendant's vehicle, and (2) that the evidence was susceptible of no other reasonable inference that that the plaintiff was negligent in failing to ascertain the identity of the other vehicle and the driver thereof. The order of the trial judge shows that in considering the matter he was quite mindful of the elementary propositions of law that in passing upon a motion for a directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the other party, and if more than one reasonable inference can be drawn therefrom, or if the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are in doubt, the case should be submitted to the jury, but, where only one reasonable or legitimate inference can be drawn from the evidence, the question is one of law for the court. See cases collected in West's South Carolina Digest, Trial, k142, 178. His Honor relied, inter alia, upon Waring v. S. C. Power Co., 177 S.C. 295, 181 S.E. 1, from which he quoted the following:

'The requirement that the testimony shall be considered in a light most favorable to the plaintiff does not by some legerdemain serve as a substitute for evidence, nor is it of sufficient potency in itself to create and generate evidentiary matter. There must always be present a scintilla of evidence before the rule may be invoked.

'In a very recent decision of this court, Turner v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 260, 180 S.E. 55, 56, Mr. Justice Bonham, who wrote the opinion, makes some very pertinent observations with reference to the scintilla rule. In this case he says:

"The appellant labors under the erroneous idea that the Supreme Court has overruled the pronounced principle, to wit, if there is any relevant testimony, amounting to a scintilla, it must be left to the jury to determine its force and effect. The meaning of the rule is that there must be some Evidence arising out of the testimony which elucidates the issues of fact, and which enables the jury to form an intelligent conclusion. It does not authorize the admission of speculative, theoretical, and hypothetical views. * * *'

"Whilst adhering to the scintilla rule, this court has recognized a rule supplemental to the scintilla rule, which is thus propounded in the case of National Bank v. Thomas J. Barrett, Jr. & Co., 173 S.C. 1, 174 S.E. 581: 'If it be conceded that there may be deduced by a process of unusual finesse of reasoning that there is a...