Hart v. Mills Hotel Trust

• Decision Date: 27 June 1932
• Citation: 258 N.Y.S. 417,144 Misc. 121
• Parties: HARRY L. HART, Plaintiff, v. MILLS HOTEL TRUST, Defendant.
• Court: New York City Municipal Court

144 Misc. 121

258 N.Y.S. 417

HARRY L. HART, Plaintiff, v. MILLS HOTEL TRUST, Defendant.

Municipal Court of New York, Borough of Manhattan, Fourth District.

June 27, 1932

Action by guest against hotel for loss of property.

Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of ninety dollars. Ten days' stay.

SYLLABUS

In this action by a guest against defendant hotel for the loss by theft of property from a room therein, it appears that plaintiff, a workingman regarding New York city as his residence, occupied the room on a weekly basis, payments being made week by week in advance. Defendant's catering to those requiring simple accommodations at prices conceived to be within their means neither increased the risk of the guest nor diminished the responsibility of the defendant, and the fact that plaintiff brought no furniture or accessories of his own to the hotel, except wearing apparel and some personal requisites, warrants the finding that plaintiff was a guest and not a roomer.

Since it is conceded that defendant complied with section 200 of the General Business Law and posted the proper notices in its rooms, including the room occupied by plaintiff, it is not liable for the loss of plaintiff's money. But plaintiff's watch, chain, knife and clothes are neither jewels nor ornaments under the statute and, because defendant was an insurer as to them, it is liable. Plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence which occasioned the loss of his property.

COUNSEL

Berg & Berk, for the plaintiff.

Anderson Gasser, Ferris & Anderson [J. Wesley Seward of counsel], for the defendant.

LEWIS DAVID C., J.

The defendant is the proprietor of a series of hotels operating in the metropolis.

The plaintiff, a workingman, ending his job at a garage in the lower section of the city, left the Mills Hotel (in that vicinity) where he had been stopping, and on or about the 8th day of May, 1931, took room 748 at Mills Hotel, No. 3, at Seventh avenue and Thirty-sixth street, for which he paid on a weekly basis, apparently week by week, in advance. He occupied this room until June third, on which day he changed to room 754, paying for five days in advance; and he continued the occupant of room 754 on the same weekly basis until June 29, 1931.

It is to be noted that the plaintiff brought no furniture or accessories of his own into the hotel, and, undoubtedly, his only baggage consisted of some wearing apparel and some personal requisites.

When the plaintiff retired on the night of May 29, 1931, he left on a chair in his room the suit of clothes which he was wearing, a belt with a gold buckle attached to his trousers and a Hamilton watch with a gold chain and knife also affixed to his apparel, together with cash in the sum of ninety-seven dollars in the pockets of his trousers. On the morning of May thirtieth, at about five-thirty A. M., he went from his room to the washroom on the floor to shave. He left his clothes, apparently in the same condition in which they were the night previous, on the chair in his room. As he went out, he felt the door to make sure that it was securely closed. Upon returning from the washroom, his clothes and the personal property had all disappeared.

In the plaintiff's room, as in the other rooms of the hotel, the proprietor furnished a steel locker in which the plaintiff might have placed his clothes together with the property contained in them.

The plaintiff seeks to recover against the defendant on the theory that the defendant as the proprietor of an inn is liable as an insurer to the plaintiff, a guest, for the loss of his property.

The defendant disputes any liability on the ground that the relationship was that of landlord and roomer; that the loss was not due to the defendant's negligence and that, at all events, the plaintiff's negligence occasioned the loss.

The defendant would limit its liability to the loss of the clothing under the provisions of section 200 of the General Business Law.

The defendant does not pretend to deny that these pre mises were conducted by it as a hotel. It asserts, however, that the particular arrangements made by the plaintiff for the occupancy of his room on a weekly basis and the weekly payments in advance and the duration of his stay, coupled with his testimony that he regarded New York city as his residence, made him a roomer and not a guest.

I cannot find proof or precedent warranting such a conclusion. The gist of the decisions indicates a contrary holding. 'She moved into her rooms her piano thus indicating more than an intention to make a temporary sojourn. The property which is the subject of this action was not of a character such as is usually taken to hotels by transient guests. * * * I do not mean to say that a resident of Albany may not go to one of the hotels of that city and establish between himself and the hotel-keeper the relation of inn-keeper and guest.' (Crapo v. Rockwell, 48 Misc. 1, 5, 6.)

'It does not appear that the plaintiff bargained to remain for any particular time; although it is true that the agreed price of the room was to be $1.25 per week. But a special agreement fixing in advance the price to be paid, or the length of the stay, does not absolutely disturb the relation of innkeeper and guest, and constitute the person so acting a boarder or lodger. 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, pp. 12, 15. A guest has been defined to be one who 'comes without any bargain for time, remains without one, and may go when he pleases, paying only for the actual entertainment which he receives; and it is not enough to make him a boarder, and not a guest, that he has stayed a long time in the inn in this way." ' (Metzger v. Schnabel, 23 Misc. 698, 699.)

'The more general modern trend, however, seems to be toward a relaxation of the older rule, so as to give the status of guest to townsmen or neighbors. 14 Ruling Case Law, 495, 496, and cases there cited; and Walling v. Potter, 35 Conn. 183; Orchard v. Bush & Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. D. (1898) 284. The mere fixing of the price does not change the status of one who would otherwise be a guest, into that of boarder or tenant. Hancock v. Rand, supra, 8.' (Roberts v. Case Hotel Co., 106 Misc. 481, at p. 485.)

'The authorities hold beyond question that the fixing of the price does not make the party a boarder. (See Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557; Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417; Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 169; Walling v. Potter, 35 Conn. 183.)

' Considering the question discussed it should not be o verlooked that the St. Cloud Hotel was kept as a public inn in every sense and was clearly distinguishable from a boarding house; its proprietors did not claim that it was a boarding house, and there is no evidence to show that it was considered in that light, and neither the fixing of the price nor the conversation had in reference to the probability of General Hancock and family remaining a period of time could alter or change its true...