Hart v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 12 June 1907
• Citation: 80 Conn. 71,66 A. 1026
• Parties: HART v. ROBERTS et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

66 A. 1026

80 Conn. 71

HART

v. ROBERTS et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 12, 1907.

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Hartford County; George W. Wheeler, Judge.

Action by Elijah Hart, trustee, against William Henry Roberts and others. Complaint, under sections 552 and 1035 of the General Statutes of 1902 for an order authorizing the plaintiff trustee to sell and convey certain real estate held by him in trust for a sum specified, and to duly reinvest the proceeds. Pacts found in part, and the cause reserved by the court for the advice of this court as to the power of the trial court. Remanded without advice.

The complaint alleged, and the answer of all parties admitted, the following facts: May 22, 1898, William W. Roberts, of Hartford, died testate and owning certain real estate in the city of Hartford described in the complaint. At his decease he left as his heirs at law and next of kin a son William Henry Roberts, who is unmarried, and a grandson, Henry Roberts Williams, both now living and parties defendant. Said Henry Roberts Williams is married and has three children, all minors and parties defendant. By his will and its codicils the testator gave the residue of his estate, consisting of real and personal property and including the real estate in question, to the plaintiff trustee in trust for the life of said William Henry Roberts. By the terms of said trust the principal thereof was to remain intact, certain provisions out of the income were made in favor of said son and of said grandson and of the surviving children of said grandson in the event of his death before that of said William Henry, and any balance of income allowed to accumulate as a part of the corpus of the fund The gift over upon the termination of the trust was made, one half to the children of William Henry, share and share alike, and the other half to said Henry Roberts Williams, or, if he should have died, to his children, or if either said William Henry or said Henry Roberts Williams should have died leaving no one to take the share set out to them, respectively, then that share to go to those entitled to take the other share. The court has found true the allegations of the complaint which set out at length and in detail the facts thus briefly summarized. The complaint further alleged, and the answers admitted, that it was for the best interests of said trust estate and of the beneficiaries thereof that the real estate described in the complaint be sold, and the avails thereof invested according to law; that $225,000 had been offered by a responsible party therefor; that said offer was a full and fair one; and that the plaintiff believed that it was for the best interest of said trust estate and of the beneficiaries thereof that the premises should be sold, and the avails thereof invested.

The court did not pass upon any of these allegations, but found that said Roberts and Williams and the guardian ad litem of the latter's minor children, being all of the defendants, desired to have a sale of the premises made, and believed it for the best interest of all concerned that a certain offer be accepted and expressly reserved the question of the advisability of accepting said offer for further hearing after the advice of this court should be obtained upon the following questions of law, which were thereupon reserved for the determination of this court, to wit: "(a) Whether this court has, in view of the terms of the will and codicils thereto, power to decree a sale of said premises, (b) Whether this court has, in view of the terms of the will and codicils thereto, power to decree a sale upon terms other than cash. (c) Whether this court has, in view of the terms of the will and codicils thereto, power to decree a sale upon the terms named in the offer attached and marked 'Exhibit B.'" The offer thus referred to was one that the purchaser pay $45,000 in cash, assume a first mortgage of $83,000 already on the property, and give a note for $97,000 payable in specified installments, bearing interest at the rate of 5 per cent. payable semiannually and secured by a mortgage upon the property subsequent to said first mortgage. Before action had been taken by the court as above recited, the state's attorney for Hartford county had, pursuant to the provisions of section 553 of the General Statutes of 1902, been directed to appear and to investigate the allegations of the complaint, and to do all things necessary and proper to protect all interests involved in the action and not actually represented in court by counsel, and he had reported that he was of the opinion that it was for the best interests of the trust estate and of the beneficiaries thereof that a sale be made conformably to the terms of said offer.

Charles Welles Gross and Charles E. Gross, for plaintiff. Henry R. Williams, in pro. per. Walter S. Schutz, for defendants Beatrice H. Willaims et al.

PRENTICE, J. (after stating the facts). If the advice of this court upon the questions propounded be given, and a negative reply be returned to all of them, such advice would result in a final judgment dismissing the action, and such judgment could be directed by this court. If, on the other hand, an affirmative reply be given to one or more of the questions, the cause would have to be remanded for a further hearing and the exercise by the trial court of its reasonable discretion as to what action it ought to take upon the facts as found before the judgment stage would be reached. The judgment when rendered might then be one in favor of either party, would be one which this court could not direct, and might not be one which was conformable to any advice given, since the questions upon which advice was given might not enter into the action of the court at all. If, upon the return of the cause, the trial court should after its hearing decide either that a sale, a sale for other terms than cash, or a sale upon the terms of the particular offer contained in the record, would not be advantageous, this court would find itself in the position of having given advice upon a question or questions which were purely academic, and could serve no helpful purpose in the decision of the cause. The language of the statute (section 751) is, doubtless, comprehensive enough to permit this court to entertain reservations of questions of law, where the advice given will not be decisive of the final judgment to be rendered in the cause. Doubtless, also, such reservations have been entertained, and possibly not infrequently. Such, however, has not been the case of late; repeated rulings having been made in open court to the contrary. State v. Feingold, 77 Conn. 326, note, 59 Atl. 211. See, also, New York, H. & W. R. Co. v. B. H. & E. R. Co., 36 Conn. 197. But whatever authority the terms of the statute may confer, and whatever practice may be discovered to have at some time existed, it is certain that the statute did not contemplate, and ought not to be construed to permit, that every question which a trial court may encounter in the progress of a cause, much less every one which it may anticipate that it may encounter, might be brought here at once upon its being either met or scented from afar and its determination had for the guidance of the trial court. Such a practice would inevitably result in this court being called upon to formulate principles of law which would never enter into the determination of a cause, to formulate such principles in an abstract form suited to more or less general application, and not as related to a concrete state of facts and narrowed and simplified by such relation, to create a mass of dicta embodying statements of abstract general principles which might some day rise up to harass judicial action, and to unnecessarily multiply the number of appearances in this court which an action might have before final disposition was made of it.

We do not, however, wish to be understood as saying that no reservation ought to be made or entertained until the case is ready for final judgment. Situations have arisen, and may well arise, where such action would be in the interest of simplicity, directness, and economy in judicial action. Such situations, however, will be those exceptional ones where the advantages resulting from such proceeding are manifest and distinct, and the question upon which advice is asked is one which will quite certainly enter into the determination of the cause. The situation in the present case is not one of the exceptional character indicated; far from it. Our advice is asked upon three points, each involving considerations more or less foreign to the others. Whether any one of them will ever become pertinent cannot be told until the trial court has performed its functions. The slender thread by which one at least of them is hung to the case is apparent, and the vice of anticipatory abstract adjudications is well illustrated by that example. We are asked to advise whether the court has the power to authorize the acceptance of a certain offer which it does not appear that either the court or the trustee deems an advantageous one. It is quite possible that this request for advice involves the determination of an important question, or questions having far-reaching consequences, and yet the withdrawal of the offer, the receipt of a better one, or an adverse finding as to the wisdom of acceptance for other cause, would quite likely remove them entirely from the case. Furthermore, if the advice asked should be given, and that advice should be favorable to the power of the court in any of the respects enumerated, the subsequent action of the trial court upon its hearing, and in its exercise of its discretion, would conceivably furnish ground for the reappearance here of the cause. The discretion which the trial court would in the end be called upon to exercise would not be an absolute but reviewable one, and the hearing preliminary to its...