Hart v. Salt Lake County Com'n
| Decision Date | 28 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 960196-CA,960196-CA |
| Citation | 945 P.2d 125 |
| Parties | 324 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 Richard S. HART, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SALT LAKE COUNTY COMMISSION, Robert L. Tweedy, Robert E. Tweedy, John Does 1 through 10, Utah Department of Transportation, and State of Utah, Defendants and Appellants. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Douglas R. Short and Patrick F. Holden, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Evan A. Schmutz and Lance N. Long, Provo, for Appellee.
Before DAVIS, WILKINS and BILLINGS, JJ.
Salt Lake County Commission (the County) appeals from the trial court's final judgment, which was entered following a jury trial in which the jury found the County negligent and liable for damages sustained by Richard S. Hart. The County also appeals the adverse post-trial orders entered by the trial court which, among other things, denied the County's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, denied the County's motion for relief from the judgment, granted Hart's motion to strike an affidavit, and denied the County's motion for a new trial.
Hart cross-appeals. Hart appeals the final order of judgment entered because it reduced the portion of the jury award for which the County was responsible to $250,000, including interest and costs, pursuant to section 63-30-34 of the Utah Code.
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
In December 1986, Robert E. Tweedy, an unlicensed, drunk driver, collided with Hart in an automobile accident on Wasatch Boulevard. Robert L. Tweedy is the father of Robert E. Tweedy and the owner of the car involved in the collision.
In June 1987, Hart filed a complaint against the Tweedys. In January 1989, Hart was allowed to amend his complaint to add additional defendants, including the County. In his amended complaint, Hart argued the County was negligent in the following five ways: (1) failing to properly design, engineer, and construct Wasatch Boulevard near the area where the collision occurred; (2) failing to properly maintain the road; (3) failing to install adequate warning devices; (4) allowing the road to remain in its dangerous condition after the County knew or should have known of the dangerous condition; and/or (5) failing to properly maintain the intersection in a reasonably safe condition. Hart argued that the shoulder of the road where he was driving at the time of the accident was not wide enough, and that had the shoulder been wider, he would have been able to avoid the collision. In February 1989, the County filed its answer and raised governmental immunity as a defense.
In December 1991, the County moved for summary judgment against Hart on the grounds of governmental immunity and causation. During oral arguments on the County's motion, the County opted not to argue that it was protected from liability by governmental immunity. In March 1992, the trial court granted the County's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the accident was caused solely by Tweedy's intervening negligence. Hart appealed the trial court's decision. In June 1993, this court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Meanwhile, Hart and the Tweedys entered into a settlement agreement. Consequently, in March 1992, the trial court ordered a judgment against Robert E. Tweedy and dismissed Robert L. Tweedy from the case.
The trial of Hart's case against the County began at the end of August 1994 and lasted four days. At the end of the trial, the jury was given a special verdict form. The jury found the County to be fifty-one percent negligent and Robert E. Tweedy to be forty-nine percent negligent. The jury also found the damages, including special and general damages, to be $1,330,000.
In September 1994, the County filed a motion to limit the amount of judgment in accordance with section 63-30-34 of the Utah Code, which Hart opposed. The trial court granted the County's motion in December 1994, limiting the County's portion of the judgment to the sum of $250,000, including costs and prejudgment and postjudgment interest. The trial court then entered a judgment on the jury's verdict in January 1995, by which the court ordered the County to pay Hart $250,000 and ordered Robert E. Tweedy to pay Hart forty-nine percent of $1,330,000.
Several post-trial motions were filed following the trial court's order of judgment. First, the County filed a motion requesting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, and remittitur. In its memorandum supporting this motion, the County argued, among other things, that the County was entitled to a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the trial court abused its discretion in two ways: (1) it did not specifically include Hart on the special verdict form as a party to whom the jury could apportion fault, and (2) it denied the County's motion for a mistrial after allowing Hart to comment on the amount of the settlement agreement between Hart and the Tweedys. Hart opposed this motion.
In March 1995, the County filed the affidavit of Michael E. Postma, the County's trial attorney in the case, in support of its Rule 59 motion for a new trial. The affidavit described the alleged circumstances surrounding (1) the trial court's decision to exclude Hart from the special verdict form and (2) the trial court's denial of the County's motion for mistrial after Hart referred to the settlement amount agreed to by Hart and the Tweedys.
Hart moved to strike Postma's affidavit in March 1995. Then, in May 1995, the County filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or Following oral argument on the County's motions, in September 1995, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order regarding the County's motions requesting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, and remittitur. Among its conclusions, the trial court concluded the following: (1) the County both abandoned and waived its governmental immunity argument and failed to introduce any evidence to support it; (2) Keegan v. State did not represent a change in law, so the County's Rule 60(b) motion should be denied; and (3) the County's Rule 59 motion was procedurally defective and should be denied on procedural grounds. The trial court therefore denied all the County's motions.
Order/or Addendum to J.N.O.V. Among the arguments made in the memorandum supporting this motion, the County argued it was entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the Utah Supreme Court's decision Keegan v. State, issued in March 1995, represented an intervening change in appellate law regarding the issue of governmental immunity. Attached as an addendum to the memorandum supporting the motion was Tosh Kano's affidavit, in which Kano testified to the way in which the County decides whether to widen or not widen road shoulders. Hart again opposed this motion.
In September 1995, following entry of the trial court's findings, conclusions, and order, Hart filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision to limit the judgment against the County. That same month, the County filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, arguing that the County was immune from suit and that immunity is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. The next month, Hart moved to strike Kano's affidavit.
Finally, in a December 1995 minute entry, the trial court denied Hart's motion requesting that the trial court reconsider limiting the amount of the judgment against the County, denied the County's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and granted Hart's motion to strike Kano's affidavit. Both the County and Hart appeal.
The County makes three main arguments on appeal: (1) it did not owe a duty to Hart; (2) governmental immunity shielded it from liability; and (3) the trial court erroneously denied its motion for a new trial. Hart makes two main arguments on cross-appeal: (1) the trial court erred in capping the damages owed by the County to Hart under the damages cap statute because that statute is unconstitutional, and (2) the trial court erred by including interest and costs within the judgment reduced by the damages cap statute. We review each of these arguments in turn.
We first address the County's argument that it did not owe a duty to Hart.
To establish negligence, a plaintiff must first establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. See Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991) ; see also Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (). On appeal, the County argues that under the public duty doctrine, it did not owe a duty to Hart. Therefore, the County argues, because it did not owe Hart a duty, it cannot be liable for negligence.
However, Hart counters the County's argument by asserting that the County did not preserve this issue for appeal. Therefore, before we consider whether the County owed Hart a duty, we first address whether the County preserved this issue for appeal.
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before the trial court. See West One Bank, Utah v. Life Ins. Co., 887 P.2d 880, 882 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App.1994). " 'A matter is sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue.' " State v. Starnes ...
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