BAM DEVELOPMENT v. Salt Lake County

• Decision Date: 20 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 20010840-CA.,20010840-CA.
• Citation: 2004 UT App 34,87 P.3d 710
• Parties: B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah body politic and political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

87 P.3d 710

2004 UT App 34

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah body politic and political subdivision of the State of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20010840-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

February 20, 2004.

Rehearing Denied April 8, 2004.

Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for Appellant.

Donald H. Hansen, Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before Judges BENCH, ORME, and THORNE, JJ.

OPINION

THORNE, Judge:

s 1 B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. (BAM), appeals from a district court decision finding that no unconstitutional taking occurred when Salt Lake County (the County) required BAM to dedicate additional land as a condition of subdivision approval. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

s 2 In 1997, BAM sought to develop a subdivision located at 7755 West 3500 South in Salt Lake County, Utah. The Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Commission (the Commission) granted preliminary approval for the proposed subdivision. In the original subdivision plat, BAM agreed to dedicate a forty-foot strip of land in anticipation of 3500 South being widened. In April 1998, the County informed BAM that after consulting with the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT), the County had determined that BAM must dedicate an additional thirteen-foot strip of land abutting 3500 South in anticipation of future road expansion. BAM objected to the increase because it had already drafted and divided the subdivision plots utilizing the forty-foot dedication.¹ BAM argued that increasing the dedication to fifty-three feet would alter several plots dramatically and would require reconfiguration of the subdivision at great expense. Without receiving any evidence, the Commission denied BAM's license to develop their subdivision without the fifty-three-foot dedication.

s 3 BAM appealed to the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners (the Board), by filing a "Notice of Claim" with the Board. In this Notice of Claim, BAM claimed that "[t]he uncompensated dedication and improvement of the additional roadway constitute[d] an unconstitutional `taking,' not reasonably justified by the actual impact created by the proposed development." Without conducting a hearing, taking evidence, or issuing findings, the Board upheld the Commission's decision.

s 4 BAM then filed suit in district court claiming that the County's demand was unconstitutional because it was not roughly proportional, as required by Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2319-20, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). After trial, the district court found in favor of the County, concluding that the rough proportionality test did not apply. BAM objected to the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and filed a motion for a new trial. The district court overruled BAM's objections and denied its motion for a new trial. BAM appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

s 5 BAM argues that the County's dedication requirement of thirteen additional feet constitutes a taking of its land without just compensation, in violation of the United States Constitution.² However, we must first determine whether the district court acted properly when it received evidence and then ruled on the constitutionality of the land-dedication requirement. Resolution of this issue requires statutory interpretation, which we review for correctness. See Valley Colour Inc. v. Beuchert Builders Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 363 (Utah 1997) (noting that "`[i]n matters of pure statutory interpretation, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for correctness and gives no deference to its legal conclusions'" (citations omitted)).

ANALYSIS

s 6 The County Land Use Development and Management Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-101 to -1003 (2001), authorizes counties "to enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and development of land within the county... unless ... expressly prohibited by law." Id. § 17-27-102(1).³ If a landowner disagrees with a county land use decision, that landowner can appeal the decision, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-1001. Section 17-27-1001(3)(a) provides that when a county's land use decision is appealed to the district court, that court shall "presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and ... determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Id. (emphasis added).⁴ "A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision violates a statute, ordinance, or existing law." Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001(3)(b).

s 7 While no Utah Court has specifically addressed the standard of review applicable to appeals brought pursuant to section 17-27-1001, we have addressed the standard of review for appeals taken pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 17-27-708 (2001), which contains language similar to that of section 17-27-1001.⁵Compare Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708, with id. § 17-27-1001. In the absence of any case law interpreting section 17-27-1001, we, by analogy, rely upon case law interpreting section 17-27-708.⁶ s 8 In Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App.1995), landowners sought a "special exception under a county zoning ordinance." Id. at 603. The county conducted a hearing, received evidence, and then granted the exception. See id. Pursuant to section 17-27-708, another landowner appealed the decision to the district court, where the county's actions were found to be "arbitrary, capricious, and illegal." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 603. The matter was then appealed to this court. See id. On appeal, the parties attempted to introduce new evidence. See id. at 610-11. We concluded, because the board of adjustments had conducted a hearing and received evidence, that we were limited to the existing record. See id. at 604. In reaching this conclusion, we stated:

Since the district court's review of the Board's decision was limited to a review of the Board's record, we do not accord any particular deference to the district court's decision. Instead, we review the Board's decision as if the appeal had come directly from the agency. Thus, the standard for our review of the Board's decision is the same standard established in the Utah Code for the district court's review.

. . . .

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Board's decision we will consider all the evidence in the record, both favorable and contrary to the Board's decision. Nevertheless, our review, like the district court's review, "is limited to the record provided by the board of adjustment.... The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the board['s] record...." We must simply determine, in light of the evidence before the Board, whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the Board. It is not our prerogative to weigh the evidence anew.

Id. at 603-04 (citations and footnotes omitted.)⁷ s 9 Here, neither the Commission, nor the Board, received evidence on whether the County's requirement of an additional thirteen feet was a "taking." Instead, both approved the County's action without a hearing. Consequently, the district court had no record to review. The lack of a record apparently prompted the district court to receive evidence and determine for itself whether the County had unconstitutionally taken BAM's property. However, the plain language of section 17-27-1001 does not authorize the district court to receive evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1002(3)(a).⁸ Thus, we conclude that the district court is limited to the record made before the County and can determine only whether the County's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Id. § 17-27-1001(3)(a)(ii); see also Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21,s 8, 70 P.3d 85 (noting that courts first look to the plain language of a statute and only look beyond the plain language if there is an ambiguity).⁹

s 10 The absence of a record in this case is highly problematic, because historically, takings determinations are mixed questions of law and fact. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2922, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that whether government action has deprived a claimant of his property without just compensation is an "essentially [an] ad hoc, factual inquir[y]"). Moreover, Utah courts also have acknowledged that evaluating the reasonableness of an exaction is a fact-intensive inquiry.

s 11 In Home Builders Ass'n v. City of American Fork, 1999 UT 7, 973 P.2d 425, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[exactions,] such [as] fees[,] are constitutionally permissible if the benefits derived from their exaction are `of "demonstrable benefit" to the subdivision,' and if newly developed properties are not required to bear more than their equitable share of the capital costs in relation to the benefits conferred." Id. at s 14 (quoting Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 905 (Utah 1981) (additional citation omitted)). In assessing the reasonableness of an exaction, a fact finder may consider, among other factors

(1) the cost of existing capital facilities; (2) the manner of financing existing capital facilities (such as user charges, special assessments, bonded indebtedness, general taxes, or federal grants); (3) the relative extent to which the newly developed properties and the other properties in the municipality have already contributed to the cost of existing capital facilities (by such means as user charges, special assessments, or payment from the proceeds of general taxes); (4) the relative extent to which the newly developed properties and the other properties in the municipality will contribute to the cost of existing capital facilities in the future; (5) the extent to which the newly developed properties are entitled to a credit because the municipality is requiring

...