Hart v. State

• Decision Date: 21 July 1896
• Citation: 20 So. 805,38 Fla. 39
• Parties: HART v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

20 So. 805

38 Fla. 39

HART v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

July 21, 1896

Error to circuit court, Gadsden county; John W. Malone, Judge.

George Hart was convicted of murder in the second degree, and brings error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. In cases of homicide, the conditions under which evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased may be introduced in evidence, as defined by this court, are that such evidence is admissible to show, or tend to show, that a defendant has acted in self-defense, or under such circumstances as would naturally cause a man of ordinary reason and prudence to believe himself to be, at the time of the killing, in imminent danger of losing his life, or of suffering great bodily harm, at the hands of the deceased. But such evidence is not admissible for the purposes indicated unless it explains, or will give meaning or significance to, the conduct of the deceased at the time of the killing, or will tend to do so; and the conduct of the deceased at the time of the killing, thus proposed to be explained, must be shown before the auxiliary evidence of such character can be introduced. The evidence must show some demonstration on the part of the accused, which, though considered independent of the dangerous character of the deceased, would be regarded as innocent or harmless, yet when received and considered in connection with, or illustrated by, such character, it may arouse a reasonable belief of imminent peril, of the kind mentioned. Bond v State, 21 Fla. 738; Garner v. State, 9 South. 835, 28 Fla. 113.

2. Under statutes prior to the act of 1895 (chapter 4400, Laws Fla.), the accused had the privilege of making a statement under oath to the jury of the matters of his or her defense but in making such statement the accused did not become a witness, nor subject to the rules applicable to witnesses and such statement alone was not sufficient to authorize the introduction of auxiliary evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased at the time of the killing.

3. Under the act of 1895 (chapter 4400) the rule is different, as this act gives to an accused person, when he elects to avail himself of its provisions, the status of a witness in his own behalf, and what he states is subject to the tests established for weighing the testimony of other witnesses. He cannot be forced to testify, and no prejudicial inference on the part of the state can be drawn from his silence; but, if he elects to take the stand in his own behalf, he must do it as other witnesses in the case, liable to cross-examination upon all facts relevant and material to the issue as other witnesses, and his testimony alone, when sufficient in itself for that purpose, will authorize the introduction of evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased.

COUNSEL

George P. Keyes, for plaintiff in error.

George P. Keyes, for plaintiff in error.

B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

MABRY C.J.

The plaintiff in error was indicted for the murder of Sylvester Royle, and, upon trial, was convicted of murder in the second degree. From the judgment of the court imposing the penalty of the law for such an offense, a writ of error has been prosecuted.

The only point involved in the case is whether, since the act of 1895 (chapter 4400, Laws Fla.), the testimony of the accused alone, laying the foundation for the introduction of evidence of the violent character of the deceased, will authorize the admission of such evidence. The conditions under which evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased may be introduced in evidence have been sufficiently defined by this court. Bond v. State, 21 Fla. 738; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So 835. In Garner's Case it was decided that evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased is admissible to show, or as tending to show, that a defendant has acted in self-defense, or under such circumstances as would naturally cause a man of ordinary reason to believe himself to be, at the time of the killing, in imminent danger of losing his life, or of suffering great bodily harm, at the hands of the deceased. But such evidence is not admissible for this purpose except when it explains, or will give meaning or significance to, the conduct of the deceased at the time of the killing, or will tend to do so; and such conduct of the deceased at the time of the killing, which is proposed to be thus explained, must be shown before the auxiliary evidence of such character can be introduced. There must be evidence of some demonstration on the part of the accused, which, though considered independent of the dangerous character of the deceased, would be regarded as innocent or harmless, when received and considered in connection with, or illustrated by, such character, may arouse a reasonable belief of imminent peril, of the kind mentioned. The testimony on the part of the state in the present case showed that the deceased died from the effects of a pistol ball discharged by the accused,...