Hart v. State, 26152

• Decision Date: 07 January 1971
• Docket Number: No. 26152,26152
• Citation: 227 Ga. 171,179 S.E.2d 346
• Parties: Robert HART v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 346

179 S.E.2d 346

227 Ga. 171

Robert HART v. The STATE.

No. 26152.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 7, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 21, 1971.

Henry L. Young, Jr., Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Carter Goode, William M. Weller, Tony H. Hight, Joel M. Feldman, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Marion O. Gordon, William R. Childers, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

HAWES, Justice.

Robert Hart was indicted, tried and convicted of the offense of armed robbery, and was sentenced to death by electrocution. His motion for new trial was overruled and he appealed to this court.

1. In grounds 1 through 4 of appellant's enumeration of errors, he contends that the court committed error in failing to exclude irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial testimony about the extent of the victim's injuries, the prognosis for his recovery, his personal and family situation and his religious and occupational background. No objection to any of the evidence referred to in these grounds was made during the trial on the ground that the same was irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial. Under repeated rulings of the appellate courts of this State, the admission in evidence of illegal evidence to which no objection is interposed cannot be made the basis of appellate review, either as a ground of a motion for new trial or as a ground of enumerated error on direct appeal. Licett v. State, 23 Ga. 57(1); Evans v. State, 33 Ga. 4(2); Edwards v. State, 224 Ga. 684(1), 164 S.E.2d 120; Robinson v. State, 225 Ga. 167, 169(6), 167 S.E.2d 158. The objection interposed by counsel for the accused to certain questions propounded to some of the jurors on their voir dire, even if it could be said to relate to the same subject matter as the evidence referred to in these four grounds of enumerated error, would not be sufficient to constitute an objection to evidence later introduced on the trial of the case where nothing was done to call the trial court's attention to the objection or to relate the same to the evidence now complained of. The exceptions here are to a mass of testimony of several different witnesses. In at least one of the four grounds, appellant specifies as objectionable the entire testimony of one witness. As to each portion of the evidence alluded to in these grounds, at least some of it was not subject to the objection urged before this court, and under established rules where an objection goes to the whole of evidence, if any part of it is admissible the objection should be overruled. Gully v. State, 116 Ga. 527, 533, 42 S.E. 790; Clarke v. State, 221 Ga. 206, 214, 144 S.E.2d 90.

2. 'In all criminal cases both the State and the defendant shall have the right to an individual examination of each juror from which the jury is to be selected prior to interposing a challenge. Such examination shall be conducted after the administration of a preliminary oath to the panel or, in criminal cases, after the usual voir dire questions have been put by the court, and in such examination the counsel for either party shall have the right to inquire of the individual jurors examined touching any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the juror in the cause, including any opinion as to which party ought to prevail, the relationship or acquaintance of the juror with the parties or counsel therefor, any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning or bias which the juror might have respecting the subject-matter of the suit, or counsel or parties thereto, and religious, social and fraternal connections of the juror.' Code Ann. § 59-705. In the instant case, after the usual voir dire questions had been put to the jurors, the court permitted the district attorney to ask several of the jurors whether they could be impartial between the 'victim' and the accused in their deliberations. Under the above quoted Code section, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing such questions to be propounded over the mere objection of counsel for the accused, that the contest was not between the victim and the accused but between the State and the accused and that such uestions were calculated to evoke sympathy for the victim on the part of the jury. Grounds 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the enumeration of errors are without merit.

3. Two grounds of enumerated error complain of the refusal of the trial court to grant a mistrial on account of alleged improper argument of the assistant district attorney in his closing arguments to the jury. Six separate instances of alleged improper remarks lifted from some eleven pages of the transcript are set forth in these grounds. However, it will be necessary for us to consider only one of these excerpts, since no objection to the arguments embodied in the other excerpts or motion for a mistrial with reference thereto was made by counsel for the accused at the time the arguments complained of were made. Satterfield v. Ayers & Cunningham, 10 Ga.App. 742(1), 73 S.E. 1091; Lenox Drug Co. v. New England Jewelry Co., 16 Ga.App. 476(5), 85 S.E. 681; McCoy v. Scarborough, 73 Ga.App. 519, 524, 37 S.E.2d 221; Campbell v. State, 111 Ga.App. 219(5), 141 S.E.2d 186.

At the conclusion of the assistant district attorney's argument and after the jury had been permitted to retire from the courtroom for the day under proper admonition, the attorney for the accused objected to the argument and conduct of counsel 'in that * * * in his closing two or three sentences he inferentially told the jury that their community would be unsafe unless this boy was convicted, which is improper * * * has been held many times that it's improper arguments to argue to the jury that they convict so that society will be safe.' This objection could have had reference only to the first of the excerpts set forth in ground 9 of the enumeration of errors. That excerpt from the argument of the assistant district attorney is 'Return your verdict and let the community where he lives * * * and where Mr. Hurston and his family live, this entire community, let it ring out and tell this boy who is fighting for his country, not against it, what you found about his father's condition and how you feel about the ones that have taken from (him).' There was evidence in the record admitted without objection that the victim had a son serving in Viet Nam. The language complained of introduced no new fact but was merely a forceful and possibly extravagant method adopted by the assistant district attorney of impressing upon the jury the magnitude of the offense and the solemnity of their duty as jurors. Patterson v. State, 124 Ga. 408(1), 52 S.E. 534; Powell v. State, 179 Ga. 401, 411, 176 S.E. 29; Miller v. Coleman, 213 Ga. 125, 129-130(6), 97 S.E.2d 313; Wheeler v. State, 220 Ga. 535, 537, 140 S.E.2d 258; Martin v. State, 223 Ga. 649, 650, 157 S.E.2d 458; Holley v. State, 225 Ga. 768, 770, 171 S.E.2d 528. The 9th and 10th grounds of enumerated error are without merit.

4. Grounds 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the enumeration of errors complain that certain portions of the charge set forth therein relating to the offense of robbery by use of an offensive weapon were erroneous 'in that they made no mention of robbery by intimidation, which offense was charged in the indictment.' Under repeated rulings of this court, an otherwise correct and pertinent instruction is not rendered erroneous by the failure to charge in connection therewith some other correct and pertinent principle of law. Lumpkin v. State, 152 Ga. 229(3), 109 S.E. 664; Grant v. State, 152 Ga. 252(1), 109 S.E. 502; Burns v. State, 188 Ga. 22, 27, 2 S.E.2d 627; Albert v. State, 215 Ga. 564, 568(4), 111 S.E.2d 215; Coleman v. State, 215 Ga. 865(6), 114 S.E.2d 2; Thurmond v. State, 220 Ga. 277, 279, 138 S.E.2d 372. Construing these grounds, however, as raising the issue that the court erred in failing to charge without request that the accused was charged with robbery by intimidation and erred in not telling the jury that they might convict the accused of that offense, they do not show cause for the grant of a new trial. The indictment in this case was substantially in the language of the indictment in Daniels v. State, 219 Ga. 381, 133 S.E.2d 357. This court held in that case that where the evidence showed that an...