Hart v. SWAROOP, INC., 89

• Decision Date: 14 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 89,89
• Citation: 385 Md. 514,870 A.2d 157
• Parties: Jonathan D. HART, et ux. v. SHASTRI NARAYAN SWAROOP, INC.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

870 A.2d 157

385 Md. 514

Jonathan D. HART, et ux. v. SHASTRI NARAYAN SWAROOP, INC.

No. 89, September Term, 2004.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 14, 2005.

Mark C. Miller (William J. Blondell, Jr., William J. Blondell, Jr., Chartered, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioners.

David S. Goldberg, Hunt Valley (C. William Michaels, Baltimore, on brief), for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

CATHELL, J.

This case arises from a claim sounding in tort brought by firefighter Jonathan D. Hart and his wife, Sarina Hart, petitioners, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, against Shastri Narayan Swaroop, Inc., respondent, the owner and operator of the Regal Inn on Pulaski Highway in Baltimore County. The impetus of petitioners' claim, which was filed on June 30, 2000, was an injurious fall Hart suffered on January 25, 2000, while responding to a fire at the Regal Inn.

On August 20, 2001, subsequent to the completion of discovery, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the petitioners, as a matter of law, were precluded from bringing the action pursuant to the fireman's rule.¹ On November 5, 2001, following a hearing, the circuit court denied respondent's motion for summary judgment.

The case was tried before a jury beginning on March 10, 2003. At the close of petitioners' case, respondent moved for judgment. The circuit court denied respondent's motion. At the close of the evidence, respondent renewed its motion but it was again denied by the circuit court. On March 12, 2003, the jury returned a verdict in favor of petitioners as against respondent and awarded damages in the amount of $454,396.43. The judgment was entered on March 13, 2003.

Respondent thereafter filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On July 19, 2004, the intermediate appellate court issued its opinion, Shastri Narayan Swaroop, Inc. v. Hart, 158 Md.App. 63, 854 A.2d 269 (2004), holding that the fireman's rule was applicable to petitioners' claim and "the circuit court therefore erred in denying [respondent's] motion for summary judgment and motions for judgment...." Id. at 66, 854 A.2d at 271 (alteration added).

On September 1, 2004, petitioners filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court. On November 12, 2004, we granted the petition. Hart v. Swaroop, 383 Md. 569, 861 A.2d 60 (2004). Petitioners present a sole question for our review, which we rephrase for the sake of clarity as follows:

Does the fireman's rule prevent a firefighter from recovering damages from a property owner for injuries suffered when the firefighter fell into an open stairwell while performing his firefighting duties?

We hold that the fireman's rule is applicable to the circumstances surrounding Hart's injury and, therefore, the fireman's rule bars petitioners' tort claim against the respondent motel owner. As we shall discuss, Hart's injuries, which he sustained while in the performance of his occupational duties, were the direct result of a fall occasioned by his inability to perceive his surroundings due to the voluminous amount of smoke emanating from the motel fire.

Facts

In the early morning hours of January 25, 2000, a fire broke out at the Regal Inn, a motel located at 8005 Pulaski Highway in Baltimore County and owned and operated by respondent. Upon being alerted that smoke was coming from one of the motel rooms, the motel's night manager promptly pulled the motel's fire alarm and called 911.

At the time of the January 25th fire at the Regal Inn, Hart was employed as a Lieutenant with the Baltimore County Fire Department and assigned to Station Number 15, Eastview. Hart was one of many firefighters of the Baltimore County Fire Department that responded to the call received at approximately 4:30 a.m. concerning the fire at the Regal Inn. His assigned functions at the scene of the fire were search and rescue, and ventilation.

Upon arrival at the Regal Inn, the firefighters encountered a "heavy volume of fire on the second floor extending onto the roof" and heavy smoke conditions making visibility minimal. Hart was immediately ordered to perform search and rescue efforts on the "Delta" side of the building.² After gathering his necessary firefighting equipment, including a thermal imaging camera,³ Hart proceeded to the "Delta" side of the Regal Inn.

After making his way to a parking lot on the "Delta" side of the Regal Inn, Hart sought a way to access the second floor of the motel to search for any trapped occupants. In order to see better through the smoke, which by that time had enveloped the area in a shroud of darkness, he activated his thermal imaging camera and through it viewed the immediate areas of the building. Hart saw that heat from the fire was venting from the second floor but that there appeared to be no fire on the first floor of the motel. He then searched for a stairway to the second floor and saw through the thermal imaging camera what he believed to be a stairway to the second floor. Moving toward the perceived stairway, Hart removed his thermal imaging camera and used a railing on the side of the building to guide his way through the dense smoke. Hart admittedly was moving very slowly at the time because of the poor visibility and his concerns over tripping over a curb in the parking lot. As he continued to walk alongside the railing, Hart suddenly found himself stepping into an open space and, unable to prevent his descent, fell several feet into the well of an open and unguarded stairwell. Hart suffered severe injuries as a result of the fall.

Discussion

Hart asks this Court to decide whether he can recover against respondent for the injuries he suffered as a result of his fall while performing his duties as a firefighter. The answer to this question is to be arrived at by an examination of what has come to be known as the "fireman's rule" and whether this common-law rule, which generally prevents firefighters from "recovering tort based damages inflicted by a negligently created risk that required their presence on the scene in their professional capacity," applies. Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 642, 751 A.2d 481, 489 (2000).

The fireman's rule was first formulated in 1892 by the Illinois Supreme Court in Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892). The Illinois Supreme Court was faced with a situation where, while firefighters were on the scene of a fire, a rope on a freight elevator in the burning building snapped, dropping a heavy counterweight, which then fell on a firefighter's leg, causing so substantial an injury to the firefighter's leg that it had to be amputated above the knee. Utilizing the theory of premises liability and finding that the injured firefighter was to be classified as a mere licensee and not an invitee, the court barred the firefighter's action against the landowner, stating that "the general rule is that the licensor assumes no duty to the licensee, except the duty to refrain from affirmative or willful acts that work an injury." Id. at 184, 32 N.E. 182. As this Court has recognized, "[o]ne explanation ... for classifying firemen ... as licensees upon premises, rather than invitees, is because they are likely to enter at unforeseeable times, upon unusual parts of the premises, and under circumstances of emergency, where care in preparing for the visit cannot be expected and a duty to make the premises reasonably safe for them at all times would constitute a severe burden." Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 242-43, 384 A.2d 76, 79 (1978).

Maryland courts first adopted the fireman's rule in 1925 in the case of Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 A. 44 (1925). In Steinwedel, a member of a "fire insurance salvage corps,"⁴ who this Court determined was "in no more favorable a position, under common law principles, than a fireman," id. at 124, 131 A. at 45, was called to the scene of a fire and was injured when he fell into an open elevator shaft on the premises that he claimed was "negligently left open and unguarded." Id. at 122, 131 A. at 45. In its discussion as to whether the firefighter's negligence claim could proceed as against the owners and occupants of the premises, this Court initially stated that:

"according to the great weight of authorities the general rule of common law is that a fireman entering premises to put out fire is a licensee only, and not an invitee, and that the owner or occupant of the premises is not under any duty of care to keep his premises prepared and safe for a fireman.... `He must take the property as he finds it, and is entitled only not to be led into danger, "something like fraud."'"

Id. at 123-24, 131 A. at 45 (citations omitted). Observing that "there is no allegation that the elevator shaft was opened in or near a way prepared and set apart as a passage way, and the case is not rested upon any such concealment or deceptive appearance, `something like fraud,' put in the path of the plaintiff, as would render the danger a trap," this Court held that the firefighter's claim was thus barred by the fireman's rule. Id. at 125, 131 A. at 46. This Court based its adoption of the fireman's rule by classifying firefighters according to entrant-based categories of premises liability first recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court in Gibson and finding that firefighters at the scene of a fire are to be considered licensees on the premises.

Forty years later, in Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965), we once again had an opportunity to examine the basis and application of the fireman's rule in Maryland. In that case, Aravanis, a firefighter who had responded to a fire at Eisenberg's home, was severely burned by a sudden flash while he was fighting the fire. The fire started when Eisenberg, while working in his basement, knocked a tool off a work bench, causing the tool to fall down onto a jug containing acetone. The jug then...