Hart v. Trs. of Supreme Lodge of Fraternal Alliance

• Decision Date: 08 January 1901
• Citation: 108 Wis. 490,84 N.W. 851
• Parties: HART ET AL. v. TRUSTEES OF SUPREME LODGE OF FRATERNAL ALLIANCE.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

108 Wis. 490

84 N.W. 851

HART ET AL.

v.TRUSTEES OF SUPREME LODGE OF FRATERNAL ALLIANCE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 8, 1901.

Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee county; D. H. Johnson, Judge.

Action by George E. Hart and others against Trustees of Supreme Lodge of Fraternal Alliance. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Action on a benefit certificate of $2,000, issued by the defendant on the life of Richard H. Hart. The beneficiary being dead, the action is brought by children of deceased. The certificate was issued upon condition that the member should comply with all existing laws, rules, and regulations of the order, and such as might, from time to time thereafter, be adopted, and which should be and form a part of the contract. At the time of Mr. Hart's death, law 24 provided, among other things, as follows: “In case of death by suicide, whether sane or insane, except where insanity of such member shall have been prior thereto judicially determined, the entire and only liability under the contract shall be the amount of premiums paid thereon to the association by the insured, as shown by the records of the association, with interest thereon at six per cent. per annum, and the same shall be received by the beneficiary in full settlement of his policy.” Law 29 required that satisfactory proofs of all claims should be filed within 90 days from date of death; that true answers should be made to all questions asked relating to the health and death of insured; and that, in case of an inquest, there should be attached to, and made a part of, such proofs, “certified copies of the evidence, verdict, and proceedings on such inquest.” The answer alleged noncompliance with law 29, and also that Hart died from suicide. Upon the trial the plaintiffs offered in evidence the proofs of death, which included the instructions of the supreme lodge; the report of the committee of the subordinate lodge of which deceased was a member; a recommendation by the lodge of payment of the claim; a certificate of the coroner that he had investigated the cause of death, and that the cause of death was suicide by carbolic acid; a certificate of a friend, who also stated that the cause of death was suicide; and a certificate of the undertaker of the interment. The death occurred January 9, 1899. A demand for payment of the claim was made March 22d, and on April 28th the defendant, by its attorney, denied liability on the ground that Hart died by his own hand, and offered to pay the amount of premiums paid by deceased, with interest. Other formal proofs were made, and plaintiffs rested their case. A motion for a nonsuit was overruled, and duly excepted to. The defendant attempted to prove that objections to proofs of death were made on the ground that they were not accompanied by a certified copy of the testimony taken by the coroner, but, under objection, the court ruled out the testimony. The defendant showed by the coroner that several witnesses were sworn on the inquest, and by the doctors who made the examination of the body that death resulted from carbolic acid poisoning. A motion for direction of a verdict for the defendant was denied, and the court instructed the jury that the failure to attach copies of the testimony taken at the inquest was not a material omission; that the statement in the proofs of death that Hart's death was from suicide “raises a presumption against the beneficiaries”; and that the burden of proof was on them “to establish to a reasonable certainty that the deceased came to his death from some other cause than suicide.” A verdict was found for plaintiffs for the amount of the certificate, less the amount of premiums paid by deceased, which had been paid into court by defendant. A motion for a new trial was denied, and from a judgment for plaintiffs the defendant brings this appeal.Quarles, Spence & Quarles, for appellant.

M. N. Lando, for respondents.

BARDEEN, J. (after stating the facts).

The certificate in suit provided that, in case of suicide, the only liability under the contract should be the amount of the premiums paid by the insured, with 6 per cent. interest. The proofs of death showed that deceased came to his death by suicide. The doctors who made the post mortem examination testified that they found a quantity of carbolic acid in the stomach of deceased; that the entire lining of the stomach was “eaten off and burned up”; and that it was congested and swollen. Their conclusion was that death was caused by carbolic acid poisoning. Concerning this fact the evidence does not admit of reasonable controversy. As already noted, the proofs of death furnished by plaintiffs showed that the death of the insured was from suicide. Such proofs, when offered by defendant, were admissible as tending to prove the fact of suicide. They operated as admissions against interest, and, while not conclusive, were competent prima facie evidence against the beneficiaries. Bachmeyer v. Association, 82 Wis. 255, 52 N. W. 101;Id., 87 Wis. 325, 58 N. W. 399;Hanna v. Insurance Co., 150 N. Y. 526, 44 N. E. 1099;Insurance Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall. 32, 22 L. Ed. 793. These admissions, taken in connection with the testimony of the doctors as to the cause of death, absolutely barred a recovery in this case, unless it was shown that such poison was not taken with suicidal intent. No such showing was made. What little evidence there...