Hart v. Wood

Decision Date27 May 1965
Docket NumberNo. 8330,8330
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
PartiesElizabeth HART, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Art WOOD, Administrator of the Estate of Lucy Ann Louise James, Defendant-Appellant.

John A. Honssinger, Lebanon, Claude T. Wood, Richland, for defendant-appellant.

J. W. Grossenheider, Lebanon, for plaintiff-respondent.

HOGAN, Judge.

In this case, the respondent claimant sought to recover the sum of $1,000.00 for services rendered to Lucy Ann Louise James, deceased, during a three-year period from the fall of 1956 to September 1959. The claim was originally filed in probate court and was transferred to circuit court for a jury trial under the provisions of Section 473.420, par. 2. 1 The jury awarded the claimant the sum of $400.00, and the defendant administrator has appealed.

Miss James was a single woman of advanced years who, during the period in question, lived alone on a small farm near Lebanon in Laclede County, Missouri. Mrs. Hart, the claimant, is a member of the Sutherland family, whose home is only a short distance from Miss James' farm. During the time with which we are concened, the claimant's brother, Mr. James Sutherland, and her sister, Mrs. Elsie Crall, lived with their father at the Sutherland home. The claimant did not live there, although she lived in the neighborhood. This case actually represents but one aspect of a claim originally made jointly by the claimant, her brother and her sister. The Sutherlands were not related to Miss James though, as might be expected, a number of the members of the community were related to the decedent in one degree or another, including the wife of the appellant administrator. It should also be noted that subsequent to the period here involved, Miss James became ill and was declared incompetent. During the period from September 8, 1959, to the date of Miss James' death on November 24, 1960, Mrs. Hart served as Miss James' guardian, and this claim was filed after Mr. Wood had qualified as administrator of Miss James' estate.

A considerable amount of proof was adduced by both parties upon the trial of this case, and on many points the evidence is in spirited conflict. However, in determining whether the claimant made a submissible case, we must review the proof in the light most favorable to the claimant, considering all factual inferences which a jury might reasonably have drawn and setting aside all evidence unfavorable to the result reached. Ashley v. Williams, 365 Mo. 286, 290, 281 S.W.2d 875, 877-878; Allmon v. Allmon, Mo.App., 314 S.W.2d 457, 459. So considered, there is substantial evidence that in 1956 Miss James returned to her farm home from a boarding or rooming house where she had been staying; at that time she was approximately 72 years old and was physically, and possibly mentally, unable to care for herself and attend to her elementary needs. In the language of one witness, 'she wasn't able to do nothing, or stay by herself,' and in the words of another, she was unable to care for herself because she was 'feebleminded.'

The Sutherland family, consisting at the time of the claimant's sister, brother and father, lived nearby, approximately one-fourth mile from Miss James. The claimant did not live in this house but was frequently there. The basis of the claim is that the three members of the Sutherland family cooked, washed, ironed, and provided other personal services for Miss James from the fall of 1956 to September 1959, before Miss James contracted her terminal illness, and indeed the claimant's evidence indicates that during that period Miss James became almost completely dependent upon the Sutherland family.

The claimant's proof was that Miss James would telephone one or another member of the Sutherland family several times daily asking to be assisted with some household chore, or asking that some errand be run. Several nights a week, the decedent would call at the Sutherland home, 'a lot of times * * * while we was eating supper,' and would remain until about 10:00 P.M. Sometimes she would spend several consecutive nights at the Sutherland home, and on other occasions she would call during the day.

Miss James owned no automobile and was unable to drive. When she had business to transact in town, either the claimant or some member of her family would, at her request, transport her to town to attend to her business. The claimant's evidence was that the nearest grocery store was six miles away. The decedent bought groceries in small quantities, and 'two or three times a week' Mrs. Hart would either drive the claimant to the grocery store or purchase and deliver Miss James' groceries for her while the claimant was purchasing her own. Miss James cooked and heated her home with a wood stove, but she was unable to cut or carry her wood, and as a consequence Mrs. Hart and the other Sutherlands were obliged to see that the decedent was provided with fuel, and quite often were required to prepare her meals for her.

Other services rendered to Miss James by the claimant were of a very personal nature. Though there is, as we say, evidence to the contrary, the claimant's proof was that Miss James was slovenly, unkempt, and dirty much of the time, and indeed one witness testified that she was sometimes covered with vermin. 2 Mrs. Hart (and sometimes Mrs. Crall) bathed Miss James, pared her toenails, and shampooed her hair in order to keep her clean, and either one or the other regularly washed and ironed Miss James' clothing. The claimant's evidence was that all these services were rendered at Miss James' request. This is, in a general way, the substance of the claimant's case, but other facts will be more specifically noted in the course of the opinion.

The appellant's first point, which he makes rather indirectly, is that the claimant made no submissible case as to her claim for transportation furnished because she made no proof of the value of those services. Relying heavily upon our ruling in Allmon v. Allmon, supra, 314 S.W.2d at 463-464[12, 13], the appellant has painstakingly and rather elaborately drawn a factual parallel between this case and the Allmon case, arguing that the evidence furnishes no guide whatever for the jury to determine the distances involved, the mode of transportation used nor the expenses incurred on the trips, and that there is no evidence whatever of the reasonable value of the transportation furnished. The respondent answers this point by saying that the services rendered were such that their reasonable value was a matter of common knowledge, and therefore it was unnecessary to prove their value.

Of course, cases of this kind sound in quantum meruit, and ordinarily it is essential for a plaintiff in quantum meruit to make proof of the reasonable value of the services rendered or the materials furnished. Williams v. Cass, Mo.App., 372 S.W.2d 156, 161[10, 11]. An exception is made to this rule, however, where the value of the services furnished is a matter of common knowledge, Ashley v. Williams, supra, 365 Mo. at 294, 281 S.W.2d at 881; In re Hartle's Estate, Mo.App., 236 S.W.2d 40, 41-42; 98 C.J.S. Work and Labor, Sec. 57, page 807, and our courts have quite often said that the value of domestic services is a matter which the jury may determine from its own knowledge without the aid of opinion evidence. Ashley v. Williams, supra, 365 Mo. at 294, 281 S.W.2d at 881; Murray v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 236, 240-241, 13 S.W. 817, 818; Boyher v. Gearhart's Estate, Mo.App., 367 S.W.2d 1, 5[5, 6]; Wise v. Rubenstein, Mo.App., 24 S.W.2d 203, 205-206.

We do not understand the appellant administrator to question these general principles. He carries his argument a step further, however, and in effect argues that since the respondent claimed compensation for furnishing transportation, as well as for the domestic services she rendered, she was obliged to make proof of the value of the transportation furnished, because that was not a matter within the common knowledge of men. We think we must reject this contention. We can readily agree that the testimony bearing on the claim for 'transportation' is diffuse and somewhat indistinct, but we cannot agree that the evidence wholly fails to show the nature of the services rendered as 'transportation' services, nor do we interpret Allmon v. Allmon, supra, 314 S.W.2d at 463-464[12, 13], as a ruling that services of the kind here characterized as 'transportation' cannot be evaluated by a jury as a matter of common knowledge.

What the respondent laid claim to, so far as 'transportation' is concerned, was compensation for doing Miss James' marketing, and on occasion providing her with a ride to 'town' to attend to business or consult a physician. There was substantial evidence from which a jury could have found that it was about six miles to the nearest grocery store, and that Mrs. Hart, sometimes accompanied by another member of her family, did Miss James' marketing 'at least' once or twice weekly during the three-year period involved. There is also substantial evidence from which a jury could infer that it was about twelve miles to Lebanon, or 'town,' and that Miss James rode to Lebanon with Mrs. Hart about three times a month. There is also evidence that, on occasion, Mrs. Crall would accompany the claimant and Miss James to Lebanon so that Mrs. Crall could assist Mrs. Hart in caring for the decedent.

We do not follow the appellants' contention that the respondent's claim must be construed as a claim for the value of transportation on a mileage, or unit cost, basis. We think the claimant's proof is quite as readily subject to the inference, as far as 'transportation' was concerned, that she sought to recover simply for the inconvenience or discommodity involved in doing the marketing and making the periodic trips to Lebanon. In other words, the claimant was seeking compensation as Miss James' driver,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • James' Estate, In re
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 23 Octubre 1970
    ...judgment. The factual setting of the case has been reported before, see In re Estate of James, Mo.App., 431 S.W.2d 660, and Hart v. Wood, Mo.App., 392 S.W.2d 20, and need not be restated at Lucy Ann Louis James died intestate in Laclede County, Missouri, on November 24 or 25, 1960. At her d......
  • Cheshire v. Barbour
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 20 Marzo 1970
    ...services of personal care and attention such as here involved fall within the rule. See Miller v. Judd, Okl., 429 P.2d 714; Hart v. Wood, Mo.App., 392 S.W.2d 20. Our Kentucky cases consistently have held that the value of such services is a matter of proof. See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 299 K......
  • State ex rel. Seiser's Estate v. Lasky, 39768
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 18 Abril 1978
    ...probate court, that trial de novo is limited to the specific issue(s) raised in the order from which an appeal was taken. Hart v. Wood, 392 S.W.2d 20(13) (Mo.App.1965). Here, the order appealed from involved only one issue whether or not good cause was alleged and proved so as to justify se......
  • Strauser v. Strauser's Estate
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 17 Octubre 1978
    ...unless it has an understanding of the nature and extent of the services performed. Tuttle, supra, 215 S.W.2d at 49; See Hart v. Wood, 392 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Mo.App.1965). Plaintiffs offered few specifics as to the nature and extent of the work they performed on the There was evidence that Claud......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT