Hartfield v. Osborne

• Decision Date: 16 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 15–20275.,15–20275.
• Citation: 808 F.3d 1066
• Parties: Jerry HARTFIELD, Petitioner–Appellant v. Frank D. OSBORNE, Sheriff, Matagorda County Jail, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

808 F.3d 1066

Jerry HARTFIELD, Petitioner–Appellant

v.Frank D. OSBORNE, Sheriff, Matagorda County Jail, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 15–20275.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 16, 2015.

David R. Dow (argued), Houston, TX, for Petitioner–Appellant.

J. Campbell Barker, Deputy Solicitor General (argued), Joseph Peter Corcoran, Assistant Attorney General, Richard Bernard Farrer, Attorney, Austin, TX, for Respondent–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, KING and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner–Appellant Jerry Hartfield filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hartfield argued that his right to a speedy trial had been violated by the State of Texas because the State had held him in prison for approximately thirty years without a valid state court judgment and without retrying him consistent with the mandate of the State's highest criminal court. The district court denied Hartfield's petition, reasoning that federal courts do not reach the merits of speedy trial claims on pretrial habeas review absent "special circumstances." However, the court issued Hartfield a certificate of appealability as to whether "special circumstances" are present in this case. Although Hartfield was not in custody pursuant to a state court judgment when he originally filed his petition, he was convicted by a Texas state court following the district court's decision. Because he has been convicted, any writ of habeas corpus granted by a federal court will necessarily free him from custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 now applies to Hartfield's petition. Section 2254 imposes a specific exhaustion requirement on habeas petitioners, which involves a different inquiry than whether "special circumstances" exist. Because the existence of "special circumstances" is no longer relevant and because we lack jurisdiction over anything related to § 2254 based on the certificate of appealability issued by the district court, we DISMISS his appeal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 30, 1977, a jury convicted Petitioner–Appellant Jerry Hartfield of the capital murder of Eunice Lowe and sentenced him to death. See Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2014, pet. ref'd) (describing the procedural history of the current matter). On direct appeal, Hartfield asserted, inter alia, that the trial court erred by improperly excluding a prospective juror who voiced general objections to the death penalty. Agreeing with Hartfield, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a new trial on September 17, 1980.

On October 2, 1980, the State sought leave to file a motion for rehearing and urged the CCA to reform Hartfield's death sentence to life imprisonment instead of remanding for a new trial. Alternatively, the State sought a reasonable period of time to seek a commutation of Hartfield's sentence from the Governor. After granting the State's motion for leave to file a motion for rehearing on November 26, 1980, the CCA denied that motion on January 26, 1983, explaining that Texas law and its prior holdings prevented it from reforming Hartfield's sentence. See Hartfield v. Thaler, 498 Fed.Appx. 440, 442 (5th Cir.2012) (per curiam) (unpublished) (describing the procedural history). On February 10, 1983, the State moved for leave to file a second motion for rehearing, which the CCA denied on March 1. On March 4, 1983, the CCA issued its mandate to the trial court, directing that the trial court's judgment be reversed and the cause retried. Id. On March 14, 1983, the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles recommended to the Governor that he commute Hartfield's death sentence to life imprisonment, and the Governor signed a proclamation, ostensibly commuting Hartfield's sentence, on March 15. Following these events, neither the State nor Hartfield took any further action. Hartfield remained in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice thereafter. Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d at 809.

After over 20 years in prison, Hartfield filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court on November 14, 2006, which he supplemented with a claim under the Speedy Trial Clause on November 27, 2006. Hartfield, 498 Fed.Appx. at 443. After the state courts dismissed two of Hartfield's habeas petitions, Hartfield filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on October 22, 2007, claiming that he had been deprived of a new trial following the CCA's 1983 decision, in violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court in the Southern District held that Hartfield's petition "was actually a pre-conviction habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241," as Hartfield was not being held pursuant to a state court judgment, and transferred the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The district court in the Eastern District agreed with the assessment of the district court in the Southern District and held that Hartfield had failed to exhaust his state remedies. Consequently, the court dismissed his petition without prejudice to allow him to bring his claims properly before the state court.

Both sides appealed to this court, with the State challenging the district court's determination that Hartfield was not in custody pursuant to a state court judgment and Hartfield challenging the requirement that he exhaust his speedy trial claim in state court. Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d at 810. Finding no controlling state precedent on the status of Hartfield's conviction, this court certified the following question to the CCA on November 28, 2012: Was Hartfield's judgment of conviction effectively vacated by the CCA prior to the governor's commutation in 1983? Hartfield, 498 Fed.Appx. at 445.

Responding to this court's certified question on June 12, 2013, the CCA held that "[t]he status of the judgment of conviction is that [Hartfield] is under no conviction or sentence." Hartfield v. Thaler, 403 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.2013). The CCA explained that when its mandate issued, it returned Hartfield's case "to the point it would have been had there never been a trial," before the Governor issued his proclamation ostensibly commuting Hartfield's sentence. Id. at 239. Because there was no sentence to commute, the Governor's proclamation had no effect on Hartfield's case. Id. Based on the CCA's answer to its certified question, this court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hartfield's habeas petition without prejudice on July 18, 2013. Hartfield v. Stephens, 536 Fed.Appx. 455, 456 (5th Cir.2013) (unpublished).

On June 20, 2013, Hartfield filed three habeas petitions in a state trial court, asserting his speedy trial claim. Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d at 810. Reaching the merits of Hartfield's speedy trial claim, the trial court found no speedy trial violation and held that Hartfield could be retried. Id. at 811. Hartfield appealed the trial court's decision on April 25, 2014, and the state appellate court determined that Hartfield's speedy trial claim could not be raised prior to trial and, accordingly, vacated the portion of the trial court's order denying Hartfield's habeas petition on the merits. Id. at 817–18. Hartfield then returned to the CCA seeking discretionary review, but that court denied his petition and his subsequent motion for rehearing. Ex parte Hartfield, Nos. PD–1084–14, PD–1085–14, PD–1086–14 (Tex.Crim.App.2014).

On October 13, 2014, Hartfield initiated the instant case, raising his now-exhausted speedy trial claim in a pretrial federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court granted summary judgment to the State on April 21, 2015. The court abstained from reviewing Hartfield's speedy trial claim "[b]ased on the pendency of the state criminal proceedings and the availability of state court remedies." Citing this court's decision in Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir.1987), the district court explained that, although exhaustion of state remedies is not mandated for pretrial claims under § 2241, "well-established Fifth Circuit precedent holds that the federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over pretrial habeas corpus claims if the issues raised in the petition may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court or by other state procedures available to the petitioner." The court further explained that "absent ‘special circumstances,’ pretrial habeas relief is available only to enforce a state's obligation to bring a defendant promptly to trial, not to adjudicate the merits of a speedy trial claim ... and bar the state from proceeding to trial."

The district court correctly pointed out that this court "has not clarified what ‘special circumstances' might warrant an exception from this rule." After noting that the Supreme Court has explained that "the Speedy Trial Clause does not ... encompass a ‘right not to be tried,’ " United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 861, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978), and that "most speedy trial claims ... are best considered only after the relevant facts have been developed at trial," id. at 858, 98 S.Ct. 1547, the district court found that Hartfield had "not presented any special circumstances that would justify consideration of his speedy-trial claim on pretrial federal habeas review." Accordingly, the court denied Hartfield's petition.

While the district court denied Hartfield's habeas petition, it considered, sua sponte, whether to grant Hartfield a certificate of appealability (COA). Noting that a court may only issue a COA when "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a...