Maldonado v. Lumpkin

Decision Date29 October 2021
Docket NumberCivil Action 7:20-cv-00222
PartiesGENARO MARTINEZ MALDONADO (TDCJ #02194418), Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Juan F. Alanis, United States Magistrate Judge

Petitioner Genaro Martinez Maldonado, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. No. 1.) The case was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). This court has construed Petitioner's application as a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and recharacterized it as such. (Dkt. No. 3.) Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 16, 2020. (Dkt. No. 5.) On December 15 2020, Petitioner filed a response in opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 6.)

After carefully considering each of the parties' pleadings and responses, and the state court record in light of the applicable law, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has not shown a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. It is recommended that Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 5) be GRANTED. Petitioner's application for § 2254 habeas relief is barred by the AEDPA limitations period and for non-exhaustion; and the claims, themselves, if considered, are meritless. Accordingly, it is recommended that Petitioner's § 2254 petition (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice.

Finally it is recommended that the District Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability in this matter.

BACKGROUND
I. The Events of April 17, 2016

This case arises out of a shooting that took place at Jaguars Gold Club in Edinburg, Texas on April 17, 2016. See Dkt. No. 15-1 at 3.[1] The shooting resulted in several injuries and the death of one individual. Id. According to Edinburg police reports, surveillance camera footage shows a group of seven individuals, three women and four men, arriving at Jaguars at 3:46 a.m., shortly before the shooting took place. Id. at 12. The floor manager, Juan Francisco Martinez, told officers that the four men were aggressive, so they were asked to leave. Id. Surveillance footage, which shows the men being escorted out of the club at 4:40 a.m., corroborates the floor manager's statement. Id. As Jaguars' staff escorted the men out of the building, a scuffle ensued. Id. As the scuffle was ongoing, one of the men fired several rounds from a high-power rifle into the club entrance. Id. at 6,12. Shortly thereafter, the men left the club in the vehicle they arrived in. Id. at 12-13.

After the shooting, Jaxmany Montes Hernandez was observed lying on the floor to the right of the entrance of the bar. Mr. Montes had a gunshot wound to his right rib area and was later pronounced dead as result of said gunshot wound. See Dkt. No. 15-1 at 2, 8-9. Besides Mr. Montes, seven other victims were identified by law enforcement with gunshot wounds of varying degrees but each survived the incident. Id. at 3-4.

Three days after the shooting, Edinburg police released the surveillance footage to local news outlets to identify the shooter. See Dkt. No. 15-1 at 18. That same day, police received a tip, identifying the shooter in the video as Genaro Martinez Maldonado, Petitioner. Id. at 19. The club's manager, Alfredo Ortuno, was presented with a photo lineup containing Petitioner's photo and Ortuno positively identified Petitioner as one of the shooting suspects. Id. at 20. Based on the photo lineup, police obtained an arrest warrant for Petitioner. Id. The identification of Petitioner as the shooter was subsequently corroborated by two of the women who were with Petitioner on the night of the shooting, Marisol Aguilar and Joanna Bazan. Id. at 24, 29-32. After his arrest and arraignment, while in custody, Petitioner apparently bragged to other inmates about the shooting, implicating himself in the murder. Id. at 28.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of murder in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 19.02. See Dkt. No. 5-1 at2,43. Petitioner pled guilty to the offense on May 1,2018 in the 93rd District Court in Hidalgo County, Texas, before the Honorable Judge Roberto Garza. Id. at 2. Petitioner was subsequently sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment pursuant to a plea agreement.[2]Id. at 2-4, 36-37. Petitioner did not file an appeal.

II. Petitioner's Habeas Petition

Petitioner filed the present petition for habeas corpus on August 11, 2020. See Dkt. No. 1. Petitioner seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) on the following grounds:

(1) the state district court did not properly advise Petitioner of the correct mandatory minimum sentence;
(2) the state district court failed to properly inform Petitioner of the nature of the cause to which he entered a guilty plea;
(3) Petitioner's guilty plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made because the state district court failed to ensure that Petitioner understood the charged offense;
(4) the state district court failed to properly inform Petitioner of any possible defenses and entitlements to lesser included offenses; and
(5) there was insufficient evidence to support Petitioner's conviction.

Id. at 4-5. Even though the proceedings were in state court, Petitioner relies, in part, on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (setting forth procedures for pleas in federal court) as the basis for his claims. Id. at 3.

On August 19, 2020, the undersigned construed the petition as an application for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Dkt. No. 3. The State was ordered to respond. Id. On November 16, 2020, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his claims and is time-barred from bringing the present action pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)[3]. See Dkt. No. 5 at 3.

In his response filed December 15, 2020, Petitioner claims that he is not barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations “because Petitioner's Claims have not been adjudicated by the State or Federal Courts.” See Dkt. No. 6 at 3. Further, Petitioner has not exhausted his claims because he did not have a right to appeal and a state writ of habeas corpus would have been ineffective because Petitioner could not bring his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims at the state level, nor could he bring forth the claim of insufficient evidence. Id. at 4-5. Petitioner also submits that, pursuant to § 2254(B)(i), the exhaustion requirement can be waived. Id. at 5. Finally, Petitioner claims that relief pursuant to § 2254 is inadequate and Petitioner's claim never should have been recharacterized as a petition under § 2254. Id. at 6-7. Petitioner reasserts the claims from his original petition for habeas relief and asserts that summary judgment should be denied because Petitioner has demonstrated that there are genuine issues of a factual dispute between the parties. Id. at 9, 11.

On July 23, 2021, the undersigned ordered the Respondent to file State Exhibit #2 by August 23,2021. (Dkt. No. 7.) On August 20,2021, the Respondent filed a motion for extension of time. (Dkt. No. 10.) After this motion was granted, the Respondent replied by requesting to file record (State Exhibit #2) under seal and also requesting that a copy not be provided to Petitioner. (Dkt. Nos. 11-13.) On September 9, 2021, the undersigned denied the request and ordered Respondent to file a redacted version of State Exhibit #2 by September 30, 2021, and to provide a copy of said redacted version to Petitioner. (Dkt. No. 14.) On September 28, 2021, the Respondent submitted a redacted version of State Exhibit #2 and noted that a copy was provided to Petitioner by mail. (Dkt. Nos. 15, 15-1.)

APPLICABLE LAW
I. Summary Judgment Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Once the movant for summary judgment presents “a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show with ‘significant probative evidence' that there exists a genuine issue of material fact.” Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473,477 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). A district court must construe . disputed facts in a light favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Within the habeas context, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply so long as there is not a conflict with the federal rules governing habeas proceedings. Banister v. Davis, __ U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 1698 (2020) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(4) and Rule 12 of Rules Governing § 2254 Cases). Therefore, these claims are reviewed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) unless there is a conflict with the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

II. Federal Habeas Review of State Proceedings
a. Section 2241 vs. Section 2254

Petitioner proceeds without an attorney. Accordingly, he is entitled to a more liberal . construction of his filings. Pleadings filed by a pro se litigant are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by practicing attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Pena v. United States, 122 F.3d 3, 4 (5th Cir. 1997); Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep't, 86 F.3d 469 472 & n. 16 (5th Cir. 1996). “It is the substance of the relief sought by a pro se pleading, not the label that the petitioner has attached to it, that determines the true nature and operative effect of a habeas filing.” ...

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