Hartfield v. State

• Decision Date: 09 November 1936
• Docket Number: 32101
• Citation: 170 So. 531,176 Miss. 776
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: HARTFIELD v. STATE

170 So. 531

176 Miss. 776

HARTFIELD v. STATE

No. 32101

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 9, 1936

Division B

1 HOMICIDE.

Whether accused had reasonable grounds to apprehend that his life was in danger so as to justify homicide on grounds of self-defense held for jury.

2 HOMICIDE.

Apprehension of danger which will justify homicide on grounds of self-defense must be apprehension of such danger as would or should under circumstances be entertained by a reasonably well-disposed man of average prudence.

3 HOMICIDE.

Whether apprehension of danger which would justify homicide on ground of self-defense was real, and such as would under circumstances have been entertained by reasonably well-disposed man of average prudence, is for the jury.

4. HOMICIDE.

Ordinarily, erroneous instructions dealing primarily with issue of murder will not reverse a manslaughter verdict, since accused is presumed not to have been prejudiced by any instructions relating to that degree of crime.

5. HOMICIDE.

Rule that erroneous instructions upon issue of murder will not reverse manslaughter verdict is not applicable to murder instructions which are erroneous and are so drawn as to be capable of interpretation by jury that thereunder justification of self-defense is wholly cut off, not only as to murder, but also as to manslaughter.

6. HOMICIDE.

Self-defense is a defense to any form of prosecution for homicide.

7. CRIMINAL LAW.

In murder prosecution, erroneous instructions which could be understood as cutting off justification of self-defense not only as to murder, but as to manslaughter, could not be cured by instructions granted defendant, where instructions would be contradictory, and hence not curative.

8. HOMICIDE.

In murder prosecution, wherein defendant was convicted of manslaughter, instruction that malice is implied from nature of weapon used, and deliberate use of deadly weapon in a difficulty, and not in necessary self-defense, is evidence of malice, held harmfully erroneous, in view of other erroneous instructions capable of being interpreted so as to cut off justification of self-defense, and where all facts surrounding homicide were fully disclosed.

9. HOMICIDE.

Where all facts surrounding homicide are fully disclosed, it is error to instruct jury that deliberate use of a deadly weapon is evidence of malice, or that malice is presumed from such use, since presumption must yield to evidence.

HON. A. G. BUSBY, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Greene county, HON. A. G. BUSBY, Judge.

Hardie Hartfield was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Jesse M. Byrd, of Leakesville, and Currie & Currie, of Hattiesburg, for appellant.

Tested by sound principles of law, having due regard to the inalienable right of self-defense, and viewed in the light of natural human conduct under such circumstances as surrounded the appellant, it would seem that the appellant was justified upon the ground of self-defense. He was corralled, hemmed in, in a house, confronted with an enemy and threatened with death or great bodily harm and this would seem to be a situation calling for self-preservation and that is all self-defense is--that is the right--and the appellant was clearly entitled to discharge by the court and the peremptory instruction requested by him should have been granted. It was error to refuse it.

On a record entitling the appellant to a peremptory instruction on the ground of self-defense, the court, at the request of the state, granted the state an instruction depriving the appellant of the right of self-defense.

The right of self-defense is not even close in this case. That right rides high and wide on the wings of the whole evidence in the case. It was not subject to being pinched, cramped, hampered, restricted, denied or forfeited by any such instruction.

The evidence shows conclusively that the deceased had not abandoned the difficulty before he was shot.

There can be no presumption of malice from the mere use of a deadly weapon when all the facts and circumstances connected with its use are fully explained by the sworn evidence of witnesses.

Jackson v. State, 140 So. 683.

Two of the instructions, both dealing with murder, are in direct and irreconcilable conflict with each other.

These instructions cannot be reconciled. They are in direct and unexplainable conflict with themselves. And neither should have been granted, and it was error to grant both because there was not an element of murder in the case.

Webb M. Mize, Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.

The facts in this case make a case for the jury. Therefore, we submit that the lower court was correct in refusing the peremptory instructions and we submit that the verdict of the jury is not contrary to the law and the evidence.

Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841, 105 So. 784; Winston v. State, 127 Miss. 477, 90 So. 177; Hall v. State, 128 Miss. 641, 91 So. 397; Joyce v. State, 169 So. 759.

The jury was well instructed as to the defense relied on by appellant. There were sixteen instructions granted at his request and nearly all of these instructions in some way explained to the jury the defendant's rights when acting in self defense. Also a number of the state's instructions informed the jury that the defendant had the right to act in self defense under certain circumstances.

There is ample testimony in the record to show that the difficulty of the morning had been abandoned and upon the evidence, as presented, the jury had the right to determine whether or not the difficulty had been abandoned.

Under the facts, as disclosed in the record, it was a peculiar province of the jury to decide just what, if anything, the appellant was guilty of and it was most proper to submit an instruction on manslaughter.

Thomas v. State, 124 So. 766; Daniels v. State, 136 So. 725; Gregory v. State, 152 Miss. 133, 118 So. 906; Joyce v. State, 169 So. 759.

Appellant complains of the court below refusing the instruction telling the jury that they could not find the defendant guilty of murder. We say that the court correctly refused this instruction for the reason that the testimony would have amply supported a verdict of murder and that where there is evidence upon which to base a conviction of murder and where the jury convicted of manslaughter appellant was not prejudiced thereby and cannot complain.

Triplett v. State, 159 Miss. 365, 132 So. 448; Blaylock v. State, 141 Miss. 1, 113 So. 627; Everett v. State, 147 Miss. 57, 113 So. 186; Thomas v. State, 124 So. 766; Daniels v. State, 136 So. 725; Gregory v. State, 152 Miss. 133, 118 So. 906.

Argued orally by Neil T. Currie, for appellant, and by Webb M. Mize, for appellee.

OPINION

Griffith, J.

Appellant was indicted for the alleged murder of Al Lawrence, and on the trial was convicted of manslaughter. The main facts are that on the morning of the homicide, which occurred late that afternoon, the deceased went to the home of Maggie Bonney, at which home Bernice Hartfield was temporarily residing. Deceased found appellant present at this place, and seemed to be displeased because of that fact. Deceased departed, but about noon returned, armed with a shotgun, and, as the aggressor, entered into a dangerous altercation with appellant. The neighbors hastened to the scene, disarmed the deceased, and persuaded him to leave. Later, about five o'clock, deceased returned, at which time Maggie Bonney and the other permanent members of the household happened to be absent, but were yet within sight of the house, in which only Bernice Hartfield and appellant remained.

When deceased approached the house, he passed by the gate which opened in front of the entrance to the house, and at a point beyond climbed the fence, thence jumped upon the west end of the front porch, went past the first of two doors opening to the porch and to the second door, broke this door open, and entered the east front bedroom. When the woman saw the approach of the deceased, she shut and fastened the door, and called to the appellant that deceased was coming. Whereupon appellant seized a shotgun belonging to the house and always kept there, and which was standing in a corner, and went immediately to a place near. the northwest corner of the west bedroom. There was a doorway between these two bedrooms, but there was no door in this opening. In it, however, there was suspended a curtain of a flimsy material so thin in texture as to be transparent.

When deceased entered the east bedroom, he appeared to be in search of something or of some one; and, according to appellant, he was armed with an iron rod...