Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wesolowski

• Citation: 305 N.E.2d 907,350 N.Y.S.2d 895,33 N.Y.2d 169
• Parties: , 305 N.E.2d 907 HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Edward WESOLOWSKI, as Administrator of the Estate of Julia Ras, also known as Julia Wesolowski, Deceased, et al., Respondents.
• Decision Date: 21 November 1973
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 895

350 N.Y.S.2d 895

33 N.Y.2d 169, 305 N.E.2d 907

HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Edward WESOLOWSKI, as Administrator of the Estate of Julia

Ras, also known as Julia Wesolowski, Deceased, et

al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 21, 1973.

Frank G. Godson, Buffalo, for appellant.

David MacRae Wagner and James J. McCabe, Nanuet, for respondents.

JONES, Judge.

Where the insured's automobile struck one oncoming vehicle, ricocheted off and struck a second more than 100 feet away, was there more than one 'occurrence' within the meaning of the provision fixing limits of liability in an automobile insurance policy?

Appellant moved for summary judgment in an action by it for a declaration that the claims filed by respondents against its insured, Gerald Koningisor, all arose out of a single 'occurrence' under the terms of the applicable automobile insurance policy. Supreme Court, Erie County, denied the motion on the ground that it was a question of fact for the jury whether there was more than a single occurrence. On appeal the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed. Pursuant to leave granted by the Appellate Division, the case is now before our court on the certified question: 'Was the order of this Court (Appellate Division) entered May 25, 1972 properly made?'

The certified question should be answered in the negative, the order of the Appellate Division reversed, and appellant's motion for summary judgment granted.

Gerald Koningisor, insured by appellant, was the owner and operator of a motor vehicle which collided with two cars while traveling southbound on Route 240 in Erie County. Koningisor first sideswiped one northbound vehicle (respondent Barreca) and then continued on to a head-on collision with a second northbound vehicle (respondent Ras). On examinations before trial there was testimony that the Koningisor vehicle was traveling 50 to 60 miles per hour and that before the collisions the northbound vehicles were proceeding 400 to 500 feet apart. The Appellate Division also found that the Koningisor vehicle had traveled at least 130 feet between the first and the second collisions.

Actions were brought to recover for personal injuries and wrongful death against Koningisor and his insurance company. The latter then tendered $20,000 to settle all of the actions, asserting that Koningisor's automobile liability insurance policy limited coverage to $20,000 for each 'occurrence' and that there had been only one 'occurrence' here. Respondents rejected the $20,000 settlement, asserting that no such limit existed because each of the two collisions was a separate 'occurrence' and that the actual damages involved were far in excess of $20,000.

We confront two questions on this appeal, one procedural, the other substantive. First, is the construction of the insurance policy to be left to a jury, as both courts below have held, or is it for the court to determine? Second, if the court is to construe the provisions of the insurance policy, how shall we then interpret the word 'occurrence' in this case?

The objective in any question of the interpretation of a written contract, of course, is to determine 'what is the intention of the parties as derived from the language employed' (4 Williston, Contracts (3d ed.), § 600, p. 280). At the same time the test on a motion for summary judgment is whether there are issues of fact properly to be resolved by a jury (CPLR 3212, subd. (b)). In general the courts have declared on countless occasions that it is the responsibility of the court to interpret written instruments (Williston, Op. cit., § 601, p. 303). This is obviously so where there is no ambiguity. (Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Turner Constr. Co., 2 N.Y.2d 456, 161 N.Y.S.2d 90, 141 N.E.2d 590.)

If there is ambiguity in the terminology used, however, and determination of the intent of the parties depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence, then such determination is to be made by the jury (Restatement, 2d, Contracts, T.D. No. 5, § 238). On the other hand, if the equivocality must be resolved wholly without reference to extrinsic evidence the issue is to be determined as a question of law for the court. (Cf. Mallad Constr. Corp. v. County Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 32 N.Y.2d 285, 291, 344 N.Y.S.2d 925, 298 N.E.2d 96.)

We hold that the interpretation of the provisions of the insurance policy in the circumstances of this case is an issue to be decided by our Court on appellate review.

As the parties agree, there is no relevant evidence extrinsic to the insurance policy bearing on the intention of the parties at the time of its execution. Thus, there is no question of credibility and there are no inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence. As to the accident, the controlling facts are adequately before us. There is no controversy as to what happened when the cars collided, and there is no offer of further proof.

Additionally both appellant and respondent agree that this case presents no dispute of fact for a jury and urge us to decide the issue. To that extent they may be said to waive any submission of the issue to a jury.

We turn, then, to the substantive question of how the word 'occurrence' shall be construed in this insurance policy on these facts.

Initially we observe that most of the reported cases involving similar questions of interpretation revolve around the number of 'accidents' rather than the number of 'occurrences'. Both parties urge, however, that the words 'accident' and 'occurrence' are synonymous. Past cases have used the words interchangeably...