Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Cambell

• Decision Date: 10 November 1920
• Citation: 95 Conn. 399,111 A. 864
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HARTFORD-CONNECTICUT TRUST CO. v. CAMBELL et al.

111 A. 864

95 Conn. 399

HARTFORD-CONNECTICUT TRUST CO. v. CAMBELL et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

November 10, 1920

Appeal from Superior Court. Hartford County; William M. Maltbie Judge.

Action by the Hartford-Connecticut Trust Company against Lindsay B Cambell and John Cope. From a judgment for plaintiff and for the last-named defendant after the sustaining of various demurrers, defendant Cambell appeals. Judgment set aside, and cause remanded for further proceedings.

Action to determine the adverse claim of defendant Cambell to certain land of which plaintiff and defendant Cope had possession, and to quiet and settle the title to the same brought to and tried by the superior court for Hartford county, upon motion to strike out parts of an amended answer and cross-complaint of defendant Cambell. Motion denied, and demurrers of plaintiff and Cope to answer of Cambell, which were sustained, and demurrer of plaintiff to amended answer and cross-complaint, which was sustained as to grounds 1 and 2 and overruled as to ground 3, and demurrer of Cope to amended answer and cross-complaint, which was sustained as to cross-complaint and overruled as to answer, and amended demurrer of Cope to amended answer and cross-complaint, which was sustained, and thereafter judgment for plaintiff and defendant Cope was rendered, with appeal by defendant Cambell.

Josiah H. Peck and Thomas J. Conroy, both of Hartford, for appellant.

Arthur Perkins, of Hartford, for appellee Hartford-Connecticut Co.

Abraham S. Bordon, of Hartford, for appellee Cope.

WHEELER, C.J.

The complaint is brought under G. S. § 5113, to determine defendant Cambell's adverse claim to number 117 Market street, Hartford, which it alleges is owned in common by plaintiff and defendant Cope and to quiet and settle the title to the same.

Cambell's claim is alleged to have arisen under a written agreement of sale by which, fairly construed, the plaintiff and Cope agree to sell to the defendant Cambell these premises for $10,000, payable, $100 upon execution of agreement, and the balance, $3,900, in cash, the assumption of a first mortgage of $3,000 and a second mortgage to Cope of $3,000 upon tender of a warranty deed by Cope and an administrator's deed by plaintiff. The agreement further provides that from the $10,000 Cope was to receive $500 in cash and the second mortgage of $3,000, and the plaintiff $3,500 in cash; that taxes and other details were to be adjusted as of date of deed, " the sale being made in behalf of the estate of George Cope subject to the order of the probate court and to the approval of plaintiff."

The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff was in fact prior to date of this complaint authorized by the probate court to sell these premises, but the trustees of plaintiff refused to approve of the sale and have never so approved; that on January 19, 1920, defendant Cambell duly caused to be recorded his copy of the agreement in the land records of Hartford, claiming an interest in these premises under this agreement; that on January 21, 1920, plaintiff tendered defendant Cambell the $100 paid on the purchase price at making of the agreement and requested a release of the interest he claimed in these premises, but Cambell refused to accept this sum or deliver such release. Thereupon the plaintiff brought this action.

The record presents a number of departures from the settled practice in actions brought under this statute. We note at this point two.

Prayers for relief 1 and 2 require the defendants, Cambell and Cope, to state by answer their claim, if any. Reference to G. S. § 5113, will disclose that such prayers for relief are out of place in a complaint under this statute.

In Foote v. Brown, 78 Conn. 369, 377, 62 A. 667, 670, we construed this act, stated the essentials of a complaint under it, and outlined the subsequent procedure with great particularity. It was there said:

" A claim that the defendant be required to state the nature of his interests, etc., cannot properly be included in the prayer for relief. Any obligation of the defendant in this respect is determined by the requirements of the statute relating to his answer. Where the defendant has made no claim, he may deny the plaintiff's allegation that he claims an adverse interest, but ordinarily in such case he would answer by disclaiming any interest."

The answer of Cambell admitted six paragraphs of the complaint and left plaintiff to his proof of the remaining paragraph. The plaintiff company demurred to the answer because defendant Cambell had not particularly set forth his adverse claim.

Cambell was not required to set forth his claim at length. the complaint had done this, and Cambell's admission and partial denial satisfies the requirements of pleading under this statute.

" Where the complaint states truly the plaintiff's ownership and the defendant's claim based on admitted facts showing the nature and extent of his title, the defendant's answer should simply admit the allegations of the complaint, and thereupon the question of law determinative of the conflicting claims of title would be in issue. In other cases the defendant must comply with the statute in stating the nature of the interest which he claims." Foote v. Brown, 78 Conn. 369, 377, 62 A. 667, 670.

After the demurrers of plaintiff and Cope had been sustained, Cambell filed a paper denominated " Amended Answer and Cross-Complaint." The amended answer admitted five of the paragraphs of the complaint and part of another paragraph, and then sets forth what purports to be a detailed statement of Cambell's claim. The plaintiff moved to strike out paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of this answer because similar allegations are alleged in the complaint and admitted. The motion was denied. It should have been granted; the allegations are obviously repetitions of those in the complaint.

Cope demurred to the remaining allegations of this answer because immaterial. These allegations, that Cambell was, up to January 20, 1920, ready to carry out the agreement and repeatedly so informed plaintiff, and plaintiff repeatedly informed Cambell that it was ready to carry out the agreement, and that the delay was due to the refusal of the widow of George Cope, its intestate, to approve and because of differences between her and defendant Cope; that the market value of this property between August 25, 1919, and January 20, 1920, had greatly increased; that plaintiff never informed Cambell of its refusal to approve except by service of the writ herein, and did not disapprove within a reasonable time, and did not notify Cambell of its approval or disapproval within a reasonable time-were all admissible facts helpful in deciding whether the plaintiff acted reasonably or not. Considered in connection with the admitted allegations of the complaint, these allegations should not be held to be immaterial.

The allegation of paragraph 7 that on or about November 1, 1919 Cambell proposed a recission of the agreement and a return of the $100 to him, and that plaintiff refused, is one which would have an...