Foote v. Brown

• Decision Date: 15 December 1905
• Citation: 62 A. 667,78 Conn. 369
• Parties: FOOTE v. BROWN et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

62 A. 667

78 Conn. 369

FOOTE

v. BROWN et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 15, 1905.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Silas A. Robinson, Judge.

Suit by Eliza S. Foote against Chester A. Brown and others to quiet title to certain land. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.

The plaintiff, under the will of her husband who died in 1878, had a freehold estate in a small bit of land bounded by the sea. The defendants entered upon this land, occupied the same, built a boathouse thereon, and thereafter continued in occupation of the land. The plaintiff, claiming this entry and occupation to be wrongful, sought redress by an action which is set forth in the complaint as follows: "(1) That she has an interest in certain land in said town of Guilford [describing the land] which is a part of the estate of the said George A. Foote. (2) Her interest in said land is the right to lease the same, and enjoy the rents and income thereof, pursuant to the will of her late husband, the said George A. Foote. (3) Said defendants, Chester A. Brown and James Garfield Brown, have wrongfully entered on said land, placed a building thereon, claiming some interest or estate in said land adverse to the plaintiff, and continue in the occupation thereof. (4) Said land is worth $1,000. The plaintiff claims: (1) That each defendant be required to state the nature and extent of his interest in said land and the source through which the same was derived; (2) judgment settling the title; (3) judgment for the possession of said premises; (4) $300 damages. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled. The defendants filed separate answers. Each answer denied the first three paragraphs of the complaint, but the answer of the defendant Chester A. Brown contained also a disclaimer of all estate or interest in the land described in the complaint, and that of James G. Brown stated the denial of the third paragraph of the complaint in the form of an allegation that the land described was common land belonging to the town of Guilford, and that said town had authorized him to place a building on said land and occupy the same, and that in pursuance of said authority and not otherwise he had occupied said land; and further alleges that his interest and occupation of said land is not adverse to any title, interest, or claim that the plaintiff may have in said land. The case was tried to the court upon the issues raised by these pleadings. The court made a finding from which it appears that the following facts were found: (1) The land was not common land belonging to the town of Guilford, but was included in a farm belonging to the plaintiff's husband at the time of his death. (2) At the time of the entry by the defendants the plaintiff was in possession of the land in pursuance of a valid title in her. (3) The defendants made wrongful entry upon the land, placed a building thereon, and have ever since continued in occupancy of said land. (4) Neither of the defendants has any title, right, or interest in the land—and thereupon rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The judgment describes the action as claiming judgment settling the title to the land described, possession of said land, $300 damages. It then states that the court finds the issues for the plaintiff and finds the facts as follows—reciting the facts substantially as above stated, with the additional fact that the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages in the sum of $5. "Whereupon it is adjudged that the defendants deliver to the plaintiff possession of said premises, and that the plaintiff recover of the defendants five dollars ($5) damages and her costs." The material errors assigned in appeal are: In overruling the demurrer; in treating this case as an action of ejectment and not one of quieting title to said premises; in refusing to grant costs to the defendant Chester A. Brown upon his filing a disclaimer; in holding that under section 4053 of the General Statutes of 1902 the plaintiff could maintain an action of ejectment and recover possession of the premises and money damages; in holding that the complaint sets forth an action of ejectment.

Robert C. Stoddard, for appellants. Henry C. White, for appellee.

HAMERSLEY, J. (after stating the facts). The disposition of this appeal depends upon the meaning and legal effect of section 4053 of the General Statutes of 1902. This section contains unchanged the provisions of "An Act concerning Civil Actions," passed in 1893 (Pub. Acts 1893, p. 237, c. 66). The terms and language of the act are suggestive of doubt as to its meaning in some particulars, and, in ascertaining its meaning where thus doubtful, the act should be read in view of the evil it was passed to remedy. What this evil was had been shortly before brought to public attention by certain opinions delivered by this court. In 1890 one Ernest Strong Miles was in possession of certain land devised to him by the will of Selah Strong (who died in 1879) and then conveyed said land to his father, Samuel A. Miles, in trust for purposes specified in the deed. The entire estate of Selah Strong had in 1882 been duly distributed to the devisees, and the estate had then been finally settled. When Samuel Miles attempted to sell the land conveyed to him in trust, he found himself hindered in making a sale, by reason of certain claims of heirs of Selah Strong that the land devised to Ernest Miles was not thereby vested in him absolutely, but that these heirs had a remainder interest contingent upon the happening of events named in the will. Whether or not Ernest Miles when he executed the trust deed had an absolute estate in the land conveyed depended on the meaning expressed by the language of the will independently of extrinsic circumstances. For the purpose of obtaining a judicial construction of this language, so that he might be able to make a sale beneficial to his cestui que trust, Samuel Miles, who was also executor of the will, brought an action as such executor for the construction of the will. We held that upon these facts an executor could not maintain such an action, and the complaint was dismissed. Miles v. Strong, 60 Conn. 393, 22 Atl. 959. Immediately afterward Samuel Mites, as trustee under the deed above mentioned, and Ernest Miles brought an action for quieting the title of said Ernest or his grantee, stating in the complaint the facts above mentioned. We held that the real question between the parties, as stated in the complaint, related wholly to the legal title to land, involving only legal questions, and as such the defendants were entitled to litigate them in a trial at law, and that under our practice an action in equity for that purpose could not be maintained, and the complaint was accordingly dismissed. Miles v. Strong, 62 Conn. 95, 25 Atl. 459. As a result of these decisions it appeared that an owner in possession of land was prevented from making a beneficial sale thereof by claims of others to a contingent remainder interest in the land, that the validity of these claims depended solely on the legal effect of language used in a will, that the owner could not have this question determined in a court of equity, because it was solely a legal question relating to the title to land, and being in possession he could not compel a trial at law until the claimants should see fit to assert their claim through a legal action or some illegal act, and that in the meantime there was no redress for the injury to his property rights caused by the existence of these claims. We recognized in our opinion the force of the dilemma in which an owner of land under such circumstances was placed, and indicated that it arose from the fact that such actual present damage did not constitute under our common law and existing statutes a present legal injury. Immediately after the rendition of this decision had called attention to this state of our law in reference to such damage, the act of 1893 was passed. The act provided that it should take effect from its passage, and the day after it went into effect Samuel and Ernest Miles, plaintiffs in the last-mentioned action, commenced an action in pursuance of the new act, stating in their complaint substantially the same facts alleged in their prior complaint, and upon this action we held in effect that the present damage caused the plaintiffs by existing claims adverse to their ownership in fee simple of the land which before the passage of the act was practically damnum absque injuria had become, through the operation of the act, a legal injury for which they were entitled to redress through a judgment settling the title in them as against the defendants. It seems to us apparent that this act was passed for the purpose of remedying an evil such as that disclosed by the decisions above mentioned, and that, as we have before said, it was evidently intended to provide a remedy for such a wrong and hardship as that thus disclosed, for which there was, under the previously existing law, no plain and adequate remedy. Miles v. Strong, 68 Conn. 273, 288, 36 Atl. 55. This evident intent and purpose of the Legislature in passing the act must be an influential element in determining its meaning and legal effect as expressed in the language used. In Miles v. Strong, 68 Conn. 287, 36 Atl. 55, we said that the act was in some respects very loosely and carelessly drawn and might require amendment, but that its purpose was tolerably clear and that effect ought to be given to its provisions. The act has now remained unchanged for 12 years. There has been misconception as to its scope, and abuse as to its application. The exigencies of the present case justify and indeed require, such a definite construction of the act in respect to the questions involved as will serve the purpose of its enactment and give...