Anderson v. Groesbeck

• Citation: 26 Colo. 3,55 P. 1086
• Parties: ANDERSON v. GROESBECK et al.
• Decision Date: 09 January 1899
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

55 P. 1086

26 Colo. 3

ANDERSON v. GROESBECK et al.

Supreme Court of Colorado

January 9, 1899

Appeal from district court, Arapahoe county.

Action by Mollie E. Groesbeck and another against Helen Anderson to recover amount of an insurance policy. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed.

W. B Harrison, for appellant.

Joseph N. Baxter and John C. Fitnam, for appellees.

CAMPBELL C.J.

In the original complaint, naming Helen Anderson and the Covenant Mutual Life Association of Illinois as defendants, it was alleged that Thomas G. Anderson obtained a $5,000 policy of insurance on his life from the association, in which Helen Anderson, his wife, was named as the beneficiary; that afterwards the insured, being then authorized by the rules of the association to change the beneficiary without the latter's consent, upon a surrender and cancellation of the certificate, thus attempted in fact to make, and in law did make, a change in the policy, whereby, instead of Helen Anderson being sole beneficiary, he made her and the plaintiffs Mollie E. Groesbeck and William W. Anderson, his children, co-beneficiaries; her to the extent of $1,000, and them $2,000 each. It was further alleged that Helen Anderson the original sole beneficiary, being in possession of this certificate, refused, upon request of the insured, to surrender it, and that the insured did all in his power to comply with the rules as to its surrender, but was unsuccessful in that respect, because of the wrongful conduct of Helen; that she now has the certificate in her possession that Thomas Anderson is dead, and the proofs of his death have been made, and the company is ready and willing to pay the amount of the policy to the beneficiaries entitled thereto, when they are judicially determined. The relief asked is that the certificate be reformed to make it comply with the change of beneficiaries, and that Helen be required to bring the same into court for the proper changes to be made, and that the association pay to them the sums of money to which they are entitled under the policy as reformed. The association filed an answer in the nature of a bill of interpleader to ascertain to which of the claimants it should pay the proceeds of the policy. In this answer it also averred that in the year 1882 it issued a policy or certificate of life insurance to Thomas G. Anderson whereby, upon certain terms, it agreed to pay to his then wife, Mary J. Anderson, the beneficiary of said policy, the sum of $5,000, if she survived him; that afterwards, in the year 1894, the insured surrendered to it the policy, with the request to change the beneficiary from Mary J. Anderson, who theretofore had died, to his then wife, Helen Anderson, as sole beneficiary, which request was complied with. Being ignorant of the rights of its co-defendant and of the rights of plaintiffs, both of whom claimed the proceeds of the same policy, it alleges that it cannot determine without hazard to itself what disposition to make of the fund. It therefore tendered the money to the court to be disbursed in accordance with its final decree. The defendant Helen Anderson filed her answer, in which was alleged the issuance of a policy in 1882, as averred by her co-defendant, her subsequent appointment as sole beneficiary therein, and that her rights acquired by virtue of an antenuptial agreement of marriage between her and the insured, were thereby placed beyond the power of the insured without her consent to devest by any subsequent appointment, and such consent was not given. She denies the alleged substitution of the plaintiffs as beneficiaries therein by Thomas G. Anderson, and denies that the company, under its by-laws or charter, had a right, without her consent, to make any change in the policy affecting her interest; and alleges a gift of the policy to her. A replication to this answer was filed, denying its affirmative allegations, and alleging certain other matters. The court made an order permitting the association to pay the money into court, and thereupon discharged it from any further liability to the other parties to the action. It being conceded that the defendant Helen Anderson was entitled to at least $1,000 of the fund, the same was paid over to her without prejudice to her right to prosecute her claim to the rest of it. The case was tried to the court without a jury, and findings were made in favor of the defendant, and judgment entered accordingly. Afterwards plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was granted, and a second trial had upon the same issues, and precisely the same evidence that was produced at the first, and at its termination the court took the case under advisement. A short time thereafter the court announced that judgment would again go for the defendant Helen Anderson unless the plaintiffs elected to amend their complaint. Acting upon this suggestion, the plaintiffs filed an amended and supplemental complaint, in which, inter alia, they alleged that the defendant association in the year 1882 issued a certificate of insurance on the life of Thomas G. Anderson in the sum of $5,000, in which Mary J. Anderson, who then was the wife of the insured, was designated as the sole beneficiary; and that, by its terms, if Mary J. Anderson should predecease the insured, the proceeds of the policy were to be paid to his 'legal heirs or devisees'; that Mary J. Anderson, the original beneficiary, died prior to the death of Thomas G., and the plaintiffs above named, being the sole heirs of Thomas G. Anderson, at once, upon their mother's death, became the sole beneficiaries of the policy, and upon their father's death were entitled to its proceeds. There is a further allegation that Thomas G. Anderson, in 1894, ineffectually attempted to make the defendant Helen Anderson, his then wife, the beneficiary in said certificate, but that this change was null and void, and of no effect, because not had with the consent of these parties, who then, as the legal heirs of the insured, were the sole beneficiaries, and vested with an interest therein; that on the 30th of June, 1896, the insured, Thomas G. Anderson, did effect a change of the beneficiaries by his instrument of writing, as was alleged in the original complaint. The death of Thomas G. Anderson is alleged, and the proofs of the death were duly furnished to the association; and that only by reason of the consent of these plaintiffs, who alone were the beneficiaries in the original policy, is Helen Anderson entitled to any part of the fund in question, and of that only in the sum of $1,000; that, although the certificate is in the physical possession of Helen, it is wholly null and void, because of the fact that these plaintiffs, being the sole heirs at law of Thomas, and, as such, beneficiaries under the original certificate, never consented to the substitution of Helen Anderson as beneficiary therein; and that such a change, even if in accordance with the rules and by-laws of the association, could not operate to devest their interest, which vested at once upon the death of their mother, the original beneficiary. There is also an allegation of the payment of the proceeds of the policy into the registry of the court by the association. The relief sought is that the certificate in which the name of Helen Anderson was substituted for the name of Mary J. Anderson be declared null and void, and of no force against plaintiffs; and the court is asked to declare that this certificate gives to Helen no rights whatever to any part of the fund; that the certificate as originally issued be declared to be the only certificate having any force and validity; that the instrument of writing of June, 1896, whereby Thomas G. Anderson, with the consent of the plaintiffs, effected a change of the beneficiaries, be declared to be valid, and that the $4,000 of the fund remaining in the registry of the court be paid to them. The defendant Helen Anderson moved to strike the amended and supplemental complaint from the files upon numerous grounds, one of which was that it contained an entirely new and distinct cause of action from that set up in the original complaint, and that the plaintiffs were, and ought to be, estopped to change the theory of the case upon which the two preceding trials were had, which change would be effected if they were now allowed to proceed upon grounds repugnant to, and wholly inconsistent with, their previous position. This motion was denied, and defendant Helen Anderson filed an answer to the amended complaint, in which, after admitting the issuance of the policy in 1882, and the substitution of her own name as beneficiary in 1894, she alleges that, both at the time of issuing the original certificate and when she was substituted as beneficiary, the laws of the state of Illinois and the charter and by-laws of the association permitted a change of beneficiary without the latter's consent. She further alleges that she acquired a vested interest and property right in the certificate in question and the proceeds of the policy by virtue of an antenuptial contract of marriage entered into with the insured, and that she paid a large part of the assessments during the time that she held the certificate. She alleges that it was beyond the power of the insured to devest this...