Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 415,415
• Citation: 94 Md.App. 225,617 A.2d 590
• Parties: The HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY v. MANOR INN OF BETHESDA, INC., et al. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 225

94 Md.App. 225

617 A.2d 590

The HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY v. MANOR INN OF BETHESDA, INC., et al.

No. 415, Sept. Term, 1992.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 29, 1992.

Jill A. Reid (Donovan, O'Connell & Broderick, on the brief), Silver Spring, for appellant.

John D. Holler, Mt. Rainier, for appellee, Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc.

Dawna M. Cobb, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. on the brief for appellee, State Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene), Baltimore, for appellees.

Argued before GARRITY, WENNER and DAVIS, JJ.

DAVIS, Judge.

This appeal arises out of an insurance subrogation claim filed on September 7, 1990 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County by Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford), appellant, against the State of Maryland (State) and Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc. (Manor), appellees. The suit sought to recover $38,241.40 plus costs and expenses paid out to appellant's insured, William Wewer, for injuries and damages suffered in an automobile accident.

On November 28, 1990 the State filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. On December 4, 1990 the motion was denied. After discovery commenced, Manor filed a cross-complaint against the State. On September 25, 1991 Manor filed an amended cross-complaint against the State.

On October 23, 1991 the State filed a Motion for Summary Judgment opposed by appellant and Manor. On January 9, 1991 a hearing was held on the motion before the Honorable William M. Cave. After oral argument, the court granted the State's Motion for Summary Judgment against appellant and sua sponte granted summary judgment in favor of Manor against appellant in order to make both judgments final and appealable. On January 24, 1992 the court entered a written order to this effect. On February 6, 1992 appellant noted a timely appeal to this Court.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1) Whether the trial court erred in granting the State of Maryland's Motion for Summary Judgment.

2) Whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., sua sponte.

For the following reasons, we shall affirm the orders of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, granting summary judgment in favor of Manor and the State.

FACTS

On August 20, 1988 Robert Lee Griffin was involuntarily committed to the Springfield State Hospital Center in Sykesville, Maryland, an inpatient facility for the mentally ill operated by the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. He had been transferred from Frederick Memorial Hospital, where two physicians had certified that Griffin met the criteria for involuntary admission. Under Md. Health-Gen.Code Ann. § 10-616(a)(2)(iii), the examining physician must certify that, among other things, involuntary admission is needed for the protection of the patient or another.

At the Center, Griffin was placed in the Solomon Ward, a high-security admissions ward reserved primarily for acutely disturbed patients. Between August 20, 1988 and October 19, 1988, pursuant to state statute, Griffin was given several hearings, in which it was determined each time that he was not competent for release.

On October 28, 1988 Griffin was discovered missing from the facility. He had last been seen at 2:45 p.m. by the staff on the ward. In an affidavit, Guy Garheart, Chief of Police at Springfield Hospital Center, stated that Springfield's elopement policy was fully enforced in the case of Griffin's elopement. Once Griffin was discovered missing, identifying characteristics were relayed to the appropriate law enforcement agency along with a request that the agency send out a teletype concerning the elopement. Griffin was described as having a scar on his left forearm and wearing a brown jacket.

On October 31, 1988 Montgomery County Police officers found Griffin wandering the streets of Bethesda, Maryland. Believing him to be homeless and in need of emergency shelter, the officers took Griffin to the Manor Inn of Bethesda located at 11410 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, where he was given a room. Manor provided the room pursuant to a thirteen-year-old verbal agreement with the Montgomery County Department of Social Services, wherein Manor agreed to provide overnight shelter to homeless and wayward persons in exchange for a single rate of $54.00 plus tax of 10 percent. The officers did not notify Springfield Hospital or the State Police of their contact with Griffin.

On the morning of November 1, 1988 an employee of Manor parked a 1985 Chevrolet van in the parking lot of the Manor Inn, directly in front of Griffin's room. The employee exited the van, left the doors unlocked, and left the keys in the ignition. Manor disputed that the van was left unattended, claiming that the employee was working in the vicinity. Another Manor employee then saw Griffin get in the van and drive away.

Approximately thirty minutes later, appellant's insured, William Wewer, was travelling southbound on East Avenue at the intersection with Bradley Boulevard in Bethesda. At the same time, Griffin was in the stolen van travelling eastbound on Bradley Boulevard. According to the State Accident Report, Griffin weaved on the roadway, crossed the centerline at a high rate of speed, drove over the curb onto East Avenue, and struck Wewer, who had stopped his 1984 Porsche 944 at a stop sign.

As a result of the collision, Wewer's vehicle was a total loss. Wewer also sustained personal injuries. Pursuant to an insurance policy, appellant compensated Wewer $38,241.40 for the total loss of his vehicle, personal injuries, lost wages, and pain and suffering.

In its complaint, appellant alleged various counts of negligence against the State and Manor. Appellant alleged that the State had a duty to supervise Griffin properly and to detain him, and that the breach of this duty had been a proximate cause of Wewer's injuries. Appellant also alleged that the negligence of Manor's employee was a proximate cause of the insured's injuries.

Following a hearing, the court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants. The court reasoned that the State owed no duty to Wewer since he was not in a group identifiable to the State prior to the accident. The court, sua sponte, determined as to Manor that the theft of the car and subsequent accident were not foreseeable, and therefore appellant could not show the necessary causation. Appellant appeals both orders of the court.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

It is well settled that summary judgment procedure is not a substitute for a trial but merely a preview to determine whether there exists a factual controversy requiring trial. Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 316 Md. 418, 422, 559 A.2d 371 (1989). Where the moving party has set forth sufficient grounds for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must show with some precision that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact. Id. If there is any genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment would not properly be granted. Id. A material fact is one that will "somehow affect the outcome of the case." Seaboard Surety v. Kline, Inc., 91 Md.App. 236, 242, 603 A.2d 1357 (1992) (citations omitted). A dispute as to a fact "relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 242-43, 603 A.2d 1357, quoting Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Board of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 40, 300 A.2d 367 (1973) (emphasis in original). Similarly, "[i]n a summary judgment proceeding even where the underlying facts are undisputed, if those facts are susceptible of more than one permissible inference, the choice between those inferences should not be made as a matter of law, but should be submitted to the trier of fact." Foy, 316 Md. at 422-23, 559 A.2d 371, quoting Fenwick Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 138, 265 A.2d 256 (1970) (citations omitted).

Appellate review of a circuit court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment is also well settled:

In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court has the same information from the record and decides the same issues of law as the trial court. It follows then that the proper standard for reviewing the granting of a summary judgment motion should be whether the trial court was legally correct.

Heat & Power v. Air Products, 320 Md. 584, 591-92, 578 A.2d 1202 (1990) (citations omitted). With the applicable standard of review in mind, we now turn to the facts of this case.

Manor Inn

Appellant contends that Manor is liable for Wewer's injuries pursuant to a violation of Md.Transp.Code Ann. § 21-1101 by the employee of Manor who left the keys in the van's ignition. Appellant argues that violation of this statute is legally sufficient evidence of negligence that should have precluded summary judgment.

"The violation of a statute may furnish evidence of negligence," Atlantic Mutual v. Kenney, 323 Md. 116, 124, 591 A.2d 507 (1991), citing Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242, 259-60, 206 A.2d 148 (1965), "but only where the person alleging negligence is within the class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of the kind which the statute was intended, in general, to prevent." Kenney, 323 Md. at 124, 591 A.2d 507. Similarly, "[e]ven though the violation of a statute may create a prima facie presumption of negligence, the mere breach is not per se enough to make a violator thereof liable for damages." Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 65, 155 A.2d 698 (1959). It is incumbent upon the plaintiff "to show not only a duty owed to the plaintiff and a breach thereof, but also to establish that the breach of that duty had not been interrupted by a break in the chain of causation." Id. In other words, the negligence must be a proximate cause of the injury. Erie Ins. Co. v. Chops, 322 Md. 79, 84, 585 A.2d 232 (1991).

The pertinent...