Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Catterson

• Decision Date: 06 October 1969
• Docket Number: No. 5--4993,5--4993
• Citation: 247 Ark. 263,445 S.W.2d 109
• Parties: HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Sally Ann CATTERSON et al., Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 109

445 S.W.2d 109

247 Ark. 263

HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Sally Ann CATTERSON et al., Appellees.

No. 5--4993.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Oct. 6, 1969.

Williams & Gardner, Russellville, for appellant.

Mobley, Bullock & Harris, Russellville, for appellees.

GEORGE ROSE SMITH, Justice.

In 1965 the appellant issued an accident and sickness policy to the appellees' mother, Becky Wilson Catterson. On March 3, 1966, Mrs. Catterson was committed to the State Hospital for a condition diagnosed as a manic-depressive reaction. The jury may have found from the evidence that Mrs. Catterson learned the next morning that she was to be given electric shock treatments. She at once left the hospital without permission and was missing until her dead body was found nine days later in an isolated wooded area. An autopsy indicated that death resulted from exposure and occurred about three days after she disappeared.

This action was brought by the beneficiaries to recover the accidental death benefit of $10,000. The insurance company sought to avoid liability on the ground that the insured's death was not within the coverage of the policy and on the additional ground that one of the questions in the written application for the policy was answered falsely. This appeal is from a judgment for the amount of the policy, plus the statutory penalty and a $4,000 attorney's fee.

First, the insurer contends that there is no substantial evidence to support a finding that the insured's death was accidental. There were no marks on the body indicative of foul play. The temperature had varied from a low of 24 degrees on March 7--which was the indicated date of death--to a high of 75 degrees on March 12. The physician who performed the post mortem examination testified that the most likely cause of death was exposure and that he could arrive at no other logical conclusion.

The contract contained fairly typical language, covering accidental bodily injury which results directly and independently of all other causes in a loss covered by the policy. 'Accidental,' as we have often said, means happening by chance, taking place unexpectedly, not according to the usual course of things. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 204 Ark. 307, 162 S.W.2d 480 (1942).

Death from exposure to cold is not essentially unlike death from heat prostration, which we considered in Continental Cas. Co. v. Bruden, 178 Ark. 683, 11 S.W.2d 493, 61 A.L.R. 1192 (1928). There the wording of the policy was arguably more restrictive than that now before us, requiring that the injury be effected solely by an external, violent, and purely accidental event. After reviewing the two conflicting lines of authority we adopted the view that death by sunstroke or heat prostration is accidental. There is a parallel division of authority with respect to death from freezing or exposure to cold. See Finley v. Prudential Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 236 Or. 235, 388 P.2d 21, 4 A.L.R.3d 1161 (1963), and the A.L.R. annotation. Consistently with our earlier decision we hold that Mrs. Catterson's death was permissibly found by the jury to have been accidental.

The appellant also insists that recovery in the case at bar is excluded by a clause which excepts death caused or contributed to by sickness or disease. We have often held, however, that such a clause does not preclude liability when death results from the co-operation of disease and accidental injury. Life & Cas. Co. of Tenn. v. Jones, 230 Ark. 979, 328 S.W.2d 118 (1959); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Meyer, 106 Ark. 91, 152 S.W. 995, 44 L.R.A., N.S., 493 (1912). In fact, the beneficiaries' position in...