Hartford Park Tenants Association v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, No. 99-3748 (RI 10/3/2005)
| Decision Date | 03 October 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-3748.,99-3748. |
| Parties | HARTFORD PARK TENANTS ASSOCIATION, DEBRA A. MARTIN, on behalf of herself and as next friend to her minor child MICHAEL J. MARTIN, SHEILA WILHELM, on behalf of herself and as next friend to her minor children, MIKAELAH WILHELM, JOSHUA WILHELM and RICHARD WILHELM, and NICHOLAS J. MARSELLA v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, CITY OF PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL BOARD, AND ALAN SEPE, in his capacity as Acting Director of the Department of Public Property of the City of Providence. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
This decision is rendered in accordance with Rule 52 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to G.L. 1956 § § 82-13, 9-30-1, 9-30-2, 42-35-7, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On July 23, 1999, Hartford Park Tenants Association (hereinafter "HPTA"), Debra A. Martin, individually and on behalf of her minor child, Michael J. Martin, Sheila Wilhelm, individually and on behalf of her minor children, Mikaelah Wilhelm, Joshua Wilhelm, and Richard Wilhelm, and Nicholas Marsella (hereinafter, collectively, "the Plaintiffs") filed a complaint seeking an injunction to halt the construction and operation of certain public schools — now named the Anthony Carnevale Elementary School and the Governor Christopher Del Sesto Middle School — (hereinafter "the Schools") — located on Springfield Street in Providence (hereinafter "the Site"), which were being constructed at that time. On August 16, 1999, Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (hereinafter a "TRO") to halt construction of the middle schools and operation of the elementary school. This motion was denied by the court (Silverstein, J) on September 10, 1999. The order was conditioned on the Muncipal Defendants' following certain procedures such as keeping the elementary school windows closed and conducting soil gas monitoring tests. The case subsequently proceeded to trial.
The complaint contained five counts. In Count One, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (hereinafter "DEM") violated G.L. 1956 § 23-19.14-5, the environmental equity requirement of the Industrial Property Remediation and Reuse Act (hereinafter, the "IPRARA), by approving the City of Providence's (hereinafter "the City" or "Providence") plans to construct schools on the Site. In the remaining four counts, the Plaintiffs alleged violations, through actions or inactions with respect to approving and implementing the City's plans to construct the schools, by the DEM, as well as the City, the Providence School Board (hereinafter "PSB"), and Alan Sepe (hereinafter "Sepe"), in his capacity as Acting Director of the Department of Public Property of the City of Providence (hereinafter the DPP) (the latter three hereinafter collectively the "Municipal Defendants"). Specifically, Count Two alleged that all of the defendants had violated the DEM Rules and Regulations for the Investigation and Remediation of Hazardous Material Releases (hereinafter the "Remediation Regulations"); Count Three alleged that the DEM had violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., and the regulations promulgated there under by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter the "EPA"), 40 CFR § 7.10 et seq., and that the City and PSB had violated regulations of the United States Department of Education (hereinafter the "USDE"), 34 CFR 100.1 et seq.; Count Four alleged that all of the Defendants had denied Plaintiffs due process of law in violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and Count Five alleged that all of the Defendants had deprived the Plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws, also in violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs asserted that Counts Three, Four and Five were all actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Counts Four and Five were also actionable pursuant to Article I, § 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution.
After a preliminary hearing, on March 26, 2003, this Court ruled on multiple motions. This Court denied the following: DEM's and Plaintiffs' cross-motions for summary judgment relating to IPRARA and the Remediation Regulations; the Municipal Defendants' motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs'claims under § 601 of Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to their due process and equal protection claims under the federal and state constitutions against the Municipal Defendants; DEM's and the Municipal Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff HPTA on the grounds of lack of standing; DEM's motion for summary judgment on grounds of mootness; DEM's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief pursuant to G.L. § 9-30-1 et seq. (the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, hereinafter the "UDJA"); and DEM's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims under Section 601 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. At the same hearing, this Court granted the following: DEM's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-7 (), DEM's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims under Section 602 of Title VI, DEM's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against the Municipal Defendants for violation of Remediation Regulations §§ 7.07 and 10.01.
Trial was held from March through May of 2003. On June 13, 2003, DEM filed a motion to reconsider the ruling denying Defendants' motions for Rule 52(c) Judgment as a Matter of Law, which motion was also denied. The Court ordered a schedule for submission of post-trial briefs and replies, and a schedule for copies of the trial transcripts. The Court also accepted proposed findings of facts from the parties and responses thereto.
As a preliminary matter, both DEM and the Municipal Defendants assert that the HPTA lacked standing to sue. Defendants' main contention is that as an unincorporated association, the HPTA is subject to the provisions of G.L. 1956 § 9-2-11, which limits the type of suits that may be brought by an unincorporated association and delineates the manner in which such suits may be maintained on its behalf. Under § 9-2-11 a civil action may be maintained on behalf of such an association to:
"recover any property or upon any cause of action for or upon which all the associates may maintain such action by reason of their interest or ownership therein, either jointly or in common, [and] . . . to recover from one or more members of the association his or her or their proportionate share of any money lawfully expended by the association for the benefits of the associates or to enforce any lawful claim of the association against a member or members." G.L. 1956 § 9-2-11.
Additionally, such a suit may only be maintained on the association's behalf by an officer or member "as trustee," and only if "so authorized by the association." Id. Defendants argue that none of the statutory reasons for bringing suit apply: there is no property of the association at issue, no money to be recovered from members, and no lawful claim against a member or members. Defendants also contend that the claim is not one that could be maintained by all of the associates by reason of their interest in the HPTA. Additionally, no officer or member of the HPTA proceeded in this case as "trustee" on behalf of the HPTA and the HPTA did not establish that the association members authorized the suit. Defendants further assert that the HPTA failed to allege the requisite injury in fact required to achieve standing. Plaintiffs insist that compliance with G.L. 1956 § 9-2-11 only implicates the HPTA's capacity to sue and that Defendants waived this defense by failing to raise it in their answers. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that the evidence established that the HPTA suffered the requisite injury in fact to establish standing.1
Standing is "an access barrier that calls for assessment of one's credentials to bring suit." Ahlburn v. Clark, 728 A.2d 449, 452 (R.I. 1999). In general, "[u]nder Rhode Island law, a plaintiff has sufficient standing to sue if he or she alleges "an injury in fact." Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992) (citing Rhode Island Opthalmological Soc'y v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 26, 317 A.2d 124, 129 (1974)). An "injury in fact" has been defined as "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1974); Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island v. Dept. of Admin., State of Rhode Island, 787 A.2d 1179, 1185-86 (R.I. 2002). "When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, .. . to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or foregone action) at issue." Id. at 561. "If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury." Id.
An association has been held to have standing as a representative if its members, "or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). The Supreme Court has additionally required that "the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose [and that] neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of the individual members in the law suit." United Food and...
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