Hartford v. McGillicuddy

• Decision Date: 26 November 1907
• Citation: 103 Me. 224,68 A. 860
• Parties: HARTFORD v. McGILLICUDDY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

68 A. 860

103 Me. 224

HARTFORD

v. McGILLICUDDY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 26, 1907.

On motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Androscoggin County.

Assumpsit by C. B. Hartford against Dennis McGillicuddy. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant moves to have the same set aside. Motion overruled.

Assumpsit by the plaintiff, a real estate agent, to recover a commission of 2 per cent. on the price ($2,800) fixed by the owner for the sale of certain real estate in Lewiston, the plaintiff claiming that he procured a customer on the authorized terms, but that the defendant refused to make the conveyance. Plea, the general issue, with a brief statement interposing the statute of limitations.

Tried at the April term, 1907, of the Supreme Judicial Court, Androscoggin county. Verdict for plaintiff for $56. The following questions were also submitted to the jury: (1) "Did the defendant in 1896 authorize the plaintiff to sell the land in question for $2,800?" (2) "Did the plaintiff in 1906 procure a purchaser for the land for the price of $2,800?" The jury answered both questions in the affirmative. The defendant then filed a general motion to have the verdict set aside.

All the material facts are stated in the opinion.

Argued before EMERY, C. J., and WHITEHOUSE, STROUT, PEABODY, SPEAR, and CORNISH, JJ.

McGillicuddy & Morey, for plaintiff. Frank W. Butler, for defendant.

CORNISH, J. This is an action of assumpsit brought by a real estate agent to recover a commission of 2 per cent. on the price fixed by the owner for the sale of real estate, the plaintiff claiming that he procured a customer on the authorized terms, but that the defendant refused to make the conveyance.

The jury found for the plaintiff, and the defendant by motion asks to have the verdict set aside on two grounds—first, because whatever authority had been given by him to the agent to make a sale had been revoked by operation of law; and, second, because as a matter of fact the plaintiff did not procure the would-be purchaser. So far as material to the questions before us, the evidence shows the following facts:

The plaintiff is a real estate agent residing in Lewiston, where the defendant also resided up to the year 1896, when he moved with his family to North Jay, where he has since made his home. Just prior to his leaving Lewiston the defendant placed in the plaintiff's hands for sale certain vacant real estate in Lewiston, the price as claimed by the defendant to be $3,000, or, as claimed by the plaintiff, the asking price to be $3,000, but the lowest figure to be $2,800. The plaintiff at once placed his signs upon the land, where they remained for many years, and, as he says, until shortly after this suit began. From time to time he endeavored to sell the property to various parties, but without success. In 1901 or 1902 he wrote the defendant, suggesting the advisability of selling off the wood lot; but the defendant preferred to sell the whole together. In 1903 he had an interview with one Bridghain concerning a sale, but the latter wished only to purchase one portion, and negotiations therefore ceased for the time. In December, 1905, a Mr. Whitten, who was interested with Mr. Bridgham, wrote directly to the defendant, offering $2,000 for the property, and the defendant replied, declining that offer, but making a counter offer to sell for $2,800. Early in April, 1906, Mr. Whitten went to North Jay to interview the defendant, but the latter refused to stand by his offer. On April 19, 1906, Mr. Bridgham went again to the plaintiff, who knew nothing of the attempted trade between Mr. Whitten and the defendant, renewed the negotiations of some years before, and offered $2,800 for the entire property, which the plaintiff accepted. A check for $100 was given on that day to bind the bargain, and within a week a tender of the remaining $2,700 was made to the plaintiff. The plaintiff notified the defendant of the sale as soon as it was made, and the defendant's wife, who held the title, replied, at first denying the plaintiff's authority to sell at any price, and later denying that he was authorized to sell for $2,800, and refusing to make the transfer. This suit resulted.

The defendant's first contention is that, where no time limit is agreed upon by the parties, a real estate broker is entitled to only a reasonable time in which to find a purchaser, and, if no purchaser is found within a reasonable time, the contract terminates by operation of law, that what is a reasonable time is a question of law, and that under the facts of this case the court must hold that the authority given to the plaintiff in 1896 was revoked by operation of law prior to 1906.

We are unable to reach that conclusion. The relation between these parties is that of principal and agent, and the rights and liabilities of a real estate agent under such circumstances are well settled. The principal in 1896 conferred upon the agent the authority to sell the real estate at a given price. It is true that no definite period of time was expressly agreed upon during which the agency was to continue. That was unnecessary. Its duration was fixed in another way. It was established for a particular purpose, and was therefore in the contemplation of the parties to continue until that purpose was accomplished, unless...