Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc.
Decision Date | 01 October 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 85-749,85-749 |
Parties | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2276 Bob M. HARTLEY, Appellant, v. OCEAN REEF CLUB, INC., Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Chonin & Sher and Neil Chonin, Coral Gables, for appellant.
Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley & Casey and Larry A. Stumpf and Victoria L. Baden, Miami, for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, HUBBART and NESBITT, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals the order dismissing his complaint for failure to state a cause of action. We affirm.
Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, the facts are as follows. The plaintiff was an at-will employee of the defendant, the Ocean Reef Club, Inc. (Ocean Reef). In his capacity as Executive Director of Utilities for Ocean Reef, the plaintiff was in charge of a reverse-osmosis water plant and several sewage treatment facilities owned and operated by Ocean Reef. While in his position as Executive Director, the plaintiff became aware of "existing violations of Federal and State environmental Statutes and regulations." The plaintiff consistently reported these violations to his supervisors and urged their correction. Ocean Reef responded by threatening to discharge the plaintiff. Finally, the plaintiff refused to build or order his workers to construct or plan any facilities without proper government approval. Soon thereafter, the plaintiff was discharged from employment by Ocean Reef.
The plaintiff brought the present action seeking compensatory and punitive damages from Ocean Reef for "wrongful discharge." The plaintiff alleged that he was discharged solely because he refused to participate in Ocean Reef's criminal activity. See § 403.161, Fla.Stat. (1983). On Ocean Reef's motion, the trial court dismissed the cause for failure to state a cause of action.
The plaintiff concedes that no Florida court has recognized a cause of action for retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee. The established rule in Florida is that when the term of employment is discretionary or indefinite, either party may terminate the employment at any time for any reason or no reason without assuming any liability. See Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla.1983); Segal v. Arrow Industries Corp., 364 So.2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So.2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 367 So.2d 1123 (Fla.1979), aff'd, 384 So.2d 1253 (Fla.1980). Nevertheless, the plaintiff would have this court create an exception to this rule in the form of a tort for retaliatory discharge where the reason for the discharge is an intention on the part of the employer to contravene the public policy of this state.
We acknowledge that several jurisdictions have created such a tort on the basis of "public policy." See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) ( ); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) ( ); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) ( ). In fact, some of the cases are factually similar to the present case. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) ( ); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Railroad, 81 Mich.App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) ( ). Nevertheless, Florida courts have consistently and expressly refused to adopt this new tort theory. See Smith, 427 So.2d at 184; Segal, 364 So.2d at 90.
As one court has recognized, the creation of a cause of action for retaliatory firing of an at-will employee would abrogate the inherent right of contract between employer and employee. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital, 352 So.2d 1130 (Ala.1977). It would overrule longstanding Florida law and create uncertainty in present employer-employee relationships as to the rights of the parties involved. This would be contrary to one of the basic functions of the law which is "to foster certainty in business relationships." Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So.2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
Furthermore, the foundation underlying the cause of action for retaliatory discharge advanced by the plaintiff, "intent which is contrary to public policy," is too vague a concept to justify the judicial creation of such a new tort. Hinrichs. The determination of what constitutes public policy, or which of competing public policies should be given precedence, is a function of the legislature. Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind.App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979) ( ). It follows that a significant change in the law such as the creation of a cause of action for retaliatory or wrongful discharge in this state is best left to the legislature. Accord Hinrichs; Martin; Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983). In that regard, we approve of the observations and comments of the New York high court in Murphy:
Those jurisdictions that have modified the traditional at-will rule appear to have been motivated by conclusions that the freedom of contract underpinnings of the rule have become outdated, that individual employees in the modern work force do not have the bargaining power to negotiate security for the jobs on which they have grown to rely, and that the rule yields harsh results for those employees who do not enjoy the benefits of express contractual limitations on the power of dismissal. Whether these conclusions are supportable or whether for other compelling reasons employers should, as a matter of policy, be held liable...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Mousa v. Lauda Air Luftfahrt, A.G.
...could exceed that notice period."). Furthermore, Florida is a strong at-will employment state. See, e.g., Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Malver v. Sheffield Indus., Inc., 462 So.2d 567, 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Rehman v. ECC Int'l Corp., No. 90-425......
-
O'Neal v. Florida a & M University
...based on retaliatory discharge. See Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof'l Adm'rs, 427 So.2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327, 1328-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Not until 1986 did the Act create "a `stand-alone statutory scheme' designed to provide an aggrieved party ......
-
Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Horne
...of those relationships." Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So.2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); see also Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327, 1329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). We think it sufficient for a dealer prior to delivery of a car to determine that a buyer has a valid license......
-
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Novotny
...Administrators, 427 So.2d 182 (Fla.1983); Gibbs v. H.J. Heinz Co., 536 So.2d 370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). We have previously held that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not created by a person w......
-
Florida workers' whistles are not silenced.
...employer who harms its employees' health under Florida's Occupational Safety and Health Act. Compare Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d at 1327 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1985) with FLA. STAT. [subsections] 448.102 and 448.103, and (13) See Sussan v. Nova Southeastern Univ., 723 So. 2d 933 (......