Hartley v. State, 92-2896
| Decision Date | 11 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-2896,92-2896 |
| Citation | 650 So.2d 1044 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D186 Clarence HARTLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant, Clarence Hartley, was convicted of the sale of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, declared an habitual felony offender and sentenced to thirty years in state prison.
In this appeal, appellant challenges his assignment to the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit's habitual felony division and argues (1) that the division was improperly created by administrative order and (2) that the creation of the division violated the separation of powers doctrine. Additionally, appellant, an African-American, argues that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the over representation of minority defendants in the new habitual felony offender division violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. We have carefully considered all of the claims raised by appellant. Because we agree that the division was improperly created by administrative order, we vacate appellant's sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
At the center of controversy in this appeal is the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit's Administrative Order No. 3.028-5/91. Pursuant to rule 2.050, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, the chief judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, established "a special court ... to hear cases involving ... serious habitual felony offenders...." The preamble to the administrative order outlined reasons for establishing the new division--"the Legislature has found that 'a substantial and disproportionate number of serious crimes is committed in Florida by a relatively small number of multiple and repeat felony offenders' "--and the objectives hoped to be fostered by its creation--"the designation of a special court, within the criminal division, to hear cases involving a restricted category of serious habitual felony offenders will permit the Court to handle a limited caseload and focus its attention on extremely serious cases...." Id. The administrative order also detailed the criteria that would be used for determining which defendants qualified for assignment to the habitual felony offender division. 1
Trial courts in Florida are commonly arranged in subject matter related divisions in order to facilitate administrative efficiency and benefit from the increased expertise which specialization affords the judiciary. Article V, section 7 of the Florida Constitution provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll courts except the supreme court may sit in divisions as may be established by general law." Both article V, section 20(c)(10), Florida Constitution and section 43.30, Florida Statutes (1991), provide that "[a]ll courts except the supreme court may sit in divisions as may be established by local rule approved by the supreme court." In accordance with these clear prescriptions, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that all subject matter related divisions must be established by local rule and not administrative order. Administrative Order, Fourth Judicial Circuit (Division of Courts), 378 So.2d 286 (Fla.1979) (); In re Report of the Comm'n on Family Courts, 588 So.2d 586 (Fla.1991) (Family Courts I).
The differences between the procedural requirements for the establishment of local rules and administrative orders are quite significant and worthy of discussion. Administrative orders are simply entered by chief judges of the circuit courts and approval of these orders by the Supreme Court of Florida is not required. Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.050(b)(2). On the other hand, local rules must be approved by a majority of all county and circuit judges in the circuit. The judges must then notify the local bar within the circuit of the proposal and must permit a representative of the local bar, and any other interested persons, to be heard on the proposal. The proposal is then submitted to the Supreme Court of Florida for approval. After submission to the supreme court, the proposal is reviewed by the Supreme Court Local Rules Advisory Committee and by appropriate committees of the Florida Bar. All other interested persons are given the opportunity to provide their comments or responses to the local rules advisory committee. The supreme court may then act on the proposal on the basis of the recommendations received by the advisory and Florida bar committees or may set the matter for a public hearing. Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.050(e)(1). It is readily apparent from the preceding review that local rules are submitted to greater scrutiny and allow for more public input than administrative orders.
Our analysis leads us to conclude that the designation of a special court to exclusively handle habitual felony cases constitutes a subject matter related division which must be accomplished by local rule. In Garcia v. Rivkind, 639 So.2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), the third district held that the Eleventh Judicial Circuit could not establish separate domestic violence departments within the criminal division of the county court and family division of the circuit court by administrative order. In so ruling, the court stated:
It is obvious that, however denominated, they created a specialized subject matter-related division of the trial courts which, under article V, section 7, Florida Constitution, and section 43.30, Florida Statutes, may be accomplished only by local rule, duly approved by the supreme court in accordance with Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.050(e)(1).
Similarly, this court, in Sapp v. Ross, No. 94-2839 (Fla. 4th DCA October 7, 1994) (unpublished order) granted a stay and issued an order to show cause regarding an administrative order of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit which purported to create a Domestic Violence Court. The petitioners, defendants who were brought before the new division on its first day of operation, challenged the creation of the division on the basis that it had not been established through a local rule as required by the provisions set out in rule 2.050(e)(1), Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. Subsequently, the stay was lifted when the Supreme Court of Florida approved the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit's petition for approval of the administrative order as a local rule thus authorizing the establishment of a domestic violence court. See Local Rule to Establish a Domestic Violence Court in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, No. 84,292 (Fla. Oct. 11, 1994) (unpublished order).
In In re Report of the Commission on Family Courts, 646 So.2d 178 (Fla.1994) (Family Courts III), the supreme court sought to clarify issues regarding the implementation and operation of family law divisions in the circuit courts which had been mandated by the legislature through chapter 90-273, section 10(3), Laws of Florida. In particular, the court discussed the confusion which had been created by the legislature in passing chapter 94-134, Laws of Florida, which made the violation of a domestic violence injunction a first-degree misdemeanor and removed the power of judges to use indirect criminal contempt to punish domestic violence injunction violators. The court stated that "[t]his legislative action effectively placed domestic violence injunction violations within the jurisdiction of county court criminal judges and removed those violations from the jurisdiction of circuit court family division judges ..." Id. at 180. The court noted that in enacting chapter 94-134, the legislature "created a number of administrative problems, given its [earlier] chapter 90-273 directive that all family issues be handled by judges assigned to family law divisions because, unquestionably domestic violence is a family law issue." Id.
Most germane to the issues at hand, however, is that the supreme court held the circuit courts' implementation of family law divisions and the assignment of all family law matters, including domestic violence, were to be controlled through either local rules or administrative orders expressly approved by that court. The court further ruled that the requirement of approval of administrative orders regarding the implementation of family court and domestic violence divisions would be an exception to rule 2.050, which ordinarily does not require approval of administrative orders. Id. at 180-82.
In Family Courts III, the supreme court specifically held the district courts' rulings in Garcia and Sapp "moot" because of the express approval in the opinion of all local rules and administrative orders concerning the assignment of judges to family law and domestic violence divisions. Thus, the court did not directly decide the issue of whether a domestic violence division of the court would ordinarily be the type of subject matter related division which must be created by administrative order. However, the supreme court's approval of local rules creating these divisions and its unusual requirement that administrative orders creating domestic violence courts be submitted to the court for approval, signifies the court's implicit endorsement of the result reached in Garcia and to a certain extent, Sapp.
The creation of the habitual felony offender division in the present case is clearly analogous to the specialized domestic violence division in Garcia. Each can be considered a subdivision of a larger body of law--domestic violence cases a subdivision of family law and habitual felony offender cases a subdivision of...
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