Hartley v. State
| Decision Date | 19 June 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 61121,61121 |
| Citation | 282 S.E.2d 684,159 Ga.App. 157 |
| Parties | HARTLEY v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Reber Boult, Atlanta, for appellant.
E. Byron Smith, Dist. Atty., W. Hal Craig, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Hartley appeals his conviction of three counts of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. The following facts presented at trial were undisputed.
Hartley was clocked on radar by Henry County Police Officer Walsh driving at 71 m.p.h. on the wrong side of the road and stopped. Officer Walsh intended to give Hartley a ticket for speeding and crossing the centerline and let him go on, but when Hartley got out of his car and addressed Walsh as "Occifer," staggering slightly, Walsh placed him under arrest for driving under the influence and took him into custody. Upon searching Hartley's person, Officer Walsh found a glass vial containing a white powder in Hartley's pocket. Hartley's automobile was towed to the jail garage where it was inventoried. Officer Walsh found several paper bags containing twenty plastic bags of a leafy substance he suspected was marijuana, and approximately one thousand tablets which he also suspected of being a drug. Among other items found in Hartley's car were two pistols (a Luger type and an antique style cap and ball), two rifles, three out-of-state license plates, an assortment of clothing, some blankets, an AM-FM radio, film, a fishing rod, a violin, a guitar, a hair dryer, work shoes, and a vast assortment of power hand tools.
Hartley was charged and indicted for unlawful possession of controlled substances after the Georgia State Crime Laboratory identified the suspected drugs as marijuana, cocaine and methaqualone (commonly called "quaaludes").
Hartley appeals, enumerating eleven errors.
1. Appellant's assertion that the warrantless search and seizure of the alleged drugs was not supported by probable cause is without merit. The violation of the speed limit authorized the stop of the automobile; the search of Hartley's person and the limited area within his control inside the car was permissible at the scene of the arrest; and the inventory search of the automobile after it was taken into custody was likewise valid. Stoker v. State, 153 Ga.App. 871(1), 267 S.E.2d 295 (1980) and cases cited.
2. Hartley's trial defenses included contentions that the state failed to prove either his possession of the alleged contraband or the correct identity of the drugs. He argues on appeal that without "meaningful access" to all of the data of the State Crime Laboratory analyst he was denied preparation for effective cross-examination; and that under a proper construction of Georgia's new discovery statute (Code Ann. § 27-1303 )), this information is required to be furnished to defense counsel upon request ten days before trial.
Code Ann. § 27-1303 provides as follows:
Under the due process standards established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the prosecution is not required to make a "complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case." Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972). See generally Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 418, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975). However, in Georgia the discovery rights of criminal defendants have been expanded. For example, Code § 27-1403 makes available to a criminal defendant a list of witnesses against him prior to trial. Additionally, Georgia has recognized the general right of a defendant charged with possession or sale of a prohibited substance, when reasonable, to have an expert of his own choosing analyze the substance in the state laboratory under the control and supervision of the state, upon timely motion to the court. Patterson v. State, 238 Ga. 204, 232 S.E.2d 233 (1977), cert. den. 431 U.S. 970, 97 S.Ct. 2932, 53 L.Ed.2d 1067. Also, Code Ann. § 68A-902.1 (a)(4), relating to chemical analysis of the blood, urine, breath or other bodily substances of drivers suspected to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, makes "full information" concerning these tests available to those accused of such traffic misdemeanors.
Thus, the language of the new statute clearly is a further extension of a defendant's right to pretrial discovery. Code Ann. § 27-1303 makes scientific reports available to a defendant upon proper and timely written demand if such information is in the possession of or available to the district attorney. The statute requires the prosecution to furnish the defense "a complete copy of any written scientific reports ... which will be introduced in whole or in part against defendant...." Appellant urges a construction of this language which would allow discovery not only of the Crime Lab report containing the conclusions of the lab analyst, but would also provide defendant with all the notes and other recordations of data which the Crime Lab compiled during its analysis of the substance and information pertaining to the methods of scientific tests and experiments used. It is argued that access to a laboratory analyst's written data is necessary for effective cross examination; and that it was imperative in the instant case to have the working materials of the lab analyst in advance of trial since the notes of the lab analyst which were made available to him at trial were a mass of lines, graphs, numbers, symbols and computations meaningless to counsel unless he could have it interpreted by an expert.
We are not willing to hold as a matter of statutory interpretation that the provision requiring pretrial production of a "complete copy of any written scientific reports" mandates that the entire written work materials of the State Crime Lab be included in that report. The language of the statute imports to us that the right of pretrial discovery under Code Ann. § 27-1303 was intended by the legislature to allow a defendant to receive a complete written copy of the results of any scientific analysis, but that the term "written report" as used in the statute does not encompass the written work materials upon which the conclusions contained in the report were based. 1 To hold otherwise would place the onerous burden on the state to produce an endless spectrum of internal memoranda, relating to the study, research, communications, computer data and points of view utilized, recorded or relied upon by lab analysts in each and every phase of their investigation. Accord, United States v. Umentum, 547 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Orzechowski, 547 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1976). In any event, the transcript here discloses that the trial judge did in fact allow defense counsel access to all work notes and memoranda of the Crime Lab at trial, and it appears from counsel's able cross-examination of the state's witnesses that he needed no assistance from outside experts.
Providing the defendant with a copy of the State Crime Lab report, even though it may contain only conclusions nevertheless allows a defendant to know what evidence the state has to present against him. This new pretrial discovery tactic will preclude surprise at trial, and the disclosure of the report 10 days prior to trial will enable the defendant to obtain an independent analysis of the alleged contraband in order to determine if the state crime lab report has erred in its analysis and identification of the substance. For these reasons we conclude that a complete disclosure of all...
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