Hartley v. Williamson

• Decision Date: 20 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 94,545.,94,545.
• Parties: Kim Allyson HARTLEY, Individually; and Amber Hartley, a minor, by and through her Mother and Next Friend, Kim Allyson Hartley, Appellants v. Diane WILLIAMSON, Ed.D., Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

18 P.3d 355

2001 OK CIV APP 6

Kim Allyson HARTLEY, Individually; and Amber Hartley, a minor, by and through her Mother and Next Friend, Kim Allyson Hartley, Appellants v. Diane WILLIAMSON, Ed.D., Appellee.

No. 94,545.

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 4.

June 20, 2000.

Certiorari Denied November 7, 2000.

Approved for Publication January 18, 2000.

Joe M. Fears, Barber & Bartz, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellants.

R. Jack Freeman, Feldman, Franden, Woodard & Farris, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Appellee.

Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 4.

Approved for Publication by Order of the Supreme Court January 18, 2000.

OPINION

STUBBLEFIELD, J.

¶ 1 This is an appeal from summary judgment granted to a court-appointed psychologist in a multi-theory action for damages brought by a mother and daughter counseled by the psychologist. The appeal has been assigned to the accelerated docket pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 1.36, 12 O.S. Supp. 1999, ch. 15, app. 1. Based on review of the record on appeal and applicable law, we affirm.

¶ 2 This action arises from child custody proceedings between the divorced couple, Kim Eugene Hartley (Father) and Kim Allyson Hartley (Mother). The couple was divorced in 1990 with Mother granted custody of the parties' two minor children, C.H. (Son), and A.H. (Daughter). However, the legal fireworks had only just begun.

¶ 3 In 1991, Mother was found guilty of contempt for denial of Father's visitation. During the same year, Mother filed a separate court action accusing Father of sexual molestation of Daughter. However, a protective order was denied in that action, and the appellate record reflects that Mother was advised by the trial judge to obtain counseling. In 1992, Father moved to modify the divorce decree by changing custody of the children to him. In mid-1993, after a trial of the motion to modify had begun, this action apparently was settled by the parties' agreement regarding visitation changes. Then, in 1996, Father sought an emergency order to modify custody. An agreed temporary order was entered giving Father custody of Son, with a final determination regarding visitation to be made after all the parties submitted to counseling by a professional agreed upon by the parties.

¶ 4 Initial contact with a psychologist was made by Mother's attorney. While at the courthouse for the proceeding that resulted in the agreed order, the lawyer called Dr. Diane Williamson (Doctor), who consented to act as the court-authorized counselor. Father's attorney agreed to the selection of Doctor, and the psychologist was engaged to counsel the parties as per the trial court's order.

¶ 5 Mother called Doctor, whose role she perceived as being "to determine visitation rights," briefly discussed facts and issues from her perspective, and made an appointment for herself and Daughter. At the initial meeting with Mother and Daughter, Doctor explained how she perceived her role— largely to provide information to the trial court. It is undisputed she indicated that, because her role was as a court-ordered "mediator," those being counseled were not her primary clients and information disclosed was not confidential.

¶ 6 Approximately one week after Doctor's session with Mother and Daughter, Father notified Doctor that Son's school had advised him that a person claiming to be his "aunt" had tried to pick Son up from school, but the school refused because the person was not on the authorized list. Father apparently related a fear that Mother was trying to steal the child. Later that day, the maternal grandmother called Doctor and advised that she had been the party attempting to pick Son up from school. Then, on the same day, Father brought two written witness' statements to Doctor, which stated that on the previous day, Mother, while conducting a garage sale, had informed each witness that she was planning to flee the jurisdiction with both her children.

¶ 7 The record reflects that Doctor asked Father for more information regarding Mother. Father provided various reports about Mother from prior court proceedings, including psychological evaluations. These materials generally may be characterized as depicting Mother as emotionally unstable.

¶ 8 On May 6, 1996, Father filed an application for an emergency ex-parte order giving him custody of Daughter, listing the witness statements reporting Mother's stated intention of fleeing the jurisdiction with both children. On inquiry by Father's attorney, Doctor agreed to testify at the hearing on the application.¹ Before she did so, she talked with two other doctors, who had professional knowledge of Mother, about the risk of Mother's flight. Doctor then testified at the hearing that she believed Mother was a flight risk, was preparing to flee and that the situation posed a risk of harm to the children.

¶ 9 The emergency order was entered. The record reflects that Doctor agreed with the trial judge that Daughter could be placed into Father's custody at a scheduled session the next day at Doctor's office, if no other safe arrangements could be made. Daughter was picked up at the session and put into Father's custody. However, after full hearing, the custody of Daughter ultimately was returned to Mother.

¶ 10 Mother sued Doctor, both individually and as next friend of Daughter, seeking damages for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, deceit and conspiracy to commit abuse of process. However, the trial court sustained Doctor's motion for summary judgment, finding that: (1) Doctor was acting at the "request" of the court; (2) all actions undertaken by Doctor were in the best interest of the children; and, (3) Doctor was immune from civil suit because of her status as a court-appointed expert. Mother appeals.

¶ 11 Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Oliver v. Farmers Ins. Group of Companies, 1997 OK 71, 941 P.2d 985. Therefore, as the decision involves purely legal determinations, the appellate standard of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., 1996 OK 136, ¶ 2, 920 P.2d 122, 124.

¶ 12 On review of a summary judgment record, this court will view all inferences and conclusions to be drawn from underlying facts contained in evidentiary materials in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Oliver, 1997 OK 71 at ¶ 6, 941 P.2d at 987. If the uncontroverted facts support legitimate inferences favoring the well-pleaded theory of the party against whom the judgment is granted, or the judgment is contrary to...