Hartline v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals

• Decision Date: 31 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. C047905.,C047905.
• Citation: 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 713,132 Cal.App.4th 458
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: DEAN HARTLINE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, Defendant and Respondent.

33 Cal.Rptr.3d 713

132 Cal.App.4th 458

DEAN HARTLINE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, Defendant and Respondent.

No. C047905.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

August 31, 2005.

The Arns Law Firm, Morgan C. Smith and Robert S. Arns, San Francisco, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

The Law Office of Marion's Inn, Kennedy P. Richardson and Eugene Chang, Oakland; The Law Office of Craddick, Candland & Conti, Danville, Jeffrey A. Harper, Fairfield and S. Bradford Harper for Defendant and Respondent.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.

Plaintiff Dean Hartline (Hartline) sued Ann Collins (Collins) and her employer Kaiser Permanente for personal injuries following a car accident. After the trial court granted the motion of Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (sued as Kaiser Permanente, hereafter Kaiser) for summary adjudication of Hartline's vicarious liability cause of action, Hartline dismissed his remaining premises liability cause of action against Kaiser and judgment was entered in Kaiser's favor. Kaiser filed a memorandum of costs including a request for expert witness fees based on plaintiff's failure to accept its offer made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998.¹ Hartline filed a notice of appeal from the judgment and then a motion to tax Kaiser's costs for medical records and expert witness fees, claiming as to the expert witness fees Kaiser's section 998 offer was not made in good faith. The trial court denied Hartline's objection that the section 998 offer was not made in good faith and granted Kaiser its postoffer expert witness fees of $1,600. Hartline filed a second notice of appeal from the award of costs.

On appeal Hartline contends the trial court erred in (1) granting Kaiser's motion for summary adjudication on his vicarious liability claim because the "premises line" rule from the area of workers' compensation law should apply to Hartline's respondeat superior claim, and (2) finding Kaiser's section 998 offer was made in good faith. We reject Hartline's claims and shall affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Collins was employed in August 2002 as a staff physical therapist in the Orthopedics Clinic at Kaiser Hospital on Morse Avenue in Sacramento. Collins left her home at about 7:15 a.m. on August 8, 2002, to drive to work. As she turned left off the street into the driveway to Kaiser's parking lot, she struck Hartline and his dog as they were walking across the driveway.

Kaiser does not pay for any of Collins's transportation costs or car insurance. Collins's regular work hours at the Morse Avenue facility were 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The accident occurred shortly before 8:00 a.m.

Hartline filed a civil complaint alleging negligence against both Collins and Kaiser and premises liability against Kaiser.

Kaiser brought a motion for summary adjudication of the negligence cause of action, claiming there were no triable issues of fact as to Kaiser because the application of the "going-and-coming" rule precluded it from being vicariously liable for Collins's actions. Hartline opposed the motion for summary adjudication contending a triable issue of material fact existed as to whether Collins was acting in the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. Hartline contended the "premises line" rule, recognized in workers' compensation law for purposes of applying the going-and-coming rule, should be applied to this case involving respondeat superior. The trial court granted Kaiser's motion. Hartline filed a motion for reconsideration and relief from excusable neglect under section 473, which Kaiser opposed and the trial court denied.

Approximately four months later, Kaiser sent an offer to compromise pursuant to section 998 to Hartline. Kaiser offered to waive costs in exchange for the entry of a request for dismissal with prejudice.

The following day, Hartline sent Kaiser a request for a stipulation allowing dismissal of the remaining cause of action against Kaiser and entry of judgment in favor of Kaiser for the purpose of allowing appeal of the summary adjudication decision.

Hartline did not accept Kaiser's offer to compromise and Kaiser did not sign Hartline's stipulation for dismissal and judgment. After Hartline's motion for dismissal of the remaining cause of action was denied by the trial court, Hartline filed a request for dismissal of the "cause of action for direct negligence against defendant Kaiser Permanente only." Dismissal was entered. Subsequently, judgment was entered for Kaiser.

Kaiser filed a memorandum of costs seeking a total of $7,214 in costs, including $2,632 in expert witness fees pursuant to section 998. Hartline filed a motion to tax costs, arguing with regard to the claim for expert witness fees that the section 998 offer was not made in good faith and there was no proof the requested fees were all incurred after the section 998 offer was made. Kaiser opposed the motion to tax its costs, although it reduced its claim for expert witness fees to $1,600.

DISCUSSION

I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO APPLY THE "PREMISES LINE" RULE

A. Standard of Review for Summary Adjudication

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when "all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (§ 437c, subd. (c).) Summary adjudication works the same way, except it acts on specific causes of action or affirmative defenses, rather than on the entire complaint. (§ 437c, subd. (f).) A summary adjudication is properly granted only if a motion therefore completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (§ 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Motions for summary adjudication proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (§ 437c, subd. (f)(2).) We review rulings on motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication de novo, applying the same rules and procedures. (Lunardi v. Great-West Life Assurance Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 807, 819, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 56; Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1715, 1726-1727, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 781.)

We decide the question on appeal from summary adjudication using the same method as the trial court. A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication shall be granted "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except that to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence...." (§ 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant has met its burden of showing a cause of action has no merit if it "has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant ... has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff ... to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff ... may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show ... a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists...." (Id., subd. (p)(2).) On review of an order granting or denying summary judgment or summary adjudication, "we examine the facts presented to the trial court and determine their effect as a matter of law." (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 464, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 936 P.2d 70.)

"The trial court's stated reasons supporting its ruling ... do not bind this court. We review the ruling, not its rationale." (Szadolci v. Hollywood Park Operating Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 16, 19, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 356.)

B. The Trial Court's Summary Adjudication of Hartline's Negligence Cause of Action Against Kaiser

"The rule of respondeat superior is familiar and simply stated: an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of the employment. [Citation.]" (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 510, 907 P.2d 358.) The plaintiff has the burden of proof to demonstrate the negligent act of the employee was committed within the scope of employment. (Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 721, 159 Cal.Rptr. 835, 602 P.2d 755; Yamaguchi v. Harnsmut (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 472, 482, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 706.) Whether an act is within the scope of employment is a question of fact, unless the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible, in which case the question is one of law. (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, supra, at p. 299, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 510, 907 P.2d 358; John Y. v. Chaparral Treatment Center, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 565, 574, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 330.)

Under the "going and coming" rule, an employee going to or coming home from work is "ordinarily considered outside the scope of employment so that the employer is not liable for his torts." (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 961, 88 Cal.Rptr. 188, 471 P.2d 988 (Hinman).) "The `going and coming' rule is sometimes ascribed to the theory that the employment relationship is `suspended' from the time the employee leaves until he returns [citation], or that in commuting he is not rendering service to his employer. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)

Kaiser claimed in its motion for summary adjudication it could not be vicariously held liable under the rule of respondeat superior based on the going-and-coming rule. According to Kaiser, the undisputed evidence established Collins was going to work from her home at the time of the accident....