Hartman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 December 1915
• Docket Number: No. 11740.,11740.
• Parties: HARTMAN v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

182 S.W. 148

HARTMAN v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.

No. 11740.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

December 6, 1915.

Rehearing Denied January 17, 1916.

Appeal from Circuit court, Linn County; Fred Lamb, Judge.

Action by Johnathan Hartman against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

See, also, 261 Mo. 279, 168 S. W. 1143.

Bailey & Hart, of Brookfield, J. C. Carr, of Cameron, and M. G. Roberts, of St. Joseph, for appellant. Burns, Burns & Burns, of Brookfield, for respondent.

JOHNSON, J.

On April 18, 1910, plaintiff, who had been employed by defendant as a locomotive fireman and engineer for ten years or more, accidentally fell from an engine on which he was serving as fireman, and which was drawing a train employed in interstate commerce, and sustained personal injuries, the nature and extent of which are a subject of serious dispute between the parties. Plaintiff contends that the injuries totally and permanently disabled him, while defendant insists that they were slight and temporary. The court, sitting as a jury, resolved this issue in favor of plaintiff, and for the purposes of the present inquiry we shall accept that solution as a finality. From September, 1900, to the date of his injury plaintiff was a member in good standing of the relief department of defendant, and this suit, which was filed August 22, 1914, is for the recovery from defendant of $2,433.35 as disability benefits plaintiff alleges are due him from that department under the terms and conditions of his contract for such benefits.

The answer alleges a forfeiture, resulting from the facts that plaintiff failed to comply with certain provisions of his contract relating to the presentation and prosecution of such claims, and elected, under a choice of remedies offered by the relief contract, to prosecute an action in tort against defendant for damages resulting from his injury, thereby surrendering his claim for indemnity. The reply denied this new matter, and interposed affirmative defenses thereto, the nature of which will appear in our review of the case. It suffices to say that the questions of law we shall discuss and determine are properly raised by the pleadings. The trial court decided these questions for plaintiff, rendered judgment accordingly, and defendant appealed.

The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts which left open and unsettled the single issue of "the extent of plaintiff's injuries and the duration of disability arising therefrom." The agreed statement is as follows:

"Hartman was injured on the 18th day of April, 1910, by falling from a locomotive on which he was engaged as a fireman and while said Hartman was employed by the defendant in interstate commerce; that prior to his said injuries the defendant Hartman became a member of the relief department of the defendant by the execution and delivery of applications for membership, true copies of which are attached to defendant's answer as Exhibits A and B; that Exhibit C attached to the defendant's answer is a correct copy of the regulations of said relief department effective at the time of plaintiff's said injury, and the said exhibits are considered in evidence and constitute the contract which exists between plaintiff and the defendant in relation to his membership in said relief department; that said relief department was operated in accordance with said regulations, and that plaintiff and defendant had contributed to the expense of operating said relief department as required by said contract, and that the plaintiff was at the time of his injury a member thereof in good standing; that when plaintiff was injured he was taken to the hospital by the defendant, and there treated by its surgeons for a period of about three weeks; that such benefits as defendant admits plaintiff might have elected to receive from said relief fund on account of said injury were duly tendered to him by the defendant and refused, and plaintiff elected to prosecute an action at law against the defendant for damages on account of said injuries, and for that purpose did on July 13, 1910, file a suit against the defendant in the circuit court of Livingston county, Mo., to recover $50,000 for said injuries, which suit the plaintiff prosecuted to a final judgment in the Supreme Court of Missouri; that the opinion handed down by the Supreme Court of Missouri July 14, 1914, in said case may be offered in evidence by the plaintiff herein subject to the objections of the defendant herein; that in said suit for damages the plaintiff alleged he was permanently disabled, and the defendant denied such injury and disability at all times; that plaintiff never made any demand upon defendant or its relief department for benefits on account of said disability until and by means of the filing of this suit, and did not report to the medical examiner of the defendant's relief department at any time after he left the care of the defendant's surgeons about three or four weeks after his injury."

The action for damages prosecuted by plaintiff for his injury was based on negligence of defendant, and was successfully maintained in the trial court, where he recovered a judgment for $18,000, but on appeal to the Supreme Court that judgment was reversed outright, on the ground that the proof did not disclose a causal relation between the alleged negligence and the injury. Hartman v. Railroad, 261 Mo. 279, 168 S. W. 1143. The agreed statement, while conceding that plaintiff was employed in interstate commerce at the time of his injury, does not disclose that his action for damages asserted a cause falling under the operation of the Employers' Liability Act, nor does the reported opinion filed in the Supreme Court contain a direct statement of that fact, but from the facts of the case, as stated therein, the inference, we think, should be drawn that the pleaded cause was under that act. The pleader was not required to refer to the federal act, and the allegation and proof of facts, which showed that the injuries were received while plaintiff was employed by the defendant railroad company in interstate commerce, would be sufficient to bring the action within the purview of the act, since state as well as federal courts are "presumed to be cognizant of the enactment of the Employers' Liability Act, and to know that with respect to the responsibility of interstate carriers by railroad to their employés injured in such commerce after its enactment it had the effect of superseding state laws upon the subject." Railway Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135, 57 L. Ed. 355, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 134; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44; Moliter v. Railroad, 180 Mo. App. 84, 168 S. W. 250.

Membership in the relief department was restricted to employés of defendant, and provision was made in the regulations of that department for the creation and maintenance of a "relief fund" for the payment of sick, disability, and death benefits; such fund to consist of "voluntary contributions from members thereof, income derived from investments and from interest paid by the company, and money advanced by the company when necessary to pay benefits as they become due." Defendant had general charge of the department, guaranteed the fulfillment of its obligations "as determined by these regulations," and took charge of all moneys and securities belonging to the relief fund. The direct management of the department devolved upon "an advisory committee" composed of appointees of defendant and of others elected by the membership; the former class being in the majority. Defendant had complete control over the department and over the advisory committee. Employés were encouraged, but not compelled, to become members, and, when they did, were required to make written application and pay dues as in fraternal associations. The right of a member injured in the service of defendant to receive disability benefits or of his beneficiary to receive death benefits did not depend upon the question of whether the injury was due to negligence or mere accident. In either case the right to benefits followed the injury, provided the member complied with certain rules and regulations put into operation by the fact of his injury. By the terms of rule 55 he was required to give immediate notice to his timekeeper and to report to the medical examiner under penalty of a forfeiture of his right if he avoided the medical examiner or neglected to report or keep appointments "as herein provided."

Rule 62 provided that:

"Any claim for disability benefits, to be valid, must be made within sixty days from the time when such benefits accrued."

And rule 64 contained provisions which are the main reliance of defendant, and are as follows:

"In case of injury to a member, he may elect to accept the benefits in pursuance of these regulations, or to prosecute such claims as he may have at law against the company or any company associated therewith in the administration of their relief departments.

"The acceptance by the members of benefits for injury shall operate as a release and satisfaction of all claims against the company and all other companies associated therewith as aforesaid, for damages arising from or growing out of such injury. * * * And, further, if any suit shall be brought against the company or any other company associated therewith as aforesaid, for damages arising from or growing out of injury or death occurring to a member, the benefits otherwise payable and all obligations of the relief department and of the company created by the membership of such member in the relief fund shall thereupon be forfeited without any declaration or other act by the relief department or the company; but the superintendent may, in his discretion, waive such forfeiture upon condition that all pending suits shall first...