Hartman v. Duke

• Decision Date: 21 December 1929
• Citation: 22 S.W.2d 221
• Parties: HARTMAN v. DUKE et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 221

22 S.W.2d 221

HARTMAN v. DUKE et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December 21, 1929.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Shelby County; D. W. De Haven, Chancellor.

Bill of interpleader by Ervin C. Hartman, administrator, against Mrs. Blanch Virginia Duke and others. From the decree, the guardian ad litem of certain infant children appeals. Affirmed.

E. C. Hartman, of Memphis, for complainant.

Andrew Kincannon and Wilson, Gates & Armstrong, all of Memphis, for defendants.

COOK, J.

Prentiss Hoop, a resident of the state of Mississippi, was killed in a railroad accident in the state of Arkansas. The administrator appointed in the state of Tennessee sued in the circuit court of Shelby county to enforce a claim for damages, for the unlawful death of his intestate, under the statutes of Arkansas, and recovered $7,500 damages.

A controversy arose among the next of kin as to the distribution of the proceeds of the suit, and the administrator, by a bill of interpleader presenting the facts, alleged that the father of his intestate was not living and the mother claimed all of the recovery by force of the Arkansas statutes; and those acting for her infant children insisted that it passed to the mother, brothers, and sisters in equal parts under the statute of Mississippi, where the decedent resided and had his domicile until his death.

The chancellor overruled the demurrer filed by the guardian ad litem, who represented the infant defendants, and held that the mother took all of the recovery under the Arkansas statutes. The guardian ad litem appealed. He insists that the cause of action for the wrongful death, when realized on, became personal property and followed the usual course of distribution, as held in Loague v. Railroad, 91 Tenn. 458, 19 S. W. 430, Freeman v. Railroad, 107 Tenn. 340, 64 S. W. 1, and Haynes v. Walker, 111 Tenn. 106, 76 S. W. 902. And so it is urged by the guardian ad litem that the brothers and sisters of Prentiss Hoop are entitled to share equally with their mother, and to hold otherwise would be equivalent to substituting the words "residents of the State of Arkansas" for the word "persons" appearing in the Arkansas statute, thus inserting an unwarranted limitation in the statute contrary to the intention of the Legislature.

The rule observed by the chancellor does not imply the construction suggested by the insistence of the guardian ad litem. Although, as a rule, the succession of personal property is controlled by the law of the intestate's domicile, it does not lie beyond the power of a state to change that law. Every state may control the devolution of property and property rights within its borders, especially where the right is a creature of its own laws. Jones v. Marable, 6 Humph. 116; McCallum v. Smith, Meigs, 342, 33 Am. Dec. 147.

The fund in controversy came to the hands of the administrator as an award of damages for the wrongful death of his intestate. The administrator is the trustee charged with the responsibility of properly distributing it. The cause of action given to the administrator was for the exclusive benefit of the next of kin of the deceased, and the right of recovery was altogether dependent upon the statutes of Arkansas. While so, the action could be maintained in Tennessee in the absence of any repugnant law in our state that would forbid. 12 C. J. p. 453; Whitlow v. N. C. & St. L. Ry., 114 Tenn. 355, 84 S. W. 618, 68 L. R. A. 503. The law of Tennessee, being the law of the forum, would control only the practice and procedure through which our court enforced the right given by the Arkansas statute. 17 C. J. p. 1252, par. 105.

While such actions are transitory, it is generally held that the disposition of the recovery is dependent upon the laws of the state giving the right of action, unless the statutes giving the right of action merely provides for the distribution of...