Hartnett v. New York City Transit Authority
| Decision Date | 26 October 1995 |
| Citation | 86 N.Y.2d 438,633 N.Y.S.2d 758,657 N.E.2d 773 |
| Parties | , 657 N.E.2d 773, 1995 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 30,921 Thomas F. HARTNETT, as Commissioner of Labor of the State of New York, Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Respondent (Two Cases). |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
These combined appeals present two issues: the appropriate Statute of Limitations applicable to actions commenced under Labor Law § 27-a, the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA), and whether the Commissioner of Labor is precluded from bringing a lawsuit under PESHA where the complaining employee failed to file a complaint with the Commissioner within the 30-day time period prescribed in Labor Law § 27-a(10)(b). The action in Hartnett I should be dismissed as time-barred since the three-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 214(2) applies to PESHA actions. In Hartnett II, we hold that the 30-day filing requirement is not a Statute of Limitations and may be waived by the State Commissioner of Labor. Nonetheless, the Hartnett II action should also be dismissed because it was not commenced within the limitations period of CPLR 214(2).
According to the complaint, on March 31, 1987, defendant New York City Transit Authority assigned four track workers to do outdoor work under allegedly hazardous conditions. The workers, fearing for their safety, refused to perform the work and requested reassignment to a less dangerous worksite. The supervisor sent the track workers home. They lost the day's pay and were suspended for three days as a result of the incident. On April 29, 1987, the Transport Workers' Union, Local 100, filed a complaint with the New York State Department of Labor, alleging that defendant suspended the workers for refusing to work under hazardous conditions, and seeking an order finding that defendant discriminated against the workers in violation of PESHA, awarding them back pay, and expunging the incident from the workers' personnel file. More than three years later, in May 1990, the Commissioner referred the complaint to the Attorney-General, who commenced this action in May 1991, seeking back pay and injunctive and declaratory relief. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely under the three-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 214(2). Supreme Court denied the motion, agreeing with the Commissioner that the complaint sought an equitable remedy and was therefore subject to a six-year Statute of Limitations. The Appellate Division reversed on the law, granted defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint, concluding that because the Legislature enacted PESHA to create "a newly cognizable cause of action to protect employees who complained about unsafe working conditions" (200 A.D.2d 27, 29, 612 N.Y.S.2d 613), actions brought under PESHA are governed by CPLR 214(2), which provides for a three-year limitations period in "an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute." This Court granted the Commissioner's motion for leave to appeal.
On August 28, 1986, defendant assigned a 16-member crew to open and lay out bundles of railroad ties as part of the installation of new rails and ties on a local track. Twelve of the workers refused to perform this task because of slippery conditions and the presence of water in close proximity to a live third rail. The next day each of the 12 workers was charged with insubordination and suspended for 10 days. The workers and Local 100 appealed the disciplinary charges pursuant to the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement and the suspension was reduced to three days. On October 31, 1986, 63 days after the workers were suspended, Local 100 filed a complaint on their behalf with the Department of Labor. The Department investigated the complaint and determined that defendant had discriminated against the 12 workers in violation of PESHA. The complaint was referred to the Attorney-General, who commenced this action on March 21, 1991.
Defendant moved to dismiss the action as barred by the 30-day limitation period for filing employee complaints with the Department of Labor under Labor Law § 27-a(10), as well as by CPLR 214(2)'s three-year Statute of Limitations. Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint based on failure to file the complaint with the Commissioner within the 30-day limitations period. The Appellate Division affirmed. Relying on Federal decisions interpreting the United States Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.) (OSHA), upon which PESHA is based, the Appellate Division concluded that the 30-day period is mandatory, rather than directory, and that an action based on a complaint not filed within that time period must be dismissed. The Court declined to reach the CPLR Statute of Limitations issue. This Court granted the Commissioner's motion for leave to appeal.
The Legislature enacted PESHA in 1980 to provide individuals working in the public sector with the same or greater workplace protections provided to employees in the private sector under OSHA (see, Governor's Approval Mem, 1980 NY Legis Ann, at 285). Under PESHA, public employers must provide employees with workplaces that are free of recognized hazards likely to cause serious physical injury and which reasonably and adequately protect their lives, safety and health (Labor Law § 27-a[3][a]. Section 27-a(5) encourages employees and their representatives to report violations of health and safety standards, while subdivision (10) makes it unlawful to discharge, discipline or in any manner discriminate against any employee "because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by this section." Furthermore, "[a]ny employee who believes that he has been discharged, disciplined, or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of this subdivision may, within thirty days after such violation occurs, file a complaint with the commissioner" (Labor Law § 27-a[10][b]. PESHA does not expressly provide victims of discrimination with a private right of action, nor does it specify the Statute of Limitations applicable to actions brought under its provisions.
The issue in Hartnett I is whether a three-year (CPLR 214[2] or six-year (CPLR 213[1] Statute of Limitations applies. Resolution of this issue is determinative of the case because the suit is timely only under the six-year Statute of Limitations.
It is the Commissioner's position that since PESHA does not specify a limitations period, and a PESHA action seeks relief of an equitable nature, the appropriate limitation period is six years under CPLR 213(1), the "residual" Statute of Limitations which governs actions in equity. The Commissioner concedes that PESHA is a creature of statute unknown at common law, but argues that CPLR 214(2) is nonetheless inapplicable because an action under PESHA cannot be considered one to "recover upon a liability" within the meaning of that rule. Instead, the Commissioner urges this Court to ascribe dispositive significance to the fact that PESHA's remedies are equitable in nature.
At the outset, we note that CPLR 213(1) is not necessarily or automatically applicable simply because PESHA does not specify a limitations period. Rather, in the absence of a limitation period specifically governing the claim at issue, "it is necessary to examine the substance of that action to identify the relationship out of which the claim arises and the relief sought" (Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 229, 425 N.Y.S.2d 68, 401 N.E.2d 190; see, Press v. County of Monroe, 50 N.Y.2d 695, 431 N.Y.S.2d 394, 409 N.E.2d 870). Such an examination here reveals that the rights created, and duties imposed, exist only by virtue of PESHA, which prohibits discrimination against public employees who assert their rights under that statutory scheme.
Furthermore, it is settled that in determining the applicability of CPLR 214(2), the pertinent inquiry is whether the statute creates a liability "for wrongs not recognized in the common or decisional law," and which would not exist but for the statute (State of New York v. Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 83, 86, 378 N.Y.S.2d 654, 341 N.E.2d 223; see, Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169, 175, 501 N.Y.S.2d 313, 492 N.E.2d 386; State of New York v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co., 64 N.Y.2d 83, 88, 484 N.Y.S.2d 810, 473 N.E.2d 1184; Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 307, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86; Siegel, NY Prac § 35, at 41 [2d ed]. As noted, it is undisputed that Labor Law § 27-a(10) creates a cause of action unknown in the common law.
It is the Commissioner's contention, however, that CPLR 214(2) is inapplicable because the term "liability," as it is used in that rule, refers only to obligations measurable in money damages. We reject this overly restrictive construction of the phrase "recover upon a liability * * * created or imposed by statute" (CPLR 214[2]. As the Appellate Division aptly observed, "liability," as a legal term, has an appreciably broader meaning than pecuniary obligations. Black's Law Dictionary, for instance, defines liability as a "broad legal term" having "the most comprehensive significance, including almost every character of...
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