Hartpence v. Rodgers

Decision Date08 March 1898
Citation143 Mo. 623,45 S.W. 650
PartiesHARTPENCE v. RODGERS.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from circuit court, Caldwell county; E. J. Broaddus, Judge.

Action by George Hartpence against George F. Rodgers. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Crosby Johnson, for appellant. O. J. Chapman, for respondent.

WILLIAMS, J.

This is an action for damages for alienating the affections of plaintiff's wife, and wrongfully causing her to abandon him. The petition further charges that defendant debauched her, but the jury was not required to pass upon that issue. The answer was a general denial. The errors assigned relate to the action of the court in the admission and exclusion of evidence, the giving and refusal of instructions, and the failure to set aside the verdict because excessive. Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that he was married August 1, 1889, and that he and his wife lived together happily thereafter until in the month of December, 1892; that, during all that time, she was kind, dutiful, and affectionate; and that he treated her with all the consideration and kindness of a devoted husband. The father and mother of plaintiff's wife were residing with defendant upon his farm, having gone there in November, 1892. The parties were in no manner related to each other. Defendant had no family, and they were living with him to help upon the farm, and to keep house for him. The plaintiff and his wife, in December, 1892, moved into the dwelling where defendant and the father and mother of plaintiff's wife were living, as above stated. The plaintiff went there to assist his father-in-law in work upon the farm. Defendant was a large landowner, and reputed to be a man of wealth. He began, within a week or two after the arrival of plaintiff's wife, to show her marked attention. He soon boldly protested his love for her, and he made her presents, and stated that he intended to get a piano for her. He put a diamond ring upon her finger, and let her have it to wear. He advised her to get a divorce from plaintiff, and suggested that she go to Dakota for that purpose. He offered to go with her, and said that they could assume to be brother and sister. The wife began to treat her husband with coolness, and manifest a preference for defendant's society. She laid aside her wedding ring for the more beautiful one which defendant was able to furnish her to wear. She declined to accede to her husband's request to leave the farm, and go to another location with him. The husband, after six or seven weeks spent upon defendant's place, determined, under the circumstances mentioned, to leave. His wife at first asked him to stay. Defendant told her to "let her husband go if he wanted to; that he (defendant) could take better care of her than" her husband. Then she ceased to ask him to remain. The proof showed that defendant said, at one time, the sooner he could get rid of plaintiff, the quicker he could have plaintiff's wife. Upon several occasions, during his temporary absence from home, defendant wrote most affectionate letters to Mrs. Hartpence. The husband, in the latter part of January, 1893, left defendant's farm. The wife refused to go, and remained there with her father and mother. They stayed some 10 months longer, and then left. Plaintiff obtained a divorce from his wife. They never lived together after January, 1893. Without setting out any more of plaintiff's evidence, it is sufficient to say that the testimony upon his part tended to show a systematic and constant effort by defendant to win the affections of plaintiff's wife, to break the ties between her and her husband, and cause her to abandon him. The defendant introduced only one witness, who was called simply for the purpose of testifying to statements alleged to have been made by plaintiff's mother-in-law (who was a witness for him), contradictory of the evidence given by her upon the stand. Defendant was called by plaintiff, and identified, as in his handwriting, some of the amorous and telltale letters written by him. He did not, however, deny any of the damaging statements concerning his conduct and conversations testified to by plaintiff's witnesses, but remained entirely silent as to that matter. In fact, his actions might well be said to be convincing evidence of the truth of what had been testified.

1. The first question that arises is the correctness of the court's ruling upon the competency of evidence offered. During the examination of plaintiff, he was asked by his counsel what caused him to leave defendant's farm. He answered: "He [defendant] gained the affections of my wife, and she was no more a wife to me." Defendant objected to this answer, and saved an exception. It is argued that this statement was a conclusion of the witness, and not a statement of a fact. Plaintiff was called upon to give his reason for refusing to remain at the farm. No objection was made to this question. The response was a legitimate answer to that inquiry. The testimony was not offered to show the fact of the alienation of the wife's affections. If the witness had said in answer to this question that he went away because he believed defendant had alienated his wife's affections, it would have been an appropriate answer. Yet his belief would not have been competent to establish the fact which he believed to be true. Still, it would have been a proper answer if it was material to know his reasons for his actions. The witness was being interrogated as to why he left defendant's place, and his answer had reference to what he understood to be the facts, and upon which he acted. If, however, the statement should be held to be a mere conclusion, it is such a conclusion as all the evidence shows beyond peradventure was a correct one, and which defendant did not offer to dispute. The defendant could not possibly have been injured by the admission of this evidence in view of the other testimony in the case. Several exceptions were taken during the progress of the trial to the exclusion of questions asked the witnesses by defendant. We have carefully examined each of them. It will serve no purpose, except to lengthen this opinion, for us to set them out here. Suffice it to say that we find no fault with the rulings of the lower court in said matters.

2. The first, third, and fourth instructions for plaintiff contained a...

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