Hartsfield v. SEAFARERS INTERN. UNION, ETC.

• Decision Date: 18 February 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 75-635-H.
• Parties: Mary Elizabeth HARTSFIELD, Plaintiff, v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, ATLANTIC, GULF, LAKES, AND INLAND WATERS DISTRICT (AFL-CIO), and Seafarers International Union of North America (AFL-CIO), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

427 F. Supp. 264

Mary Elizabeth HARTSFIELD, Plaintiff, v. SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, ATLANTIC, GULF, LAKES, AND INLAND WATERS DISTRICT (AFL-CIO), and Seafarers International Union of North America (AFL-CIO), Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 75-635-H.

United States District Court, S. D. Alabama, S. D.

February 18, 1977.

Jerry O. Lorant, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff.

Otto E. Simon and Jonathan P. Gardberg, Mobile, Ala., for defendants.

HAND, District Judge.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The defendants having filed motion for summary judgment and the Court having considered the exhibits, the legal briefs, and the arguments of counsel, finds as follows:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Robert Earl Kiedinger died on or about December 30, 1974, while on board the vessel SS "EAGLE VOYAGER", a tanker of American registry, while said ship was docked in the Port of Odessa, U.S.S.R. At the time of his death, Robert Earl Kiedinger was a member of the crew of the SS "EAGLE VOYAGER".

2. Mary Elizabeth Hartsfield, the sister and personal representative of the decedent's three minor children, on April 2, 1975, brought an action on her own behalf and for the decedent's three minor children against the owner and operator of the vessel, SS "EAGLE VOYAGER" in the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama. The complaint was a pro se complaint and charged that the vessel was unseaworthy and that the shipowner was negligent and failed to provide the decedent with a safe place to work. Damages were sought in the amount of $180,000 under the Jones Act, the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768, and the General Maritime Law as established in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970). On that same date counsel for the shipowner and operator simultaneously filed an agreement for a judgment by consent for the full $180,000 asked by the Plaintiff as total damages. The court appointed an attorney to represent the interests of the minor children and, after considering the matter, entered a final judgment in the amount of $180,000.00.

3. The said $180,000 judgment has been satisfied and paid in full and the proceeds of said judgment have been accepted by the Plaintiff in the instant lawsuit and the persons on whose behalf the present lawsuit was instigated or their legal guardians.

4. After receiving the benefits of the judgment described above, the Plaintiff filed the present action against the United States of America in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on December 30, 1975. The complaint charged that the United States Coast Guard undertook to evaluate the mental and/or psychological suitability of James Hendrix to be a merchant seaman and a crew member on a United States Merchant Marine vessel. The complaint further alleges that the investigation and evaluation were performed negligently, that the Coast Guard knew or should have known that James Hendrix was mentally or psychologically unsuited and that the Coast Guard should not have issued James Hendrix seaman's documents. The complaint against the United States of America was brought under the Death on the High Seas Act and for wrongful death under the General Maritime Law.

5. On December 30, 1975, the Plaintiff also brought the present action against the Defendant, Seafarers International Union of North America. The complaint, as last amended, was brought by the Plaintiff, Mary Elizabeth Hartsfield, as the personal representative of Robert Earl Kiedinger, on behalf of the minor children of Robert Earl Kiedinger. The Defendants, in the complaint as last amended, are the Seafarers International Union (AFL-CIO), and Seafarers International Union, Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District (AFL-CIO). The amended complaint sought to state a claim against the union defendants under the Death on the High Seas Act and the General Maritime Law.

The amended complaint alleges that the union undertook the duty of supplying a crew to the owner of the SS "EAGLE VOYAGER" for the operation of the vessel and that they performed this duty negligently in that they caused James Hendrix to be a member of the crew of the vessel when they knew or should have known that James Hendrix was unstable and dangerous to his fellow crew members. The complaint further alleges that said James Hendrix killed Robert Earl Kiedinger and that the death of Kiedinger was the proximate result of the misconduct of the Union Defendants.

6. The action against the United States was transferred to this district and consolidated with the Plaintiff's action against the Union Defendants.

7. The United States of America and the Union Defendants both moved for summary judgment and all parties submitted affidavits and exhibits in support of their respective positions.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM RECOVERY AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS HEREIN BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF HAS HAD JUDGMENT AND SATISFACTION AGAINST A JOINT TORTFEASOR IN AN EARLIER ACTION ON THE SAME FACTS AND FOR THE SAME INJURY.

1. If Plaintiff's allegations against the Defendants herein are accepted as true for purposes of argument, then the Defendants herein stand as joint tortfeasors with the shipowner in that their conduct joined in producing Plaintiff's alleged injury. See Viehweg v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 141 F.Supp. 848 (E.D.Idaho 1956).

2. The pervasively accepted rule is that where a plaintiff has obtained a judgment against one joint tortfeasor and that judgment has been satisfied, the plaintiff is barred from seeking recovery from another joint tortfeasor. Sessions v. Johnson, 95 U.S. 347, 24 L.Ed. 596 (1877); McPherson v. Amalgamated Sugar Company, 271 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1959); Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 120 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1941); Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. v. Beech, 347 F.Supp. 669 (M.D.Tenn.1972); Pillo v. Reading Company, 232 F.Supp. 761 (E.D.Pa. 1964); Presser v. United States, 218 F.Supp. 108 (E.D.Wis.1963); Gentry v. Jett, 173 F.Supp. 722 (W.D.Ark.1959), aff'd 273 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1960); Viehweg v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra; Garvin v. Osterhaus, 125 F.Supp. 729 (E.D.Okl.1954); Muise v. Abbott, 60 F.Supp. 561 (D.Mass.1945), aff'd 160 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1947).

3. The law of the State of Alabama is in complete accord. Boles v. Steel, 48 Ala. App. 268, 264 So.2d 191, cert. denied, 288 Ala. 732, 264 So.2d 194 (1972); Baggett v. Allen, 276 Ala. 423, 163 So.2d 209 (1964); Brooks v. City of Birmingham, 239 Ala. 172, 194 So. 525 (1940); Bradford v. Carson, 223 Ala. 594, 137 So. 426 (1931); Steenhuis v. Holland, 217 Ala. 105, 115 So. 2 (1927); Jones v. Russell, 206 Ala. 215, 89 So. 660 (1921); Huey v. Dykes, 203 Ala. 231, 82 So. 481 (1919); McCoy v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 146 Ala. 333, 40 So. 106 (1906).

4. The rationale behind the rule is that of preventing unjust enrichment and conservation of the courts' resources. Having had a judgment satisfied, the injured party has been made whole and can be compensated but once. McPherson v. Amalgamated Sugar Company, supra; Pillo v. Reading Company, supra; Baggett v. Allen, supra. The rule prevails in admiralty as elsewhere that no one may recover compensatory damages more than once. Muise v. Abbott, supra; Smith v. Lykes Bros. Corp., 105 F.2d 604 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 604, 60 S.Ct. 141, 84 L.Ed. 505 (1939). Where there has been a judgment and satisfaction, there is a conclusive presumption that full damages have been awarded. Jones v. Russell, supra; McCoy v. Louisville & N. R. Co., supra.

5. In the present case, the Plaintiff and the shipowner entered into a consent judgment agreement. A judgment was entered after due consideration by the Court and the minor beneficiaries were represented by an attorney and guardian ad litem. A consent judgment pursuant to agreement by the parties has the same force and effect as any other judgment and is a final adjudication. A. D. Juillard & Co. v. Johnson, 166 F.Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y.1957), aff'd 259 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1958).

6. In the present case, the Plaintiff brought her first action against the shipowner and recovered $180,000 by a judgment of the state court. Plaintiff had claimed that amount as her "total damages". The amount was accepted because the Plaintiff did not want to have a trial and because this amount was the most she thought she could obtain.

7. The Plaintiff brings these actions on identical causes of action as the earlier action against the shipowner and recites the same damages. It is readily apparent that Plaintiff accepted satisfaction of her earlier judgment as full satisfaction of her cause of action. She is precluded by abundant precedent from splitting her causes and pursuing additional recovery from alleged joint tortfeasors. Any attempted explanation that subsequent to the first judgment the Plaintiff learned facts that she felt entitled her to greater recovery is irrelevant to this question. Plaintiff is presumed to know her damages and her failure to know them does not make a judgment any less effective.

B. PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER AGAINST THE UNION DEFENDANTS UNDER THE DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT OR THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW.

a. Death on the High Seas Act

1. Under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768, the personal representative of a deceased seaman is authorized to bring an action against a vessel, a person, or a corporation whose wrongful acts, neglects, and defaults occurring in international waters cause the death of the seaman. To render a vessel, person or corporation liable under the Death on the High Seas Act, there must be a violation of some legal duty owed to the decedent. The Black Gull, 82 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied 298 U.S. 684, 56 S.Ct. 954, 80 L.Ed. 1404. Only those wrongful acts, neglects, or defaults which would produce causes of action for a living person are preserved by the Act. Noel v. United...