Harvard Law School Coalition for Civil Rights v. President and Fellows of Harvard College

• Decision Date: 09 July 1992
• Citation: 595 N.E.2d 316,413 Mass. 66
• Parties: , 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 704, 75 Ed. Law Rep. 1168 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL COALITION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS et al. 1 v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 316

595 N.E.2d 316

413 Mass. 66, 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 704,

75 Ed. Law Rep. 1168

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL COALITION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS et al.¹ v. PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued March 3, 1992.

Decided July 9, 1992.

Caroline Witcoff, pro se.

Laura Hankins, pro se.

Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Cambridge, for defendant.

Ozell Hudson, Jr., Richard J. Yurko, Richard R. Lavin, Phyllis N. Crockett, Sharon D. Gillis and John W. Banse, Boston, for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law of the Boston Bar Ass'n, amicus curiae.

Antonia Hernandez, Los Angeles, Cal., for Mexican-American Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, amicus curiae.

Geraldine S. Hines, Boston, for Nat. Conference of Black Lawyers, amicus curiae.

Arthur Kinoy, Bethesda, Md., for Nat. Lawyers' Guild-Massachusetts Chapter, amicus curiae.

Linda Gadsby, New York City, for Nat. Black Law Students Ass'n-Northeast Region, amicus curiae.

Claire Gonzalez, Washington, D.C., for Nat. Council of La Raza, amicus curiae.

Paula Ettelbrick, New York City, for Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., amicus curiae.

Joan Gibbs, New York City, for Center for Constitutional Rights, amicus curiae.

Elisabeth Ryder Benjamin, New York City, for Coalition for Diversity in Legal Educ./Columbia, et al., amici curiae.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The plaintiffs, Harvard Law School Coalition for Civil Rights (coalition) and individual students from Harvard Law School, appeal from the dismissal of their first amended complaint under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), seeking equitable relief for the allegedly discriminatory faculty hiring policies of Harvard Law School (law school) in violation of G.L. c. 151B (1990 ed.), and G.L. c. 93, § 102 (1990 ed.). In dismissing the complaint, the Superior Court judge ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing under either statute and that the coalition lacked capacity to sue. The judge also denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to add a claim under G.L. c. 151C (1990 ed.). After judgment for the defendant, the plaintiffs appealed. We allowed the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review, and we now affirm.

1. Standard of review of judgments on motions to dismiss. In determining the appropriateness of a judgment dismissing a complaint, "we accept as true all of the allegations of the complaint and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the complaint and which are favorable to the party whose claims have been dismissed.... Further, a motion to dismiss a complaint ... should not be allowed unless it appears certain that the complaining party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim" (citations omitted). Rae v. Air-Speed, Inc., 386 Mass. 187, 191, 435 N.E.2d 628 (1982).

2. Standing under G.L. c. 151B. The plaintiffs essentially allege that, because the law school has not hired certain minorities, females, and disabled persons, they have been denied the benefit of association with an integrated faculty and therefore they have standing as "persons aggrieved" under G.L. c. 151B, § 9.

The authority to bring an action for a statutory violation is determined with reference to the context, subject matter, and area of concern of the statute. Beard Motors, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Distribs., Inc., 395 Mass. 428, 431-432, 480 N.E.2d 303 (1985). General Laws c. 151B, § 4, prohibits employers from engaging in discriminatory employment practices against certain protected classes. ² "Chapter 151B, § 4(1) ... seeks the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to full participation in the workplace." College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass. 156, 162, 508 N.E.2d 587 (1987). Section 9 of G.L. c. 151B, grants to "[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved" by such a discriminatory practice standing to bring a civil action for damages or injunctive relief or both. "[T]he central focus of inquiry is whether the employer penalizes some employees or prospective employees because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." School Comm. of Braintree v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 377 Mass. 424, 428, 386 N.E.2d 1251 (1979). "Although the Commonwealth's employment discrimination law, G.L. c. 151B, affects 'a broad array of employment practices' ... we will not assume that the Legislature intended to cover relationships outside the traditional common law employer-employee relationship." Comey v. Hill, 387 Mass. 11, 15, 438 N.E.2d 811 (1982). "To qualify as a 'person aggrieved,' a person must allege substantial injury as the direct result of the action complained of." Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375 Mass. 160, 177-178, 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). It is clear from the statute and case law that an individual has to be within the employment relationship and has to have suffered injury as a result of a prohibited practice in order to have a cause of action under § 9. On analysis we determine that the plaintiffs are not within the employer-employee relationship and have not alleged substantial injury within the area of concern of the statute. ³ The plaintiffs were neither employees nor applicants for employment at the law school. They have not claimed the law school denied or discharged them from employment, or discriminated in compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of their employment. Likewise, the injuries they complain of--denial of "perspectives," "life experiences," and "access to ... role models"--are not within the area of concern of the statute. Since the plaintiffs are not "persons" within the employment relationship, they are not "[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved" as the term is used in the statute. Consequently, they have no standing under G.L. c. 151B.

3. Standing under G.L. c. 93, § 102. The judge ruled that G.L. c. 93, § 102, does not confer standing on anyone other than those whose rights have been violated. The plaintiffs argue that, as tuition-paying students, they have a contractual relationship with the law school protected by G.L. c. 93, § 102. General Laws c. 93, § 102, guarantees that "[a]ll persons within the Commonwealth, regardless of sex, race, color, creed or national origin, shall have ... the same rights enjoyed by white male citizens, to make and enforce contracts...." The plaintiffs' amended complaint failed to allege that the plaintiffs had a contract with the law school in which the law school agreed not to discriminate in faculty hiring or agreed to hire valuable role models of diverse backgrounds. The only hint of any contract or agreement in the entire complaint is the allegation that the plaintiffs "as students ... are the intended beneficiaries of the agreement to employ individuals as law teachers at their school." Moreover, the plaintiffs did not allege that the law school discriminates against them on the basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation, in providing contractual benefits to them. Rather, the plaintiffs contend that the law school's alleged failure to hire a diverse faculty injures all students. Such an allegation can hardly amount to "discrimination in the enforcement" of the plaintiffs' contracts with the law school or a denial of the same contractual benefits enjoyed by white male students.

The plaintiffs' contention that they are the intended beneficiaries of the employment contracts between the law school and its faculty, is also flawed. The plaintiffs are no more than incidental beneficiaries of these contracts. Rae v. Air-Speed, Inc., 386 Mass. 187, 194-195, 435 N.E.2d 628 (1982). See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981); 4 A. Corbin, Contracts § 779C (1951 & Supp.1991); 2 S. Williston, Contracts §§ 402, 403 (3d ed. 1959). Under Massachusetts law, only intended beneficiaries, not incidental beneficiaries, can enforce a contract. Rae v. Air-Speed, Inc., supra at 195-196, 435 N.E.2d 628. See Plymouth Hous. Auth. v. Plymouth, 401 Mass. 503, 505, 517 N.E.2d 470 (1988).

4. Breach of implied contract claim. The plaintiffs contend for the first time on appeal that dismissal of their complaint was erroneous because their complaint implicitly stated a claim that the law school breached a contract with them.

"[A] plaintiff can withstand a motion to dismiss if he has alleged facts that entitle him to any form of relief, even if he has not alleged the correct legal theory in his complaint." Independence Park, Inc. v. Board of Health of Barnstable, 403 Mass. 477, 482, 530 N.E.2d 1235 (1988). See Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 104, 360 N.E.2d 870 (1977). The lengthy and detailed amended complaint deals with the plaintiffs' alleged standing underG.L. c. 151B, and G.L. c. 93, § 102. Nowhere in the complaint, however, is there any allegation of such a contract or facts from which the judge could have inferred the terms of such a contract. Neither is there any allegation of a breach of contract nor facts alleged that would establish one. On appeal, the plaintiffs again do not set out the provisions of the contract, nor what terms they rely on in their contractual relationship as students with the law school. Instead, they make allegations of "[c]atalogue" and "literature" without identifying those sources other than the defendant's affirmative action plan. Furthermore, at oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs referred to their educational contracts with the law school, not to allege a breach of contract, but to advance their argument that they had standing under the "make and enforce contracts" language under G.L. c. 93, § 102. These allegations are not sufficient to support the plaintiffs' contention that there was a breach of their "contract" with the law school. Clearly, the amended...