Harvey v. Cedar Hills City
| Decision Date | 26 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 20080586.,20080586. |
| Citation | 227 P.3d 256,2010 UT 12 |
| Parties | David C. HARVEY and Dixie Harvey, Petitioners and Appellants, v. CEDAR HILLS CITY, Respondent and Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Gordon W. Duval, American Fork, for petitioners.
Eric Todd Johnson, R. Christopher Preston, Kyle C. Fielding, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 This case arises from a petition filed by appellants, David C. and Dixie Harvey (the "Harveys"), seeking disconnection of their land from Cedar Hills City. After this petition was filed in August 2001, but before the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Cedar Hills in June 2008, the legislature amended certain sections of the Utah Code that relate to the standards for granting disconnection (the "2003 amendments").1 The district court determined that disconnection was prohibited under both versions of the disconnection statute because it found the two versions identical with regard to what it believed to be the single dispositive issue: that disconnection would form an unincorporated island. In this appeal, we must determine whether the district court erred in this determination. To resolve that issue, we must decide (1) which version of the disconnection statute applies to the Harveys' petition; and (2) whether, under the correct version of the law, the district court erred in dismissing the petition based solely on the fact that disconnection would result in an island of unincorporated land.
¶ 2 We hold that because the 2003 amendments substantively modified the criteria for disconnection the 2001 version of the disconnection statute ("2001 statute") applies in this case. We further hold that disconnection under the 2001 statute is permissible, even if it results in an island of unincorporated land, if the district court determines that disconnection will not materially increase the burdens borne by the municipality. Because the district court failed to consider whether disconnection of the Harveys' land would materially increase the burdens on Cedar Hills, it erred in granting summary judgment. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand so that the court may determine the overall impact of disconnection.
¶ 3 The parcel of land at issue in this case lies at the border between the cities of Cedar Hills and Pleasant Grove. Indeed, the Harveys own two contiguous parcels of land. The southern halves of each parcel are incorporated into Pleasant Grove, while the northern halves of each parcel—the land at issue in this case—are incorporated into Cedar Hills.
¶ 4 The border between the two cities is irregularly drawn. In general, Cedar Hills is north of Pleasant Grove. But on Pleasant Grove's eastern border, Cedar Hills extends southward, forming a peninsula that separates Pleasant Grove from unincorporated land further east. Along this same border, Pleasant Grove extends northward, forming a smaller peninsula that extends into Cedar Hills. The Harvey property lies in the midst of this area of mutual encroachment, in a corner of the boundary between the two cities. Cedar Hills is situated to the west and north of the Harvey property. Pleasant Grove lies to the south and east.
¶ 5 In June of 2001, the Harveys presented Cedar Hills with a Request for Disconnection. This request cited, as the justification for disconnection, city zoning decisions that the Harveys found to be objectionable, including the decision by Cedar Hills to annex a portion of the Harvey property for use as a city park and the apparent failure of the Harveys and Cedar Hills to negotiate a mutually satisfactory plan for the future use of the land. The Harveys also cited their desire to have their parcels of land united under a single city's government, indicating their intention to seek incorporation into Pleasant Grove if the disconnection were granted.
¶ 6 When Cedar Hills did not grant this request for disconnection within the statutory time frame, the Harveys filed their petition with the district court. At about this same time, Cedar Hills' proposed use of the Harveys' land led to the commencement of two other cases. In one case, the Harveys alleged that Cedar Hills' actions amounted to an unconstitutional taking. In the second case, Cedar Hills sought condemnation of the territory proposed for disconnection. The condemnation action and the takings claim were ultimately consolidated with this case and stayed pending the district court's resolution of the disconnection issue. These actions delayed until 2008 the district court's consideration of the issues regarding retroactive application of the amended standard.
¶ 7 This delay bears on the central issue in this case. Had the dispute between Cedar Hills and the Harveys been resolved prior to 2003, only one version of the relevant portions of the Utah Code would have been at issue. But because the legislature amended portions of the disconnection statutes in 2003, the court was faced with two potentially applicable versions of the disconnection statute and was therefore required to determine whether the 2003 amendments should be given retroactive effect.
¶ 8 The Harveys moved for summary judgment on the issue of which version of the disconnection statute should be applied in this case. After oral argument on the issue, the district court determined that no substantive difference exists between the 2001 statute and the 2003 amendments. Instead, the court found that unincorporated islands of land are prohibited under either version. Finding also that the Harveys' property would form such an island, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Cedar Hills and denied the Harveys' petition.
¶ 9 We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Cedar Hills. The court's conclusion that the statutes are identical was incorrect because the 2003 amendments substantively modified the criteria for disconnection. Unlike the 2003 amendments, the 2001 statute does not absolutely prohibit islands of unincorporated territory. Instead, the creation of such an island is one of several factors that the court must consider in determining whether to permit disconnection. Because the district court concluded that unincorporated islands are prohibited under either version of the disconnection statute, it did not consider the impact of the island as required by the 2001 statute. Without resolution of this factual question, summary judgment was inappropriate. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for application of the correct standard. We have jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A-3-102(3) of the Utah Code.
¶ 10 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness.2 We affirm a grant of summary judgment when the record shows "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."3 A district court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we also review for correctness.4
¶ 11 Our task is not to determine the propriety of disconnection in this case. Instead, we must determine whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Cedar Hills. In resolving this question we have come to two conclusions. First, the Harveys' petition should be analyzed under the 2001 statute. Second, summary judgment was inappropriate because the district court did not examine the overall impact of disconnection relative to the burdens borne by the municipality in providing services to the surrounding area. Because the court did not determine whether disconnection of the Harveys' land would materially increase the burdens on Cedar Hills, we reverse its grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 12 The Harveys filed their disconnection petition in August 2001. As a general rule, when adjudicating a dispute we apply the version of the statute that was in effect "at the time of the events giving rise to [the] suit."5 Thus, the statute in effect in 2001 will control the resolution of this dispute unless an exception to the general rule applies in this case.
¶ 13 We have previously observed that exceptions to this general rule are rare.6 In large part, this is because the Utah Code expressly restricts the retroactive application of legislative changes by declaring that "[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."7 In conjunction with this restriction, we "presume that when the legislature amends a statute, it intended the amendment `to change existing legal rights.'"8 When a statute is amended without expressly providing for retroactive application—as is the case here—the circumstances that justify retroactive application of the amendment are limited.9
¶ 14 Within these limits, we have recognized two exceptions that Cedar Hills argues should apply in this case. First, we will give retroactive effect to statutory amendments that merely "clarify the meaning of an earlier enactment."10 Second, a statute may be given retroactive effect if it changed prior law in ways that are merely procedural.11 A change will be considered procedural if it "merely `pertains to ... the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective.'"12 We have often stated that retroactive application is permissible if the amended version of the statute "[does] not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights."13 In contrast, we have characterized the substantive law as "the positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties."14 Thus, if the 2003 amendments modified the Harveys' rights with regard to...
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