Harvey v. Town of Greenwich

• Docket Number: 3:21-cv-771 (KAD)
• Decision Date: 11 September 2023
• Parties: JOHN HARVEY, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF GREENWICH, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

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JOHN HARVEY, Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF GREENWICH, Defendant.

No. 3:21-cv-771 (KAD)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

September 11, 2023

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 47)

KARI A. DOOLEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This employment discrimination action arises out of Plaintiff John Harvey being bypassed for appointment as Commissioner of Human Services for the Town of Greenwich (“Greenwich” or “Defendant”). Plaintiff alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (Count One), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as made actionable by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Two), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. (Count Three), and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(b)(1) (Count Four). Principally, Plaintiff alleges that he was not hired for the position of Commissioner of Human Services due to his age and race. Pending before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment, which Plaintiff opposes. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (ECF No. 47)

Standard of Review

The standard under which courts review motions for summary judgment is well established. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

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law,” while a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Significantly, the inquiry being conducted by the court when reviewing a motion for summary judgment focuses on “whether there is the need for a trial - whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250. As a result, the moving party satisfies his burden under Rule 56 “by showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case” at trial. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the movant meets his burden, the nonmoving party “must set forth ‘specific facts' demonstrating that there is ‘a genuine issue for trial.'” Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). “[T]he party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading” to establish the existence of a disputed fact. Wright, 554 F.3d at 266; accord Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). “[M]ere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts” will not suffice. Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Nor will wholly implausible claims or bald assertions that are unsupported by evidence. See Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991); Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

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In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the Court is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)). “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court's function is not to weigh the evidence or resolve issues of fact; it is confined to deciding whether a rational juror could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 2002).

Facts

The following facts are taken from Defendant's Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement of Material Facts (“Def. LRS,” ECF No. 47-2), Plaintiff's response thereto (“Pl. LRS,” ECF No. 55), and the parties' exhibits.

The Greenwich Department of Human Services (“GDHS”) provides direct services to Greenwich residents and is led by a Commissioner of Human Services. Def. LRS at 1 ¶ 1. The Greenwich Board of Human Services is responsible for hiring the Commissioner of the GDHS. Def. LRS at 1 ¶ 2.

Plaintiff is a 61-year-old Caucasian man. Pl. LRS at 31 ¶ 1. He holds a bachelor's degree in sociology, a master's degree in social work, and is a State of Connecticut licensed clinical social worker. Pl. LRS at 31 ¶¶ 2-4. Greenwich hired Plaintiff as a Case Manager with the GDHS in 2013. Def. LRS at 1- 2 ¶ 4. In 2019, Plaintiff was appointed interim Director of Case Management, and subsequently applied for and was made the permanent Director. Id.

In February 2020, Alan Barry announced his retirement as the Commissioner of Human Services. Def. LRS at 2 ¶ 5. Greenwich Human Resources posted the job opening for the position on February 21, 2020 with a closing date of June 17, 2020. Def. LRS at 2 ¶ 6. An outside search

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firm, The Strategy Group, was hired to assist in the search. Def. LRS at 2 ¶ 7. The Strategy Group met with outgoing Commissioner Barry, the Greenwich Board of Human Services, and senior and mid-level GDHS staff members to understand the role of Commissioner and the qualities the Board was looking for in a new Commissioner. Def. LRS at 2 ¶ 8.

Thirty people applied for the Commissioner position. Def. LRS at 2 ¶ 9. Plaintiff was the only internal candidate who applied. Def. LRS at 2 ¶ 10. The Strategy Group reviewed the applications and selected 13 applicants, including Plaintiff, to have an exploratory interview. Def. LRS at 2 ¶ 11. Karen Brennan, a senior consultant with the Strategy Group, conducted the exploratory interviews. Def. LRS at 3 ¶ 12. Following the exploratory interviews, Brennan advanced 9 candidates, including Plaintiff, to interview with the search committee. Id.

Five members of the Board of Human Services volunteered to be on the search committee: Annalisa Nash, Alan Gunzburg, Abbott Jones, Natalie Queen, and Winston Robinson. Def. LRS at 3 ¶ 17. The search committee interviewed each of the nine candidates over Zoom. Def. LRS at 4 ¶ 24. Following Plaintiff's interview, the search committee thought that Plaintiff “is very qualified,” had “the heart of a social worker” and understands social work, had “many of the advantages” the committee is looking for (such living in the community and working for the department), would have no “downtime to step into the role,” had a “[g]ood depth of knowledge of clients and nonprofit agencies,” had “grown in his presence,” and was “[k]knowledgeable of [the] department and [its] needs.” Def. LRS at 4-5 ¶ 27; Exhibit H, ECF No. 47-11 at 14. The committee also shared a concern regarding Plaintiff's ability to “work a budget and a room” and further observed that he may “need a bit more management under his belt before he takes on this role.” Id.^[1]

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Plaintiff was thereafter one of only five candidates who advanced to a second round of interviews. Def. LRS at 5 ¶ 28. The five candidates included two Caucasian males, one Hispanic female, one Caucasian female, and one African American female. Def. LRS at 5 ¶ 30. For the second round interview, each candidate was asked to prepare a presentation on their goals as Commissioner and strategies to achieve those goals, as well as what they saw as the most significant challenges that GDHS would face in the coming years and how GDHS could prepare for those challenges. Def. LRS at 5 ¶ 32. Plaintiff had never done a PowerPoint presentation and reached out to Brennan for support. Def. LRS at 5 ¶ 33. Four of the five Board members were present for Plaintiff's second interview (Nash was unavailable). Def. LRS at 6 ¶ 34.

Plaintiff struggled in his second interview and had trouble operating his PowerPoint presentation. Def. LRS at 6 ¶ 35. Jones and Queen expressed that while Plaintiff had some good ideas for GDHS, he was not ready to be Commissioner. Def. LRS at 6 ¶¶ 36-37. Brennan believed that Plaintiff was not adequately prepared for the second interview. Def. LRS at 7 ¶ 40. After completing the second round of interviews, the committee agreed that the top three candidates were Demetria Nelson (an African American woman), Margaret Watt (a Caucasian woman), and Jim Vivier (a Caucasian man). Def. LRS at 8 ¶ 46. The committee then selected Nelson and Watt as their final two candidates. Def. LRS at 8 ¶ 47.

Jones assessed that Nelson and Watt were stronger candidates than Plaintiff because they had more management experience; Queen felt that Nelson and Watt were the top candidates because they had experience running large departments, offered great strategies to improve the departments they worked in, were great communicators, had success working in different groups, and had researched and understood GDHS's current work; and Nash was of the view that Nelson's

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and Watt's experience in managing larger departments and in more urban environments made them better suited to the role of Commissioner than Plaintiff. Def. LRS at 8 ¶¶ 49-51. Thereafter, after several rounds of voting, the search committee unanimously selected Nelson as the final candidate. Def. LRS at 9 ¶¶ 53, 55.

Sometime after Plaintiff was eliminated from the selection process, but before Nelson was selected as the final candidate, Gunzburg remarked to one GDHS staff member that “ten years ago, we hired a white male, Alan [Barry] got us to this point, but we need...