Harville v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Decision Date: 28 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. 2:15-CV-1175-DMC,2:15-CV-1175-DMC
• Parties: MATTHEW HARVILLE, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

MATTHEW HARVILLE, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 2:15-CV-1175-DMC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 28, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to the written consent of all parties (Docs. 7 and 18), this case is before the undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. 17 and 20).

The court reviews the Commissioner's final decision to determine whether it is: (1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). "Substantial evidence" is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). It is ". . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole, including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, must be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

I. THE DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS

This case involves determinations on separate applications. On a first application for childhood disability benefits, the Commissioner determined plaintiff was disabled as a child and, because plaintiff attained age 18 prior to the decision, as an adult. In this action plaintiff challenges a subsequent determination on the first application that plaintiff is no longer disabled. Plaintiff also challenges the Commissioner's determination in the context of a second application filed after plaintiff attained age 18 that plaintiff is not disabled.

Initial Adult Disability Determinations

To achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner employs a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f) and 416.920(a)-(f). The sequential evaluation proceeds as follows:

Step 1 Determination whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is presumed not disabled and the claim is denied;

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Step 2 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, determination whether the claimant has a severe impairment; if not, the claimant is presumed not disabled and the claim is denied;

Step 3 If the claimant has one or more severe impairments, determination whether any such severe impairment meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations; if the claimant has such an impairment, the claimant is presumed disabled and the clam is granted;

Step 4 If the claimant's impairment is not listed in the regulations, determination whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past work in light of the claimant's residual functional capacity; if not, the claimant is presumed not disabled and the claim is denied;

Step 5 If the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past work, determination whether, in light of the claimant's residual functional capacity, the claimant can engage in other types of substantial gainful work that exist in the national economy; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f) and 416.920(a)-(f).

To qualify for benefits, the claimant must establish the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has lasted, or can be expected to last, a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant must provide evidence of a physical or mental impairment of such severity the claimant is unable to engage in previous work and cannot, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. See Quang Van Han v. Bower, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The claimant has the initial burden of proving the existence of a disability. See Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990).

The claimant establishes a prima facie case by showing that a physical or mental impairment prevents the claimant from engaging in previous work. See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f). If the claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant can perform other work existing in the national economy. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988); Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); Hammock v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1209, 1212-1213 (9th Cir. 1989).

Continuing Adult Disability Determinations

A presumption of continuing disability arises in favor of claimants who have met their burden of establishing disability under the Social Security Act. See Bellamy v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 755 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1983)). Under the Act, however, cases must be reviewed at least once every three years "to determine whether a period of disability has ended." Flaten v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 415 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 421(i)(1) (requiring review for continuing eligibility at least once every three years); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 (regulation governing termination of benefits). To determine whether a claimant continues to be disabled for purposes of receiving social security benefits, the Commissioner engages in a seven-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.994. The sequential evaluation proceeds as follows:

Step 1 Determination whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal an impairment listed in the regulations; if so, the claimant remains disabled;

Step 2 Determination whether, since the time of the most recent favorable decision (comparison point decision, or CPD), there has been medical improvement, which is any decrease in medical severity; if so, the analysis proceeds to Step 3; if not, the analysis proceeds to Step 4;

Step 3 Determination whether medical improvement results in an increase in the claimant's capacity to perform basic work activities;

Step 4 Determination whether an exception to the requirement of medical improvement under one of the two groups of exceptions outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(3) and (4) applies; if an exception from the first group applies, the analysis proceeds to Step 5; if an exception from the second group applies, the claimant is no longer disabled; if no except applies, the claimant's remains disabled;

Step 5 Determination whether all of the claimant's current impairments are severe; if not, the claimant is no longer disabled;Step 6 If the claimant has severe impairments, determination whether the impairments prevent the claimant from performing past work in light of the claimant's residual functional capacity; if not, the claimant is no longer disabled;

Step 7 If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, determination whether, in light of the claimant's residual functional capacity, the claimant can engage in other types of substantial gainful work that exist in the national economy; if so, the claimant is no longer disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.994.

The Commissioner bears the "burden of producing evidence sufficient to rebut [the] presumption of continuing disability." Bellamy, 755 F.2d at 1381; see also Murray, 722 F.2d at 500 ("The Secretary. . . has the burden to come forward with evidence of improvement").

II. THE COMMISSIONER'S FINDINGS

Plaintiff's mother applied for childhood social security benefits on behalf of plaintiff of May 3, 2005. See CAR 398-400.¹ In the application, plaintiff's mother claimed disability beginning on June 10, 1992. See at 49. The claim was denied and an action for judicial review was initiated in this court. See Harville v. Astrue, E. Dist. Cal. Case No. 2:08-CV-0171-KJM. The court remanded the matter to the agency for consideration of new evidence. See id.

On remand, a new hearing was held on June 10, 2010, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Theodore T.N. Slocum. See CAR 49. In an August 20, 2010, decision, the ALJ outlined the issues as follows:

The issue is whether the claimant is disabled under section 1614(a)(3) of the Social Security Act. The claimant was under age 18 at the time of the application and attained age 18 before the date of this decision. Therefore, in accordance with 20 CFR 416.942(f), the specific issues are whether the claimant was disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(C) [governing childhood disability] of the Social Security Act for the period before age 18 and whether the claimant is disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(

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