Harwell v. Fitts

• Decision Date: 30 November 1856
• Docket Number: N0. 138.
• Citation: 20 Ga. 723
• Parties: Lewis P. Harwell and another, plaintiffs in error. vs. John B. Fitts, for the use, &c, defendant.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

20 Ga. 723

Lewis P. Harwell and another, plaintiffs in error. vs. John B. Fitts, for the use, &c, defendant.

N0. 138.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

NOVEMBER TERM, 1856.

Case, &c, in Putnam Superior Court. Tried before Judge Hardeman, September Term, 1856.

This was an action brought by John B. Fitts, as Sheriff, for the use of sundry plaintiffs in H. fas. against one W. G. Lee, for the recovery of the purchase money of certain negroes sold as the property of defendant in fi. fa. It appeared that the negroes were mortgaged to Harwell & Callaway. These mortgages were foreclosed prior to the sale. The negroes were sold under general judgments, and at the sale Harwell & Callaway gave notice to the bidders of their mortgages. They bought the negroes for $1,500. In settling with the Sheriff, they deducted the amount of their mortgage debts, and paid him the balance of the bid in cash, and hegave them a bill of sale, acknowledging the receipt of the purchase money.

Counsel for Harwell & Callaway requested the Court to charge--

1st. "That if the Jury believed the plaintiffs executed the bill of sale, he can not now deny the receipts of the money."

2d. "That if the mortgage was foreclosed before the day of sale, the purchase by defendants, of the negroes, did not extinguish the debt, but the mortgagees have the right to look to the fund arising from the sale for payment of their debts."

The Court refused so to charge, and error is assigned thereon.

Nisbet; Adams & Davis, for plaintiffs.

Wingfield; Hudson, for defendant.

By the Court.— Lumpkin, J., delivering the opinion.

Was the Court right in refusing to charge the Jury, upon the proof in this case, that if they believed the plaintiff executed the bill of sale to the defendants, acknowledging upon its face the receipt of the purchase money from them, he is estopped from denying it?

Whether the recital in a deed of conveyance of the payment of the consideration money falls within the rule by which the party is estopped to deny it, or belongs to the exceptions, and is, therefore, open to opposing or explanatory proof, is a vexed question in the books. The English Courts have inclined to regard such recitals as conclusive evidence of payment, and binding the parties by estoppel; yet, in one of the earliest cases reported, Rowntree vs. Jacob, (2 Taunton, 141,) Chief Justice Mansfield said: "I still have great doubts on my mind which, perhaps, has been biased by my practice in Courts of Equity." "My brothers, " continuedhis Lordship, "are all of opinion that a verdict could not stand, if obtained against the evidence of that deed, and the receipt indorsed on the back of it for the money; and consequently, the verdict already found, according to the legal operation of those instruments, must be supported."

And this decision, thus grudgingly made, is the authority upon which the case of Sampson vs. Corke, (5 Bain & Alder. 606,) was adjudged, and the two together are cited as precedents in support of the next case of Baker vs. Dewy, (1 Barn.

& Cress. 704,) and so on.

We think we may safely assume, that while the weight of authority is in favor of the doctrine in England, still, there was no such settled rule, even there, as to this point, at the time of our Revolution, as to make it of binding obligation upon the Courts of this State.

The American States have, with overwhelming concurrence, treated the recital of the payment of the purchase money like the mention of the date of the deed, the quantity of land and other matters incidental and collateral to the principal thing, and which may be supposed not to have received the deliberate attention of the parties; and consequently, while the grantor is estopped from denying the conveyance, yet, the recital is considered, at most, but prima facie evidence only of payment in an action of assumpsit to recover the price which '19 yet unpaid. And in some of the Courts it is not even deemed sufficient to cast the onus upon the grantor. I will refer to a few of the leading cases. In Massachusetts, (Wilkinson vs. Scott, 17 Mass. R. 249; Clapp vs. Terrell, 20 Pick. 247; Livermore vs. Aldrich, 5 Cush. 431. In Maine, (Schilenger vs. McCann, 6 Greenlf. 364; Tyler vs. Carlton,

7 Greenlf. 175; Emmons vs. LittleHeld, 1 Shepl. 233; Burbank vs. Gould, 3 Shepl. 118.) In Vermont, Beach vs. Packard, (10 Vermt. 96.) In New Hampshire, (Morse vs. Shattuck, 4 New Hamp. 229; Pritchard vs. Brown, Id. 397.) In Connecticut, Belden vs. Seymour, (8 Conn. 304.) In New York, (Shepherd vs. Little, 14 Johns. 210; Bowen vs. Bell, 20 Johns. 388; Whitbeck vs. Whitbeck, 9 Cowen, 266; McCrca vs. Pumont, 16 Wend. 460.) In Pennsylvania, \' (Weigley vs. Weir, 7 Serg. & Rawl. 311; Watson vs. Blaine, 12 Serg. &Raw. 131; Jack vs. Dougherty, 3 Watts. 151.) In Maryland, (Higdon vs. Thomas, 1 Har. & Gill. 139; Singar vs. Henderson, 1 Bland, eh. 239, 269.) In Virginia, (Dewal vs. Bibb, 4 to, Mur. 113; Harvey vs. Alexander, 1 Randolph, 219.) In South Carolina, Curry vs. Lyles, 2 Hill 404; Garret vs. Stuart, 1 McCord, 514.) In Alabama, Mead vs. Steger, (5 Porter, 498, 507.) In Tennessee, vs. Ward, (10 Yerger, 160, 166.) In Kentucky, (Hutchinson vs. Sinclair, 7 Monroe, 291, 293; Gully vs. Grnbbs, 1 J. J. Marshall, 389.) In North Carolina, they seem still to hold that a receipt under the seal of the party, and not open to explanation in a Court of Law. (Brockett vs. Foscue, 1 Hawks. 64; Spiers vs. Clay, 4 Hawks, 22, and Jones vs. Lasser, 1 Dev. & Batt. 452.)

But all the cases, English and American, concede that the remedy in Equity is ample. Will it be insisted that at this day, Anno Domini 1856, a party will be compelled to resort to Chancery for this purpose merely? And with a full knowledge of the known and universal practice and understanding among our people upon this subject, would the Courts of Justice tolerate, for a moment, the idea that such formal acknowledgments, which are a mere ceremony, can not be rebutted? For myself, I do not believe that they should be held as a presumption even of payment against the seller. It is well established that you may explain a receipt for money; and why not the receipt of money confessed in a deed?

Settle such a principle and look at the consequence. Where cash is not paid, notes of hand are most usually given for land; but they are of no higher nature than verbal promises, and are classed among parol contracts. If the deed expresses that the consideration was paid in hand, would it not prevent such notes from being recoverable? Certainly, upon the doctrine contended for. The defendant, by showing that they were given for the land or other property con-veyecl, and by showing that the consideration was confessed to be paid by the deed, would necessarily defeat a recovery by the higher proof arising from the deed! For one, I am unwilling to go back to the black broth and iron currency of Sparta.

But the defendants were not entitled to the charge requested, for another reason. Richard F. Davis testified, that he was present at the settlement when the proceeds of the sale were paid out by the Sheriff on the evening of the day of sale, and that the defendants only paid to the Sheriff the difference between the amount of the purchase money and the aggregate sum due upon their mortgages. No objection was made to this parol proof at the time it was offered, and no motion made to withdraw it from the Jury. We respectfully submit, that under these circumstances, it was not competent for the Court to defeat the plaintiff's right of recovery, by instructing the Jury as asked; that that could not be done which had actually been done, without objection on the part of the defendants.,

There is still a broader ground upon which to justify the refusal by Judge Hardeman to give the charge. The testimony shows that the Sheriff considered the purchase money as paid, and that he settled with the defendants for the amount of their mortgage ft. fas. and that the action is substantially brought; and if it is deficient in form, it can be amended at any stage of the proceeding to recover this fund back as having been wrongfully expended or paid by mistake. If the mortgage executions were not entitled to the proceeds of the property, can the defendants, ex equo et beno, retain it? In the judgment of this Court, the doctrine of seals and estoppels has nothing to do with the real facts and merits of this case.

The other charge requested was, that if the Jury believed that the mortgage to defendants was foreclosed before the day of sale, then the purchase by the defendants of the mortgage property, did not extinguish the mortgage debt; but the mortgagees have the right to look to the fund arisingfrom the sale of the mortgage property, for the payment of their debt.

Was the Court right in refusing to give this charge?

One of the mortgages seems to have been foreclosed on the 25th day of May, 1854, and the other, on the 6th of June, 1854, the day of the sale. It is in proof that notice was given, on the day of sale, of the mortgage liens upon the property by Lewis P. Harwell, for himself and Callaway; and that persons who attended the sale for the purpose of bidding for the negroes, were prevented from doing so on account of this notice. Shall the mortgagees, under such circumstances, be permitted to abandon their lien on the property and look to the proceeds, they...