Harwinton Drilling and Engineering Co., Inc. v. Public Utilities Control Authority

• Decision Date: 10 August 1982
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HARWINTON DRILLING AND ENGINEERING CO., INC., et al. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES CONTROL AUTHORITY et al.

Page 210

448 A.2d 210

188 Conn. 90

HARWINTON DRILLING AND ENGINEERING CO., INC., et al. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES CONTROL AUTHORITY et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 12, 1982.

Decided Aug. 10, 1982.

John L. Gerardo, Torrington, with whom, on the brief, was John M. Massameno, Wallingford, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Robert S. Golden, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellee (named defendant).

Anne U. MacClintock, New Haven, for appellee (defendant Southern New England Telephone Co.).

Before PETERS, ARMENTANO, SPONZO, SPADA and BRENNAN, JJ.

SPADA, Associate Justice.

The plaintiffs, business subscribers to telephone and telecommunication services offered by the Southern New England Telephone Company, (hereinafter the company), have appealed from the trial court's dismissal of their action to enjoin implementation of a March 27, 1979 decision rendered by the department of public utilities control (hereinafter the DPUC). Prior to the DPUC decision, the towns of Harwinton and Burlington were served by one regional school district but by more than one telephone exchange, requiring a toll charge for calls made between them. As a consequence of the March, 1979 decision, the DPUC eliminated the toll barrier between Burlington and Harwinton and created a single new telephone exchange for both towns.

On September 11, 1978, after giving notice entitled "Investigation to Consider Possible Remedies to Telephone Toll Call Exchange Barriers Between Towns Forming Regional School District No. 10," ¹ the DPUC conducted a generic hearing which was attended by the DPUC and its consumer counsel, the company and four intervenors. ² That meeting was continued to November 29, 1978, at which time the company explained the five plans presented at prior meetings together with a sixth plan proposing a new foreign exchange. ³

On March 27, 1979, the DPUC rendered its decision in which it concluded that "substantial community and social benefits" would be derived from the creation of a new exchange for the towns of Burlington and Harwinton. The DPUC conditioned implementation of its decision upon a favorable response to a canvass of the customers comprising the new exchange. A ballot was prepared explaining that the creation of a new exchange would require telephone number changes for all residents and assessments of different rate categories for basic monthly service, based on the appropriate existing rate schedule applicable to the proposed new exchange classification. Completed in July, the canvass disclosed that the required plurality supported implementation of a new exchange.

After realizing the impact the DPUC's decision would have upon their various businesses, the plaintiffs, in October of 1980, petitioned the DPUC for a reconsideration of its March, 1979 decision. The DPUC rejected the petition after a hearing attended by representatives of the DPUC, the company and the plaintiffs. Approximately one month later, on November 26, 1980, the plaintiffs instituted this action in the Superior Court seeking (1) a judgment declaring the March decision a nullity; (2) a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from implementing the March decision; (3) money damages; and (4) other appropriate relief. Thereafter, each defendant filed timely motions to dismiss, which the trial court granted on January 6, 1981. The plaintiffs have appealed from the trial court's judgment of dismissal.

In addressing the merits of this appeal, we must decide whether the plaintiffs' failure to pursue appellate review of the March, 1979 DPUC decision under the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter the UAPA) foreclosed the trial court from exercising jurisdiction. After surveying relevant case law, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' action for want of jurisdiction.

This court has "repeatedly affirmed the principle that when an adequate administrative remedy is provided by law, it should be exhausted." Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. [CL & HIGA ] v. Jackson, 173 Conn. 352, 357, 377 A.2d 1099 (1977); see Conto v. Zoning Commission, 186 Conn. 106, 114-15, 439 A.2d 441 (1982); Rybinski v. State Employees' Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 472, 378 A.2d 547 (1977). A policy of judicial restraint underlies the doctrine of exhaustion: "[t]he doctrine of exhaustion is grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly process of administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency's findings and conclusions. To allow a party ... to bypass the entire process ... would be to interject an unnecessary and potentially confusing element into an otherwise well-defined area of the law." CL&HIGA v. Jackson, supra, 173 Conn. 358-59, 377 A.2d 1099.

From the exhaustion doctrine, however, we have grudgingly carved several exceptions. For example, we have permitted parties who have not exhausted their administrative remedies to bypass the statutorily mandated appeal route where: the constitutional propriety of an agency ruling is raised; Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Norwalk, 179 Conn. 111, 117, 425 A.2d 576 (1979); the administrative action is void for lack of notice; Smith v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 142 Conn. 88, 94-5, 111 A.2d 552 (1955); the relief sought and issues raised are distinctly equitable; Bianco v. Darien, 157 Conn. 548, 554-55, 254 A.2d 898 (1969); the validity of the regulations on the appropriateness of jurisdiction is challenged by way of a declaratory judgment action; Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 178 Conn. 173, 179, 422 A.2d 290 (1979); the remedies available pursuant to the statutory route of appeal are either futile or inadequate. Kosinski v. Lawlor, 177 Conn. 420, 425, 418 A.2d 66 (1979).

In their brief, the plaintiffs concede that they did not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to instituting their independent lawsuit in the Superior Court. They are now attempting to bring themselves within one of the above enumerated exceptions. ⁴ The plaintiffs argue that they were "unaware" of the violation of their rights on the date their appeal should have been taken, and contend that their ignorance was unavoidable because the DPUC failed to afford them procedural due process. Specifically, they claim that the DPUC's failure to notify them of the potential ramifications of its decision precluded them from filing a timely appeal under the provisions of the UAPA. ⁵ Accordingly, they assert that the DPUC's failure to notify them of the ramifications of its decision rendered that decision void.

The trial court concluded that the DPUC provided the plaintiffs with adequate notice in all respects. This conclusion is amply supported by both the pertinent law and the underlying facts. The notice required by General Statutes § 4-177 need not include speculation about potential ramifications of an agency's decision. To satisfy the requirements of the UAPA, notice need only include: "(1) A statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing; (2) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; (3) a reference to the particular sections of the statutes and regulations involved; (4) a short and plain statement of the matters asserted.... Thereafter upon application a more definite and detailed statement shall be furnished." General Statutes § 4-177(b). The record discloses that the DPUC gave adequate notice of its September 11, 1978 hearing. Moreover, the plaintiffs did not apply for "a more definite and detailed statement." Thus, we find that the DPUC provided sufficient and reasonable notice, and that its ensuing decision was not void for lack of adequate notice.

The plaintiffs...