LaCroix v. Board of Educ. of City of Bridgeport

• Decision Date: 11 March 1986
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 31 Ed. Law Rep. 142 Theodore LaCROIX v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT.

Page 1233

505 A.2d 1233

199 Conn. 70, 31 Ed. Law Rep. 142

Theodore LaCROIX v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 15, 1986.

Decided March 11, 1986.

Paul E. Knag, Stamford, with whom, on brief, was Gregory B. Nokes, West Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Robert J. Malone, Milford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, SANTANIELLO, CALLAHAN and BRENNAN, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue on this appeal after certification from a judgment of the Appellate Court is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims that his contract of employment as a tenured teacher had been wrongfully terminated. The plaintiff, Theodore LaCroix, brought this action against the defendant board of education of Bridgeport (hereinafter the board) alleging that the board, in failing to follow the procedural requirements for termination mandated by General Statutes § 10-151(b), ¹ the Teacher Tenure Act, violated his contract of employment and deprived him of his right to due process of law as guaranteed by article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. ² Following an appeal after trial, the Appellate Court found that the plaintiff's contract had never been legally terminated, and it ordered him reinstated with damages. We granted certification to review the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The underlying facts are not in dispute. In 1972, the plaintiff was a tenured teacher in the Bridgeport school system, having been employed as an elementary school physical education teacher since 1966. On June 21, 1972, the assistant superintendent of schools notified the plaintiff by letter that his contract was being terminated on June 23, 1972, because "all principals with whom you have worked have sent written notification that they find it impossible to communicate with you, and have you follow instructions and other due and sufficient causes ...." In response to this letter, the plaintiff, on July 10, 1972, hand-delivered to the board a written request for a hearing. ³ No hearing was held during the remainder of the summer, nor was the plaintiff given a teaching assignment when the new school year commenced in September. Subsequently, on October 16, 1972, before a hearing had been held, the board voted to approve the termination of the plaintiff's contract, effective June 30, 1972. Two days later, the board notified the plaintiff that the hearing he had requested in July would be held on October 26, 1972. On the advice of his retained counsel, the plaintiff did not attend this hearing. ⁴ Finally, in a letter dated October 31, 1972, the board notified the plaintiff that "termination of [his] services as a teacher in the Bridgeport School System [had] been taken under consideration by the Board of Education at their last regular meeting on October 30, 1972." The letter informed the plaintiff of his right, upon written request, to a hearing or a statement of the reasons for the proposed termination. The plaintiff failed to make such a request or to respond to the board's letter in any way, nor did he appeal the board's decision to Superior Court as provided by General Statutes § 10-151(f). ⁵ No further communications of record occurred between the parties until May, 1974, when the plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit.

Following a trial without a jury, the trial court found that the board's initial attempt in June, 1972, to terminate the plaintiff's contract had been ineffective because it had failed to comply with the procedural requirements prescribed by General Statutes § 10-151(b). However, the court found that the board's letter of October 31 had effectively reinitiated the statutory termination procedure and had resulted in a valid termination when the plaintiff failed to request a hearing.

On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed in part, holding that the initial procedurally defective June termination rendered ineffective the subsequent October 31 attempt by the board to terminate the plaintiff's contract in compliance with the procedural mandates of § 10-151(b). LaCroix v. Board of Education, 2 Conn.App. 36, 39-42, 475 A.2d 1110 (1984). Consequently, the court ruled that, because the plaintiff's contract had never legally been terminated, he was entitled to reinstatement and damages dating from June, 1972. In reaching the merits of the plaintiff's claim, the Appellate Court rejected the defendant's challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction, holding that the plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and to bring an administrative appeal of the board's action, as provided by § 10-151(f), did not preclude him from bringing an independent action to contest the termination of his contract.

We granted certification to review the judgment of the Appellate Court in respect to three issues: (1) whether the plaintiff was barred from bringing this action because of his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as provided by § 10-151(b) and (f); (2) whether the procedurally defective June termination rendered ineffective the board's subsequent October 31 termination attempt; and (3) whether the plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement "without regard to the grounds for or the merits of his termination," as well as to an award of "more than a decade's worth of back pay." Our resolution of the first two issues makes it unnecessary for us to consider the third.

It is important to note at the outset the analytical framework in which we consider these issues. Our focus of review is the action of the Appellate Court, not the action of the trial court. State v. Beckenbach, 198 Conn. 43, 47, 501 A.2d 752 (1985); State v. Torrence, 196 Conn. 430, 433, 493 A.2d 865 (1985). The Appellate Court viewed the board's various actions from June through October, 1972, as components of one single termination attempt which was rendered invalid by the initial failure to follow prescribed statutory procedures. As we view the case, however, we conclude that the ramifications of the board's attempt to terminate the plaintiff's contract in June are significantly different from those which flowed from its attempt to terminate the contract in October. Accordingly, our consideration of the action of the Appellate Court will deal separately with the June termination and the October termination.

I

The Appellate Court made two crucial determinations with respect to the board's initial attempt to terminate the plaintiff's contract in June, 1972. It held, first, that the termination attempt was ineffective because it failed to comport with the procedures mandated by General Statutes § 10-151(b), and second, that the plaintiff was entitled to judicial relief without having exhausted his administrative remedies under General Statutes § 10-151(f) because, in its view, the plaintiff's "statutory appeal rights for wrongful termination did not preclude an action for breach of contract." LaCroix v. Board of Education, supra, 2 Conn.App. 39, 475 A.2d 1110. We disagree in part with the second of these holdings.

The Appellate Court was clearly correct in holding, as had the trial court, that the defendant board had failed to comply with the requirements of § 10-151(b) in its June attempt to terminate the plaintiff's contract of employment. Under that subsection, before a tenured teacher's contract may be terminated, a board of education must: (1) give the teacher written notice that termination of his contract is "under consideration"; (2) provide a written statement of the reasons therefor within five days of a timely written request by the teacher; and (3) provide a hearing, followed by a written decision, within fifteen days of a timely written request by the teacher. The defendant no longer contests the finding of noncompliance arising out of its failure to provide the plaintiff either notice that his termination was under consideration or a hearing within fifteen days of the plaintiff's timely request.

We do not, however, concur with the Appellate Court's broadly stated authorization for bypass of a tenured teacher's administrative remedies under § 10-151(f). The Appellate Court, reading the plaintiff's complaint, as had the trial court, as an action for breach of a contract of employment, determined that such an action would lie regardless of available statutory rights of appeal. In arriving at this conclusion, the Appellate Court relied on our decisions in Cahill v. Board of Education, 187 Conn. 94, 103, 444 A.2d 907 (1982), (Cahill I), and Petrovich v. Board of Education, 189 Conn. 585, 589, 457 A.2d 315 (1983). These cases do not permit a litigant to invoke common law contract remedies in complete disregard of available administrative relief.

In Cahill I, supra, the plaintiff, a tenured teacher, claimed that her assignment following her return from an approved sabbatical violated the terms of her contract. After an extended dispute between the parties, the board of education terminated the plaintiff's employment contract in accordance with the procedures prescribed by § 10-151. The plaintiff did not appeal this termination directly under § 10-151(f), but subsequently brought a separate action alleging breach of contract both in the termination of her contract and in the board's failure to assign her to an appropriate position. Insofar as her law suit challenged her allegedly wrongful termination, we held that she was limited to the statutory appeal process provided by § 10-151(f). In holding, in Cahill I, supra, 187 Conn. 103, 444 A.2d 907 that "[t]o the extent that the complaint alleged a breach of the agreement [by failing to assign her to the proper position], the court had jurisdiction to hear this case," we permitted direct judicial relief only with respect to matters totally outside of the remedial scope of § 10-151.

In Petrovich v. Board of Education, supra, a nontenured teacher brought a breach of contract...