Harwood v. Ardagh Grp.

• Decision Date: 01 June 2022
• Docket Number: 118,947
• Parties: Jerry Neal HARWOOD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. ARDAGH GROUP, Ardagh Glass, Inc., Defendant/Appellee, and Patrick Thom McLaughlan, Defendant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

522 P.3d 473

Jerry Neal HARWOOD, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.ARDAGH GROUP, Ardagh Glass, Inc., Defendant/Appellee,andPatrick Thom McLaughlan, Defendant.

No. 118,947

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Filed June 1, 2022

As Corrected September 19, 2022

John L. Harlan, Sapulpa, Oklahoma, For Plaintiff/Appellant.

Drew A. Lagow, Rhiannon K. Baker, Edmond, Oklahoma, For Defendant/Appellee.

KAUGER, J.:

¶1 We granted certiorari to address the dispositive issue of whether the employee pled a claim for relief because the employer may owe a duty to provide a safer crosswalk for employees parking in the employer designated parking lot and accessing the place of employment by using the crosswalk. We hold that because the employer may have assumed the duty to provide a safer crosswalk for access to an employer designated parking lot, the employee has pled a claim for relief which is legally possible.¹ The trial court's dismissal was premature.

ALLEGED FACTS

¶2 The defendant, Ardagh (Ardagh/employer), employed the plaintiff, Jerry Neal Harwood, (Harwood/employee) at its glass plant in Sapulpa, Oklahoma.² Ardagh provided hourly employees, such as Harwood, two parking lots across the street (a/k/a Oklahoma State Highway 66) from the glass plant to park their vehicles while at work. Ardagh directed employees to use the marked crosswalk between the plant and the parking lots when crossing the street.

¶3 The crosswalk was covered by overhead stop lights which were activated by the employees from either end of the crosswalk. At night, street lights also lined both sides of the street at and near the marked crosswalk. Although the employer did not own, operate, or control the crosswalks, according to the employee, Ardagh knew that:

1) the stop lights and street lights were inoperable 2 or 3 times a year;

2) on the afternoon of July 14, 2016, the lights were inoperable until July 17, 2016;

3) following a power outage on July 14, 2016, the City of Sapulpa placed a four-way metal stop sign in the center of the intersection adjacent to the marked crosswalk;

4) local City of Sapulpa police were occasionally, but not always, present during shift changes when employees were crossing in the crosswalk; and

5) some motor vehicles did not stop for the crosswalk and/or metal four way stop sign.

¶4 On the night of July 16, 2016, while the stop lights and street lights were not working, a motor vehicle, driven by the defendant, Patrick Thom McLaughlan (McLaughlan), hit Harwood while he was leaving his 11:00 p.m. shift. The employee suffered severe injuries, rendering him permanently and totally disabled for the rest of his life, and unable to work again.

¶5 The employee first sought workers compensation benefits from the employer which were denied because the accident occurred after the employee had "clocked out" and left work. Consequently, the injuries did not arise out of the course of employment and thus were not covered by workers' compensation benefits. The denial of workers compensation benefits is not before us in this cause, and the matter has been concluded.³

¶6 On February 8, 2019, the employee filed a lawsuit against Ardagh and the driver who hit him in the District Court of Creek County, Oklahoma. The employee alleged that the driver caused the employee's injuries when he negligently failed to stop at the crosswalk. He also alleged that the employer was a cause of his injuries because the employer negligently failed to ensure adequate lighting and protection for employees crossing the crosswalk.

¶7 On March 5, 2019, the employer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It argued that because it did not own, operate or control the crosswalk, and the employee was not within the course and scope of employment at the time of the accident, Ardagh did not have a duty to make the crosswalk safer. Accordingly, because no duty existed, the employer could not be determined to have been negligent as matter of law, and the employee failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

¶8 On April 8, 2019, the trial court agreed with the employer, and granted the employer's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. However, the trial court also allowed the employee the opportunity to file an amended petition, which the employee did on April 29, 2019.

¶9 In the amended petition, the employee added additional allegations that the employer:

1) instead of providing parking for hourly employees adjacent to the plant, like they did with management, the employer provided hourly employees with two parking lots across a four lane street which it either leased or owned and were surrounded by a chain link fence;

2) the employer instructed the hourly employees to park in the lots and they were forbidden from parking adjacent to the plant;

3) the four lane street was also a four lane state highway and was the most direct route from Sapulpa to Tulsa, thereby making it heavily traveled and a hazard;

4) the transit between the plant and the parking lots was the marked crosswalk;

5) employees were told using the crosswalk was "part of your job" and that it was "the most dangerous part of your job" even if the employees were not "on the clock yet";

6) employees were issued reprimands if they did not use the crosswalk;

7) only plant employees used the crosswalk, as there were no other businesses or homes near it;

8) the employer created a walkway, "cattle chute," in the chainlink fence to the marked crosswalk and another walkway with railings leading from the crosswalk to the plant;

9) even if the street was a public street, the employer's use of the crosswalk was de facto part of its property and constituted a constructive use or occupancy of it;

10) the night before the employee was injured a supervisor placed a set of strobe lights on the four way, temporary, metal stop sign, but took it off at the shift change;

11) the plant manager assisted, and approved of, employees placing another set of strobe lights on the four way stop within two and a half hours after the employee's accident; and

12) the employer represented to employees that it would make the passage across the crosswalk as safe as possible.

¶10 On June 7, 2019, the employer filed a second Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On September 9, 2019, the employer filed a additional Motion to Dismiss, arguing that because the employee's negligence claims arose out of an employment relationship between the employee and the employer, the employee's remedy was limited to the workers' compensation commission.

¶11 On June 29, 2020, the trial court filed an order dismissing the employer from the lawsuit because the employee failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court also found that there was no just reason to delay the entry of a final judgment as to the employer.⁴ The employee appealed, and on April 23, 2021, the Court of Civil Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court. The employee petitioned for certiorari in this Court, and we granted certiorari on January 25, 2022, to address the employer's duty under the facts and circumstances alleged in this cause.

BECAUSE THE EMPLOYER MAY HAVE ASSUMED THE DUTY TO PROVIDE A SAFER CROSSWALK FOR ACCESS TO AN EMPLOYER DESIGNATED PARKING LOT, THE EMPLOYEE PLED A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF IS LEGALLY POSSIBLE. THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL WAS PREMATURE.

¶12 The employer argues that because it does not own or control the crosswalk, it had no duty as a matter of law to make the crosswalk any safer. It insists that the employee's only remedy against the employer is through workers' compensation proceedings which have already been pursued. The employee contends that, irrespective of whether the employee was entitled to workers' compensation benefits, the employer assumed the duty to make the crosswalk safer on the day of the accident, but that duty was breached and a cause of the accident.

A.Standard of Review/Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.

¶13 The trial court dismissed the cause pursuant to the employer's motion to dismiss for the employee's failure to state a claim for negligence against it.⁵ The trial court determined that no claim existed against the employer because any action of the employer toward making the crosswalk safer would be purely gratuitous, and not a "duty." Consequently, at this juncture, the facts have not been determined and are mere allegations.

¶14 An order dismissing a case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is subject to de novo review.⁶ When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must take as true all of the challenged pleading's allegations together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them.⁷ The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the law that governs the claim in litigation, not the underlying facts.⁸

¶15 A pleading must not be dismissed for failure to state a legally cognizable claim unless the allegations indicate beyond any doubt that the litigant can prove no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.⁹ Therefore, the precise issue presented on appeal is whether the facts pled may support a claim for relief.¹⁰ The burden to show the legal insufficiency of the petition is on the party moving for dismissal.¹¹ Motions to dismiss are usually viewed with disfavor under this standard, and the burden of demonstrating a petition's insufficiency is not a light one.¹²

B.The Employer/Employee Relationship Status as it Relates to Premises Liability and/or Workers' Compensation Benefits.

¶16 This cause does not concern the award or denial of Workers' Compensation Benefits. The Workers' Compensation coverage issue has already been decided, and the court determined that because the employee had "clocked out" when he was injured in the crosswalk while crossing the highway, he was not injured "in the course of employment" it must deny coverage....