Hasegawa v. Maui Pineapple Co.

• Decision Date: 09 October 1970
• Docket Number: No. 4936,4936
• Citation: 52 Haw. 327,475 P.2d 679
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Parties: , 19 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 841, 64 Lab.Cas. P 52,468 Robert K. HASEGAWA, Director of Labor and Industrial Relations of the State of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAUI PINEAPPLE CO., Ltd., Defendant-Appellant.

Page 679

475 P.2d 679

52 Haw. 327, 19 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 841,

64 Lab.Cas. P 52,468

Robert K. HASEGAWA, Director of Labor and Industrial Relations of the State of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAUI PINEAPPLE CO., Ltd., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4936.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Oct. 9, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The equal protection guarantee does not prohibit the states from classifying the subjects of legislation.

2. The equal protection of the law requires that the classification of a particular group as a subject for regulation be reasonable in relation to the purpose of the legislation.

3. A party who complains that a statutory classification deprives him of the equal protection of the law has the burden of showing that the challenged classification does not rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.

4. In reviewing the reasonableness of a legislative classification this court must ascertain whether the statutory discrimination is based upon differences that are reasonably related to the purpose of the law.

5. A statute which seeks to increase the compensation paid to jurors and members of public boards and commissions by imposing the economic cost of remuneration on the private employers of these public employees works an invidious class distinction in violation of the equal protection of law, since there is nothing in the position of private employers in society which places them in a relationship to these public institutions different from the relationship of the general public to them.

6. The due process guarantees of the State and Federal Constitutions and article I, section 18 of the Hawaii Constitution prohibit the taking of property for a public use without just compensation.

7. When the taking of money to pay public employees cannot be justified under either the police power or the taxing power of the State, it amounts to a taking of private property for a public use without just compensation.

Robert S. Katz, Honolulu (R. M. Torkildson, Honolulu, with him of the briefs; Moore, Torkildson & Schulze, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Alana W. Lau, Deputy Atty. Gen., State of Hawaii (Bertram T. Kanbara, Atty. Gen., with her on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ.

LEVINSON, Justice.

This case involves the constitutionality, under both the Hawaii and United States Constitutions, of HRS § 388-32 which requires that every employer who employs more than 25 persons

* * * shall pay to each of his employees who serves on a jury or a public board compensation in an amount equal to the eifference between the remuneration the employee receives for such service on a jury or a public board and the wages and any other remuneration he would have received from his employer had he not served on the jury or public board.

The appellant, Maui Pineapple Co., Ltd., having more than 25 persons in its employment, falls within the coverage of this statute. One Tsugio Nouchi, an employee of the appellant and also chairman of the Maui County Liquor Commission, a public board, attended a conference on behalf of the Liquor Commission held in Denver, Colorado during the period from June 3, 1968 to June 7, 1968. Nouchi submitted a claim to Maui Pineapple for $79.20 which he alleged was due to him under HRS § 388-32 as compensation for the services he rendered to the Liquor Commission in Denver during this period. The appellant refused payment and Nouchi assigned his claim to the appellee, the Hawaii Director of Labor and Industrial Relations, who filed the complaint in this action. The trial judge rendered his judgment in favor of the appellee, upholding the constitutionality of the statute. The appellant appeals arguing that the statute (1) violates the equal protection guarantees of the Hawaii and United States Constitutions and (2) results in a taking of private property for public use without just compensation in violation of article I, section 18 of the Hawaii Constitution and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendmant to the United States Constitution. We agree with the appellant's contentions.

I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The guarantee of the equal protection of the laws, found in both the Hawaii and Federal Constitutions, was not intended to interfere with the power of the State to prescribe regulatios to promote the general welfare of the people. Nor was it intended that the demand for equal protection require that all laws apply universally to all persons and that they never classify when imposing special burdens upon or granting special benefits to distinct groups. ¹ It has been recognized that a state cannot function without classifying its citizens for various purposes and treating some differently from others. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31, 5 S.Ct. 357, 28 L.Ed. 923 (1885); State v. Johnston, 51 Haw. 195, 202-203, 456 P.2d 805, 810 (1969). However, in exercising this right to classify in order to achieve social goals the legislature may not act arbitrarily; that is, the classification of a particular group as a subject for egulation must be reasonable in relation to the purpose of the legislation. As the Supreme Court stated in Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527, 79 S.Ct. 437, 441, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959):

(T)here is a point beyond which the State cannot go without violating the Equal Protection Clause. The State must proced upon a rational basis and may not resort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary. The rule often has been stated to be that the classification 'must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.'

Thus, one who questions the constitutionality of a statute on equal protection grounds has the burden of showing, with convincing clarity, that the challenged classification does not 'rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' In ascertaining whether this burden has been met it is necessary for this court to follow a two-step procedure. First, we must ascertain the purpose or objective that the State sought to achieve in enacting HRS § 388-32. Second, we must examine the means chosen to accomplish that purpose, to determine whether the means bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose. ²

A. The Legislative Purpose to be Achieved in Enacting HRS § 388-32.

The legislative history of HRS § 388-32 indicates that the leigslature was motivated toward two goals in passing the statute. First, there was a finding that the compensation paid by the State for service on juries and public boards and commissions was insufficient to prevent economic hardship falling on those workers who did not continue to receive wages from their private employers when called for public service. HRS § 382-32, it was felt, would eliminate this economic hardship by requiring employers to pay their employees any wages they may have lost as a result of service on a jury or a public board or commission. ³ Also in addition to preventing economic hardship it was hoped that HRS § 382-32 would encourage greater participation in civic affairs on the part of wage earners. ⁴

Increasing the divic responsibility of citizens and ensuring that those who serve their community do not suffer economic deprivation are undoubtedly goals which serve a high and benevolent purpose under our representative form of government. It is not the role of this court to debate the wisdom of these policies. ⁵ However, it is the duty of this court to see that the legislature does not seek to achieve noble ends by unconstitutionally arbitrary means. The statutory discrimination must be based upon differences that are reasonably related to the purpose of the law. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485 (1957). Specifically, in the case at land, we must ask what is the 'ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object' of this legislation which justifies the legislature in imposing on private employers this special burden of compensation? Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers,supra 358 U.S. at 527, 79 S.Ct. 437.

B. The Rational Relationship of the Statutory Classification to the Achievement of the Legislative Purpose.

Appellant advances compelling reasons in support of its constitutional challenge to this statute. It argues that the functions performed by the jury system and public regulatory boards flow to the benefit of all of society and that neither it nor the class it represents receives any special benefit from these institutions. Absent a special benefit to this class of private employers, it contends, there is nothing in the nature of the employment relationship that would reasonably justify the legislature's decision to place on private employers the obligation to pay their employees for services and time they furnish to the State's public commissions and juries. Appellee, in justifying the law as a proper exercise of the State's police power, relies principally on the Supreme Court decision in Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 72 S.Ct. 405, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952), which upheld the constitutionality of a Missouri statute making it a misdemeanor for any employer to deduct wages from an employee who absented himself from his place of employment to vote. However, we do not find that this case resolves the compelling equal protection problems raised by the appellant.

In the Day-Brite case the Missouri legislature had determined that employers as a class were using their power over their employees' wages to coerce them to vote as they directed. Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, supra at 421, 72 S.Ct. 405. In order to remedy this evil the statute prohibited employers from deducting wages while their employees absented themselves from work to vote. ...