Haskell v. Boston Dist. Messenger Co.
| Decision Date | 04 January 1906 |
| Parties | HASKELL v. BOSTON DIST. MESSENGER CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
William A. Abbott and John E. Abbott, for plaintiff.
Roger F. Sturgis, for defendant.
The defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of New Hampshire for the purpose of 'carrying on a general messenger business, leasing, operating, erecting, and maintaining wires and fixtures for call boxes, telegraphs and other things relating to and useful in the receiving and transmitting and delivery of messages.' For many years it has had a general office and branch offices in the city of Boston, and has been engaged in the business of furnishing messengers for hire. The ordinary method of doing the business has been for the company to send a messenger in response to a call, and to sent with him a printed slip, with blank spaces for filling in the 'time started,' 'name,' 'address,' 'messenger occupied' (time), 'expenses' (paid), 'total,' 'messenger detained' (minutes), 'by' (name of person employing messenger). There were other blanks to be filled, to show where the messenger was sent, by whom the message was received, where the answer was delivered, and by whom it was received. An advertising pamphlet, issued by the defendant, gave the rates of charges for a messenger between specified points in all parts of Boston, and also rates by the hour. At the bottom of one of its pages was a printed statement: 'We employ bright, intelligent boys, who are thoroughly experienced in messenger work.' The rates stated are all without reference to the nature or importance of the work in which the particular messenger may be employed. The pamphlet contained numerous other advertising statements, all of which implied that the business done by the company was only in furnishing messengers for the service of others, except that at the bottom of one page there was this statement: It also appeared that for several years, shortly before Christmas, the defendant had distributed a card, saying that it made a specialty of delivering Christmas presents. In carrying on its business, the defendant employed boys 15 or 16 years of age. The plaintiff signaled to the defendant for a messenger by means of a call box, and delivered to the messenger, sent in response to his call, a receipted bill for rent, amounting to $58.33, and sent him to a tenant to collect it. The messenger collected the money and failed to return it. The question is whether there was any evidence at the trial which would warrant the jury in finding for the plaintiff for the amount of this money which he seeks to recover.
The plaintiff contends that the defendant acted as a common carrier in receiving the bill and undertaking to bring back the money. We find nothing in the evidence tending to show this. It undertook to furnish messengers to be used by its employers in any way in which messengers could properly be employed. If special and peculiar service was wanted, special arrangements were to be made for it. In the ordinary conduct of its business the defendant did not assume any control of the work in which the messengers were to be employed, and usually had no knowledge of it until after it was completed. Even then it had no knowledge of the nature of the message delivered, or the particulars of the service. The employer was left to direct the...
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