Haskell v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S.

Decision Date20 May 1902
Citation181 Mass. 341,63 N.E. 899
PartiesHASKELL v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF UNITED STATES.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

Frederic F. Haskell, pro se.

Geo. R Nutter, Jos. Warren, and Brandeis, Dunbar & Nutter, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

The defendant's demurrer to the declaration rests on two grounds: First, that it does not appear from the declaration that the policy has a cash surrender value; and, secondly that there is no averment that the beneficiary in the policy has ceased to have an interest in it, or has agreed to surrender it. The contract does not, in terms, give the policy a surrender value; and, if it has such a value, it is by reason of some statute in reference to which it was made. The contract is to be performed in New York, but the declaration does not state, nor from any of the writings does it plainly appear, where it was made. If it was made in Massachusetts, and is to be governed by the laws of this commonwealth, it has no cash surrender value, because our statutes do not provide for a cash surrender value when the policy is issued by a foreign corporation. The statutes touching this subject relate only to domestic corporations. St. 1887, c. 214, § 76; St. 1894, c. 522, § 76; St. 1900, c. 363,§ 3; Rev. Laws, c. 118, §§ 76-82. If the policy was made in New York, and is governed by the laws of that state, there is no averment that there are any laws which give such a policy a cash surrender value. If there are such laws, they should be stated as facts. In the declaration there is an averment that the 'said policy was an asset it having at the time a cash surrender value of six hundred and ninety-two dollars and fifty cents.' But this is in the nature of a conclusion of law which the facts set out in the declaration do not warrant, and if, in any sense, it can be called a statement of fact, it is a statement of a deduction of fact from primary facts which are not stated, and which on demurrer are necessary to be stated as a foundation for an action. Everett v. Drew, 129 Mass. 150; Hollis v. Richardson, 13 Gray, 392.

A policy of life insurance for the benefit of a third person named therein cannot be surrendered without the consent of the beneficiary. Gould v. Emerson, 99 Mass. 154, 96 Am. Dec. 720; Pingrey v. Insurance Co., 144 Mass. 374, 11 N.E. 562; Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195, 9 S.Ct. 41, 32 L.Ed. 370; Rev. Laws, c. 118, § 76.

By the terms of the policy, if the assured died within 20 years from its date the company was to pay the amount of the policy to his mother, if living, or, if she were dead, to his estate. At the expiration of 20 years, if he survived so long, they were to...

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