Haskell v. Hastings
| Decision Date | 08 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO: CV-D9-689 |
| Parties | MICHAEL J. HASKELL, JOSEPH M. BROWN, and SEBAGO GRAVEL PIT, LLC Plaintiffs, v. ANN E. HASTINGS and THE ANN E. HASTINGS LAW OFFICE, P.A. Defendants |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Plaintiffs Michael J. Haskell, Joseph M. Brown, and Sebago Gravel Pit, LLC filed this action against defendants Ann E. Hastings and the Ann E. Hastings Law Office, P.A., to recover for professional negligence, breaches of fiduciary duty, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendants argue that the six-year statute of limitations bars all claims arising from acts or omissions occurring prior to December 30, 2003.
Plaintiffs Michael J. Haskell, Joseph M. Brown, and Sebago Gravel Pit, LLC own property on the western shore of Lake Sebago. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 1-4.) They had operated the land as a gravel pit, but the land is now unproductive because the plaintiffs have no legal way to access the property from the public road due to the alleged negligence of defendants Ann E. Hastings and the Ann E. Hastings Law Office, P.A. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 1.) A gap of 48.41 feet currently lies between the plaintiffs' property and Route 114, occupied by a pond and thesubmerged land of Arthur C. and Emma L. Shute. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 60.) The Shutes also hold flowage mill rights to the high-water mark of the pond and the Northwest River that feeds it. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 59.)
In 1960 Harold and Muriel Butler, the plaintiffs' predecessors in interest, owned the plaintiffs' land. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 12.) The Butlers were bounded on the north by the property of Byron Pride, and to the west by the property of Lewis Lumber Co. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 10, 12.) In 1960 the Shutes purchased Lewis Lumber Co.'s land together with certain pond lots, mill buildings, a mill dam, mill privileges, and all rights to the pond and the Northwest River. (Pl.'s Compl.
10-11.) In 1968, Arthur and Anita Crowe purchased the land of Byron Pride, excepting a twelve-foot right-of-way in favor of the Butlers to be held by them "appurtenant to their said land." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 12.)
In that same year, 1968, the State of Maine took over 4.4 acres of the Shutes' land to construct the current Route 114. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 13.) The taking diagonally bisected the Shutes' land from the southwest to the northeast, and was depicted on a map recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 13.) In 1969 the Legislature passed a resolution granting the Shutes flowage rights adjacent to their mill privilege, recognizing that the Shutes intended to reconstruct an old dam and flood their land to the elevation of 299 feet, and granting them flowage privileges over part of the highway right-of-way to facilitate their goal. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 14.) After the taking and resolution, the Shutes owned land and flowage rights between the Route 114 right-of-way and the property of Harold and Muriel Butler. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 15.)
The plaintiffs purchased the Butlers' land in June of 1998. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 17.) Defendant Hastings, who had begun handling the plaintiffs' legal work inthe early 1990s, represented the plaintiffs in this purchase and performed the necessary title work. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.) The plaintiffs began to operate a gravel pit on the property, using an entry road that passed over Mr. Crowe's property to access Route 114. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 18.) Mr. Crowe quickly contacted Ms. Hastings to accuse the plaintiffs of trespassing and provide notice of a boundary dispute. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 19.)
In October 1999 Mr. Crowe's attorney informed Ms. Hastings that the plaintiffs did not have a deeded right-of-way. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 20.) On November 9, 1999, Ms. Hastings responded with a letter asserting that a right-of-way had been reserved and that even without a deed the plaintiffs had established a right-of-way by "usage." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 21A-B.) She proposed a twelve-month standstill agreement so that she and the plaintiffs could explore alternative means of accessing the property. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 21B.) She also referred to the Maine Highway Commission's map of its takings, recorded in 1968, which depicts a right-of-way in the plaintiffs over Mr. Crowe's land. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 21C.) The map also depicts the Shutes' interest in the area around Route 114-.1 (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 21C.)
In 1999 Mr. Crowe filed suit against the plaintiffs, whom Ms. Hastings continued to represent. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 22-23.) Surveys performed during the course of discovery indicated that the precise boundaries of the plaintiffs' property were impossible to define accurately, but also noted the Shutes' mill privilege encumbering the banks of the pond and river. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 31, Ex. K at 7-8, 11, 13, 17.) The parties ultimately reached a settlement whereby Mr.Crowe would give the plaintiffs a triangular piece of land that would extend their holdings to the northwest in exchange for a similar piece of land to the southeast. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 33-34.) The plaintiffs understood that this exchange would give them the opportunity to connect their lot to Route 114 by constructing an alternative access road across the pond. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 33.)
On November 22, 2000, Ms. Hastings read the settlement agreement to a court reporter, whereby the plaintiffs would continue to use the existing access for three and one-half years, at which time they would release their claims to that access and begin using an alternative route. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 34.) On December 15, 2000, the Superior Court entered an order by agreement, allegedly prompting Ms. Hastings to tell her clients that "she had gotten them access to Route 114" and '"it's now all on you guys' to get regulatory approval." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 34A.)
She continued to work on executing the settlement, and the parties exchanged documents and dismissed the lawsuit on September 6, 2001. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 38.) These documents included a licensing agreement recorded on September 5, 2001, giving the plaintiffs access over Mr. Crowe's road until the earlier of May 17, 2004 or the establishment of an alternative access route. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 39.) The plaintiffs allege that Ms. Hastings specifically advised them that they would have "all right title and interest in the property to access Route 114 over the flood plain known as Mill Pond" and led them to believe "that they would have title to the land under Mill Pond." (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 40.)
Ms. Hastings continued to represent the plaintiffs in other matters following the settlement with Mr. Crowe. (Pi's Compl. ¶ 43.) In 2003 the plaintiffs began to proceed with the planning and engineering of the new access they intended to construct across the pond to Route 114. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 44.) Ms. Hastings began to perform legal work related to the road in 2004, and by March 2004 the plaintiffs had received the required permits from the Maine Department of Transportation and the Department of Environmental Protection. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 45-46.) The plaintiffs continued to expend funds on planning and permitting until September 20, 2004, when the Shutes wrote to the Department of Environmental Protection to object to the road and assert their mill privilege and flowage rights. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 49-51.)
The plaintiffs brought an action against the Shutes in October 2004, having no recourse against Mr. Crowe following the earlier settlement.2 (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 52, 60.) Ms. Hastings continued to work on the access issue as well as other legal matters through 2005 and into 2006. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 65-66.) She was unable to resolve the issue of access, however, and the Sebago Planning Board indicated that the plaintiffs lacked standing to apply for site plan review of the proposed access road because they had no authority to build across the pond. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 60-64.)
In May 2006 Ms. Hastings suggested that the plaintiffs employ another attorney to represent them in matters related to the landlocked property. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 68-69.) She introduced the plaintiffs to Attorney James Levis and began to consult with him on ways to challenge Mr. Crowe or the Shutes. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 67-72.) This collaboration continued until approximately September 28, 2006, around which time plaintiff Brown expressed his displeasure with Ms. Hastings's representation and apparently terminated their relationship. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 72.) Ms. Hastings never informed the plaintiffs that they might have a claim against her for malpractice. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 88.)
On December 31, 2009, the plaintiffs filed their complaint against Ms. Hastings and her law office alleging professional negligence, breaches of fiduciary duty, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from her work on the Sebago property and the 2001 settlement with Mr. Crowe. The defendants answered on February 18, 2010, and filed this partial motion to dismiss on April 20, 2010.3 Ms. Hastings contends that any of the plaintiffs' claims based on acts or omissions prior to December 30, 2003, are barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice.4 14 M.R.S. §§ 752, 753-B (2009). This would include all claims arising from the litigation with Mr. Crowe and the negotiation of the 2001 settlement agreement.
On a motion to dismiss, the court examines "the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Heber v. Lucerne-in-Maine Village Corp., 2000 ME 137, ¶ 7, 755 A.2d 1064, 1066 (quoting McAfee v. Cole, 637 A.2d 463, 465 (Me. 1994)). Maine imposes a six-year statute of limitations on actions for legal malpractice. 14 M.R.S. § 752. In 1986 the Legislature clarified that the limitations period "starts to run from the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury, not from the discovery of the...
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