Haskell v. Starbird
| Decision Date | 30 June 1890 |
| Citation | 152 Mass. 117,25 N.E. 14 |
| Parties | HASKELL v. STARBIRD. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Exceptions from superior court, Middlesex county LINCOLN F. BRIGHAM, Judge.
C Cowley, for plaintiff.
J.N Marshall, M.L. Homblet, and J.C. Burke, for defendant.
There was evidence that the purchase of the tract of land in Canada, in which purchase the plaintiff alleged himself to have been deceived, was made through one Rockwell, who acted as the agent for the defendant, and that plaintiff was deceived by the representations made by Rockwell that it was of the value of $1,200, contained a large amount of timber, and was adjacent to a flourishing village, which representations were false. There was also evidence that Rockwell made these representations as the agent of defendant. Rockwell also testified that defendant made these representations to him; that he therefore made them to Haskell; and that, before the conveyance was made, he informed the defendant that he had so made them. While the statement as to the value of land might be treated as an expression of opinion, only, those in reference to the locality of the land, and the amount of timber on it, were statements of fact, of importance to any one proposing to purchase it; nor does the land appear to have been readily accessible, so that the accuracy of them could have been tested by the plaintiff. The defendant offered evidence that, at the time the conveyance was made by him, he informed the plaintiff that he had never seen the land, knew nothing about it except what he had been informed, etc. He requested the court to instruct the jury as follows: "If the jury shall find that Rockwell was the agent of the defendant in selling the land in question, and that, as such agent, he made the misrepresentations relied on, and that after the same were made, and at the time, but before the deed of this land was delivered, the defendant, in answer to inquiry made of him by the plaintiff, replied that he had never seen the land, and knew nothing about it except what had been told him, and the plaintiff, without further inquiry, accepted the deed, and paid the consideration agreed on, he cannot recover." This instruction should not have been given. It was an instruction on only a part of the evidence, and omitted entirely any consideration of the important testimony of Rockwell that he made the false representations acting as defendant's agent and upon his express authority, and also that the fact that they had been made was communicated to the defendant before the transaction was closed by the payment of the $600, and the making of the conveyance. Even if the testimony of Rockwell was denied by defendant, and controverted by other evidence, the instruction asked, if adopted, would have led the jury to infer that it was unimportant for them to consider this evidence, and that the mere fact that the defendant made the remarks testified to by him at the time of passing the deed would prevent the plaintiff from recovering, while it might be, also, that the plaintiff, in completing the transaction, depended upon the false and fraudulent representations of defendant's agent, made at defendant's own instance. The contention of the defendant is that, the plaintiff having been put upon his guard by this conversation, he was affected by all the knowledge which he might have obtained if he had inquired further, and elsewhere. But the defendant did not in the conversation, in any way, repudiate the representations of Rockwell, assuming them to have been made, or put the plaintiff on inquiry as to the correctness of them. On the contrary, the natural inference would be that the defendant adopted them, although he disclaimed personal knowledge. If it is true that these statements of Rockwell had been falsely and fraudulently made, and especially if made on the authority of defendant himself, and if they had induced the plaintiff to make the purchase, the defendant cannot extricate himself from responsibility therefor by such a disclaimer.
Upon the second request for a ruling, which was, in substance that, even if Rockwell was the agent of defendant to sell, the plaintiff could not recover unless it was proved that the defendant was privy to or adopted the misrepresentations relied on, the instruction of the court made the defendant responsible for the false and fraudulent representations as to the land made by Rockwell, if Rockwell was employed by defendant to sell the land as his agent, notwithstanding Rockwell was not authorized to make them, and notwithstanding ...
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