Haskett v. Unsell

• Decision Date: 03 March 1914
• Citation: 164 S.W. 651,181 Mo. App. 480
• Parties: HASKETT et al. v. UNSELL.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

164 S.W. 651

181 Mo. App. 480

HASKETT et al. v. UNSELL.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

March 3, 1914.

1. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 136)—CONTRACT WITH AGENT — UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL — TIMELY DISCLOSURE.

Where defendant contracted with plaintiff's for certain plastering, without disclosing an alleged agency for the owner of the property until nearly all the work had been done, the disclosure was not in sufficient time to relieve defendant from individual liability.

2. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 190)—ACTION AGAINST AGENT—EVIDENCE—RELEVANCY.

Where a defendant claimed freedom from liability for certain plastering under a contract with plaintiff, on the ground that defendant was only acting for the owner of the property, and that defendant's agency for such owner was disclosed by defendant's representative prior to the making of the contract, plaintiff having testified to his version of the conversation between himself and such representative, defendant was entitled to have the latter give his version of the conversation and show, if possible, that in such conversation plaintiff was notified that defendant was acting for the owner.

3. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 194)—UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL—LIABILITY OF AGENT— INSTRUCTIONS.

In an action for the price of certain plastering performed by plaintiffs under contract with defendant, who subsequently claimed he was only acting as agent for the owner of the premises, an instruction that the jury should find for plaintiffs against defendant, unless they believed that the owner authorized defendant to employ plaintiffs to do the work on his account, and that plaintiffs accepted such employment and agreed to do the work on the account of the owner and to charge him instead of defendant, was erroneous, since it was only necessary to make good his defense that defendant prove that, acting in good faith, he disclosed the name of his principal, and that he was acting for the principal in the premises.

4. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (§ 136)—UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL—LIABILITY OF AGENT.

Where plaintiffs did certain work under an agreement with defendant, who repudiated liability, on the ground that he was acting as agent for another, it was not essential, to establish such defense, that defendant prove a specific agreement that the work should be done on the account of the alleged principal, but it was enough that plaintiff's undertook to do the work at defendant's request, after being fully advised that defendant was acting for his alleged principal, and was, in fact, clothed with authority.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Pike County; B. H. Dyer, Judge.

Action by Forest Haskett and another, doing business as Haskett & Terry, against J. B. Unsell. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Pearson & Pearson, of Louisiana, Mo., for appellant. J. E. Pew and R. A. May, both of Louisiana, Mo., for respondents.

ALLEN, J.

This is an action for services performed by the plaintiffs, and for materials furnished, in plastering a laundry room in the city of Louisiana, Mo. The cause originated before a justice of the peace, and found its way by appeal to the circuit court, where plaintiffs had judgment, and the defendant appeals.

At the time when plaintiffs did the work in question, the defendant, Dr. Unsell, was conducting a laundry business in a building owned by one Pratt, as a tenant of the latter. There is no dispute as to the character of the work done by plaintiffs, nor as to the amount of their bill; but the controversy pertains to defendant's personal liability therefor, and turns upon whether defendant, in contracting with plaintiffs, bound himself, or whether he acted as the authorized agent of a disclosed principal, viz., Pratt, and bound the latter only.

Plaintiff Haskett made the contract with defendant for doing the work in question, and he testified that defendant's foreman, one Milt. Holmes, "came by" the courthouse in Louisiana, where Haskett was working, and told him that defendant had some plastering to be done at the latter's laundry; that thereupon he (Haskett) went to see defendant, who showed him what work was to be done, and that he made defendant a price thereupon; that shortly thereafter the agreement between this plaintiff and the defendant was made for doing the work, at the price per yard mentioned in plaintiff's account. He further testified that on a certain Friday, one week after making the contract, the work was begun; that nothing was said to him to the effect that defendant was contracting in any manner otherwise than on his own behalf until the next day, Saturday, at noon, when this plaintiff gave an order on defendant to pay the wages of an employé who was quitting plaintiffs' services; that defendant refused to pay anything upon the order, and that, when the witness saw defendant some two hours later, the latter told him that he would have to look to Pratt for his money; that Pratt was paymaster. And Haskett, who had charge of the matter for himself and his copartner, asserts that this was the first time that Pratt's name was mentioned to him in connection therewith.

On cross-examination of this witness, counsel for defendant asked him what defendant's foreman, Milt. Holmes, had said to him in the conversation to which the witness had previously referred, and the witness said that Holmes told him: "That Dr. Unsell was going to plaster up there," and that this was all that Holmes had said. The witness was further asked by defendant's counsel if Holmes did not, in that conversation, tell him that Mr. Pratt had said to get one John Ross, but that the latter could not do the work, or had gone away. This question was objected to as being immaterial, and the objection was sustained, defendant excepting.

On behalf of plaintiff's, it was further shown that, by noon of the Saturday when the conversation is said to have taken place between Haskett and defendant, the plastering had been completed, with the exception of the finishing, i. e.,...