Haskins v. D'Este
| Decision Date | 07 September 1882 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | Joseph W. Haskins v. Julian D'Este & another |
Suffolk.
Exceptions sustained.
B. E Perry & S.W. Creech, Jr., for the plaintiff.
P. H Hutchinson, for the defendant.
The St. of 1877, c. 163, provides that "any signature to a written instrument declared on or set forth as a cause of action or ground of defence or set-off, in an action at law, shall be taken as admitted, unless the party sought to be charged thereby shall file in court, within the time allowed for answer, a special denial of the genuineness of such signature and a demand that the party relying thereon shall prove the same at the trial."
The two defendants were sued in a writ which describes them as "late copartners under the firm name and style of D'Este & Co.," and the declaration alleges that they made a promissory note signed "D'Este & Co." One of the defendants, McKenzie, did not appear; the other, D'Este, appeared and filed a general denial. The question is, whether the signature is to be taken as admitted to bind D'Este, or whether it is only admitted as the signature of a copartnership of D'Este & Co., and the plaintiff, to hold D'Este, must prove that he was a member of the firm whose signature he admits. The question is precisely what it would have been if both defendants had appeared and filed a general denial in answer. The admission is the same, as to those making it, whether made by both defendants together, or separately, or by one alone.
A partnership is not a person distinct from its members, like a corporation. A partnership cannot be sued; a suit must be against the individuals composing it, and each individual stands, as to proof of his liability, as if he were sued alone. In either case, his personal liability upon the joint undertaking would have to be made out, and, in either case, the allegation of partnership would but express the relation between the copartners; and the relation of copartners to each other, as affects their liability to third persons, is simply one of agency. The allegation that a number of individuals as members of a copartnership made a contract, is only the allegation that each of them, personally, or by his agent, made it, and the agency is alleged and proved by the copartnership.
In the case at bar, the substantial allegation is that each of the defendants made a joint note in the name of D'Este & Co., that is, that each of them signed that name to the note. The allegation of copartnership amounts only to a statement that each of the defendants...
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Lockwood v. Twitchell
...“GEO. W. TWITCHELL” and “JOHN ELIOT;” and John Eliot stands, “as to proof of his liability, as if he were sued alone.” Haskins v. D'Este, 133 Mass. 356. It is also immaterial, upon this question of the liability of Eliot, that the money was raised by the real plaintiff for the private uses ......
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Lockwood v. Twitchell
... ... W. TWITCHELL" and "JOHN ELIOT;" and John Eliot ... stands, "as to proof of his liability, as if he were ... sued alone." Haskins v. D'Este, 133 Mass ... 356. It is also immaterial, upon this question of the ... liability of Eliot, that the money was raised by the real ... ...
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Graustein v. Boston & M.R.R.
...Compare Ostrom v. Jocobs, 9 Metc. 454, 457;Patch v. Wheatland, 8 Allen 102. The partnership is not being sued, compare Haskins v. D'Este, 133 Mass. 356; neither are the questions of the authority to attach the seal or of its materiality before us on this record. Compare Alfano v. Donnelly, ......
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Munro v. Huber
...for their individual names; the firm names bound them because they had adopted such names as the equivalent of their own names. Haskins v. D'Este, 133 Mass. 356. They would have been stockholders of record if they had seen fit to register themselves as John Doe. The problem that faced the r......