Haslam v. Morrison
Citation | 113 Utah 14,190 P.2d 520 |
Decision Date | 05 March 1948 |
Docket Number | 7019 |
Court | Supreme Court of Utah |
Parties | HASLAM v. MORRISON, District Judge |
Petition By Henry M Haslam Against Honorable Marriner M Morrison Judge of The District Court of Cache County, For Writ of Mandate Directing Respondent To Grant Petitioner's Motion, In An Action For False Imprisonment In Which Petitioner Was Plaintiff, That Another District Judge, Not Disqualified, Be Called In To Try Cause
Alternative writ recalled, and peremptory writ denied.
Leon Fonnesbeck, of Logan, for plaintiff.
Grover A. Giles, Atty. Gen., and Zar E. Hayes and Calvin L. Rampton, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant.
Original alternative writ of mandamus issued out of this court.
that petitioner's wife was an indispensable witness and refused to come and testify at the trial if it were tried before respondent judge. Petitioner then alleged that respondent judge ignored the affidavit; that thereafter petitioner filed a motion that another district judge, not disqualified, be called in to try the case, and that counsel for defendants did not resist the motion; and that the motion was denied. Petitioner then alleged that he had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and prayed that an alternative writ of mandate be issued, directing respondent to grant petitioner's motion that another district judge, not disqualified, be called in to try the cause.
Pursuant to petitioner's application, an alternative writ issued as prayed for, with a return date of December 31, 1946.
On December 30, 1946, respondent filed a general demurrer to the application for a writ of mandate.
A number of procedural questions have been raised or suggested in the briefs of respective counsel. A determination of those questions could not affect the result of this case, and since the circumstances under which these questions arose are not apt to recur, we think no useful purpose could be subserved by entering into a discussion of them. We proceed directly, therefore, to consideration of the substantive issues upon which this case must be determined.
Three main questions are raised by this proceeding:
(1) Is actual bias and prejudice on the part of a judge a ground for disqualification?
(2) Assuming an affirmative answer to the first question, does the mere filing of an affidavit of bias and prejudice disqualify a judge?
(3) Where an affidavit of bias and prejudice is filed, should this court, by writ of mandate, compel the trial judge to disqualify himself?
The questions will be considered in the order stated.
The only grounds of disqualification of a judge expressly provided by our Constitution and statutes are:
(1) Connection with either of the parties by consanguinity or affinity within the degree of first cousin.
(2) Having been attorney or counsel for either party.
(3) Having presided at the trial of the same cause in any inferior court.
(4) Being a party to, or interested in, the suit. Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Sec. 13, and Sec. 20-6-1, U. C. A. 1943.
It was held in Re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 86, 269 P. 103, 127, that the section of the Constitution above cited did not define nor prescribe the term "disqualification." In the recent case of Musser v. Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 106 Utah 373, 148 P. 2d 802, we held that a motion, supported by affidavits, seeking to disqualify a trial judge under this section on the ground of bias and prejudice was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, he to determine it the same as any other matter which came before him. The implied holding of the Musser case is that actual bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge for or against any litigant will disqualify him, but the existence of bias and prejudice is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the judge against whom the affidavit is filed. We reaffirm that.
It may be noted here, parenthetically, that the decision in the Musser case was based partially on Section 20-4-30, U. C. A. 1943, providing for change of judge in the discretion of the court, in case of bias and prejudice. That statute is applicable to city courts only, and hence was not controlling in the Musser case. But although the statute relied upon did not support the decision, the rule there laid down was correct and is reaffirmed here. Actual bias and prejudice on the part of a judge disqualifies him.
Turning now to the second question: It has been held that an affidavit stating that the resident judge was biased and prejudiced does not show disqualification. Cox v. Dixie Power Co., 72 Utah 236, 269 P. 1000. And as heretofore noted, it was held in the Musser case that a motion to call in another judge, supported by affidavits of bias and prejudice, raises a question to be determined by the trial court the same as any other matter coming before him. The mere filing of an affidavit of bias and prejudice does not ipso facto disqualify a judge. He is disqualified only if he is actually biased and prejudiced and that is a matter to be determined by him in the first instance, subject, of course, to review by this court on appeal.
Bias and prejudice mean a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism toward one. The fact that a judge may have an opinion as to the merits of the cause or that he has strong feelings about the type of litigation involved, does not make him biased or prejudiced. For example, a judge with strong feelings about the use of liquor or violation of the liquor laws, is not biased against a defendant charged with a violation of the liquor laws, unless he has some active personal hostility toward the defendant. See State ex rel. Nowakowski v. Lockridge, 6 Okl. Cr. 216, 118 P. 152, 45 L.R.A., N.S., 525, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 251; Fulton v. Longshore, 156 Ala. 611, 46 So. 989, 19 L.R.A., N.S., 602; Hudspeth v. State, 188 Ark. 323, 67 S.W.2d 191; Rush v. Denhardt, 138 Ky. 238, 127 S.W. 785, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1199.
The general practice in this jurisdiction has been for judges to disqualify themselves whenever an affidavit of bias and prejudice against them has been filed. As a general rule, we think this as a commendable practice. The purity and integrity of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts. This is not to say that the mere filing of an affidavit of bias and prejudice, ipso facto casts such suspicion on the judge, and upon his integrity and fairness, that he ought to disqualify himself. However, it is ordinarily better for a judge to disqualify himself even though he may be entirely free of bias and prejudice if either litigant files an affidavit of bias and prejudice.
"Next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness or integrity of the judge."
Crook v. Newberg & Son, 124 Ala. 479, 27 So. 432, 433, 82 Am. St. Rep. 190; 30 Am. Jur. 767, Judges, Sec. 53.
Moreover, if the judge concludes that the affiant is sincere in his belief that he, the judge is biased against him, it ordinarily is well for such judge not to try the case for the very reason that he may unconsciously lean toward such litigant to demonstrate that he is not biased toward him. And unless the judge is entirely insensitive to criticism and a revealed state of a litigant's mind, he may be rendering his judgment from a mind not entirely free from emotion.
But where the judge has reason to believe that the affidavit is not filed in good faith, and that an attempt is being made to drive him from the bench for purposes of delay or other ulterior or improper motives, then it is the judge's duty to hear and determine the matter, even though it may entail considerable personal embarrassment. See ...
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